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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Supreme Court Docket No. 
40793-2013 
STEVEN CUMMINGS 
Plaintiff/Aee!llanU Cross Rese 
vs. LAW ut: K 
ROGER L. STEPHENS, et al 
Defendanl/RespondenVCross-
DAVIDC. NYE District Judge 
Appealed from the Dlstnct Court of the SIXTH 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for 
BEAR LAKE County. 
-
Nathan M. Olsen, 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Respondent 
Brad Beamson, 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent/Cron-Appellant 
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B. CUMMINGS, an individual 
residing in Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant/Cross-Respondent, 
vs. 
ROGER L STEPHENS, an individual 
residing in Providence, Utah; 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Respondent, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
and ) 
NORTHERN TITLE COMPANY OF IDAHO, INC.,) 
an Idaho Corporation; ) 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant. ) 
NO. 
Supreme 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
No. 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Jndicial District of the State of 
the County of Bear 
HONORABLE DA YID C. NYE 
Sixth District Judge 
NA THAN M. OLSEN 
Peterson Moss Hall & Olsen 
485 "E" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Attorney for Steven Cummings, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant/Cross-Respondent, 
RANDALL C. BUDGE 
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204- I 391 
Attorney for Roger Stephens, 
Defendant/Respondent 
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BRAD H. BEARNSON 
Bearnson & Caldwell, LLC 
399 North Main, Suite 270 
Logan, UT 84321 
Attorney for Northern Title of Idaho, 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant 
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DISTRICT COURT SIXTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BEAR LAKE COUNTY IUAIIO 
STEVEN CUMMINGS, an individual 
residing in Montana 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROGER L STEPHENS, an individual 
residing in Providence, Utah, JOHN 
Defendants. 
' COMPLAINT 
The plaintiff, by and through counsel record, alleges and 
defendants as follows: 
PAHTIES 
A: 
1. Plaintiff, Steven Cummings ("Cummings") is a resident of State of 
Montana. 
IS a Utah 
jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to Jdaho Code § 
5 
I 
4. matter as a or 
Lake County, Idaho. 
6. On or about August 3, 2007 the Plaintiff purchased the ranch 
(hereinafter "Stephens Ranch") from the Defendant. Stephens Ranch is located in Bear 
County, Idaho. 1be Plaintiff purchased Stephens Ranch from the Defendant for the 
purchase price of $800,000. 
7. At the time of the purchase of Stephens Ranch the Defendant a 
deed in favor of the Plaintiff which transferred portions 
to the Plaintiff The warranty was recorded Bear Lake County on 
A true and correct warranty deed is attached as Exhibit A. 
8. In 
that 
2007, Plaintiff a 
were made to Warranty Deed on 
Stephens did not on 
2007. 
9. Plaintiff researched the issue and learned that on November 8, 2007, Stephens 
another deed. The two the revised deed were the same as 
original, including the signatures and notarization. The third was the 
same except that the sentence following the first paragraph was crossed out and the 
statement: "THE FOLLOWING PARCELS ARE CONVEYED EXCEPTING 
THEREFROM PORTION L Y1NG HIGHWAY was 
placed at the top of the page. 
10. Defendants John Doe I-X are unknown persons or entities who 
the 8, 
t 
11 . Plaintiff realleges 1 through 9 by 
a Warranty on 
transferred real property to the Plaintiff for consideration. 
13. grantor, Stephens warranted the title to property that was to 
Plaintiff. 
14. Included in the made by Stephens was the covenant of seisin, the 
covenant of right to the covenant the covemmt 
and the quiet of further assurances. 
15. Defendant covenants to the Plaintiff in 
when altered a and disturbed 
Ranch. 
16. Plaintiff as a result of Defendant's actions in an amount 
to at triaL 
II Conversion 
17. Plaintiff 1 through 16 by reference. 
18. Plaintiff purchased the property described in the August 3, 
from the Defendant. 
warranty deed 
19. Stephens and John I-X executed another warranty deed on November 11, 
2007, which transferred approximately 83 acres away from Plaintiff back to Stephens. 
no than acres Plaintiff a to 
so. 
an amount to 
I 
. Plaintiff is 
Plaintiffs 
regard to 
complaint as additional 
at 
Plaintiff reserves 
to 
by 
nrrYnPrhf described in the 3, 
and maliciously 
Plaintiff's title to 
in an amount to 
may be additional claims against 
the Stephens Ranch, and reserves 
is learned 
to amend this complaint to 
punitive damages completion of discovery. 
For 
Beard 
of 
Clair 
ATTORNEY FEES 
paragraphs 1 through by reference. 
stated claims, Plaintiff has been 
PA in order to protect his rights. 
30. Plaintiff is entitled to an of attorney m 
Agreement, Idaho 
provision. 
§ ] 20, § 1 121, 1509 and any other 
at 
tenne11s and John 
to this 
a 
to retain 
statute or 
Plaintiff as 
1. Granting judgment Plaintiff and John an 
amount to be proven at trial including out-of-pocket costs and incidental 
2. Granting judgment and relief for Plaintiff and against Stephens in regard to the 
Warranty Deed and recorded Stephens on August 3, 2007. 
3. That the Defendant Stephens be estopped by deed from conveying that portion 
of the Ranch vvrongfully from Plaintiff's to any other and that 
the Court deem the entire ""'"''"'''"'" to Plaintiff 
4. 
120 
and costs incurred in this action pursuant to [daho Code 
l 1, and any other applicable rule or law; 
5. Awarding prejudgment interest at the maximum legal 
6. Granting any other that this Court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO: 
Steven R Cummings 
43 North 100 East 
American Ur 84003 
# 
BEAR LAKE COUNTY 
lll07-08-03 112:57:43 Na. of Pages: :l 
Rscard!ld for : NORTHERN TITLE CO. 
KERRY HADOOCK 
Ex-Officio Recon:lar -~, •.•• ,~~""' 
WARRANTY 
Roger L. And Barbara L Stephens Family 
Trust, Roger L. Stephens and Barbara L. 
Stephens, Trustees 
436 Cobblestone 
Providence, Utah 84332 
Steven B. Cummings 
43 North 100 East 
American Fork, Ut 84003 
FOR GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, 
the Grantor hereby sells and transfers the following of real property to the uuu.1•"''"" 
including the Grantor's right, title and interest 
EXHIBIT "N' AND 
IN CORPORA TED BY 
TOGETHER WITH one hundred (100) shares Montpelier Irrigation and 
hundred (900) shares of water stock in Bennington Irrigation Company. 
WITH all pumps, motors, lines, main line and 
TOGETHER WITH: AND INCLUDING any and all fixtures and any and a1! 
appurtenances, tenements, and hereditaments, and any and all rents, issues, and profits that relate or 
otherwise pertain to the foregoing parcels of real property. 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the +,.,.,,,,.,.""'" parcels of 
successors and assigns forever. 
property unto the Grantee and its 
The Grantor hereby covenants that the Grantor is the owner in fee simple of the foregoing parcels of 
real property; that the foregoing parcels of real property are free and clear of any and all mortgages, 
liens, or other encumbrances, excepting encumbrances of record in the records of Bear Lake County, 
Idaho, current taxes, ordinances and federal and state rights and reservations, including, without 
EXHIBIT 
WARRANTYDEED 1 
199 0 
"~'~""""' .... ~--~-~, oil, gas 
or any other which a correct easements or 
by the public records, use restrictions and building and zoning regi.llations and of any 
governmental unit; and that the Grantors will warrant and defend the same from any and all lawful 
claims whatsoever. 
STATE OF ) 
; SS 
County of ) 
ROGER L. AND BARBARA L. 
FAMilX TRUST 
ROGER L. STEPHENS 
BARBARA L. STEPHENS 
On day 2007, before me, a Notary Public, personally 
appeared Roger L. Stephens Trustees of the Roger L And Barbara L. 
Stephens Family Tmst, known or identified to me to be the persons who executed the Warranty 
and duly acknowledged to me that they executed this Warranty Deed. 
WARRANTY DEED - 2 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR: 
Residing at: '-?? ,r:,71 J4{, 
My Commission Expires: 
199030 
EXHIBIT A 
PARCEL A 
BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER 
OF SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 12 SOUTH, RANGE 44 EAST OF THE BOISE MERIDIAN, BEAR LAKE COUNTY, 
IDAHO, RUNNING THENCE NORTH 80 RODS; THENCE EAST 62.5 RODS; THENCE NORTH 80 RODS; THENCE 
EAST 257.5 RODS, THENCE SOUTH 80 RODS; THENCE WEST 2530 FEET; THENCE SOUT1115° EAST 952 
FEET; THENCE SOUT1175° 30' WEST318 THENCE NORlH 15~ WEST218 FEET; THENCE SOUTH75" 
30' WEST 2764 FEET; THENCE NORTH 164 THE PLACE OF BE.GINNING. 
EXCEPT ALL OF lHAT PORTION OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED LAND LYING EASTERLY OF U.S. HIGHWAY 
30, 
PARCELD 
COMMENCING AT A POINT 11. 16 CHAINS EAST FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHEAST 
QUARTER OF SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 12 SOUTH, RANGE 44 EAST OF THE BOISE MERIDIAN, BEAR LAKE 
COUNTY, IDAHO, RUNNING THENCE EAST 3.90 CHAINS; THENCE SOUTH 13° 45' EAST 8.87 CHAINS; THENCE 
SOUT1175• WEST 44.63 CHAINS; THENCE NORTH 89" 55' WEST 13.66 CHAINS; THENCE NORTH 30• WEST 
6.54 CHAINS; THENCE NORTH 75" EAST 52.50 CHAINS TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
PARCELE 
BEGINNING AT THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER 
OF SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 12 SOUT11, RANGE 44 EAST OF THE BOISE MERIDIAN, BEAR LAKE COUNTY, 
IDAHO, RUNNING THENCE EAST 34. 17 CHAINS; THENCE SOUT11 76" 15' WEST 35.30 CHAINS; THENCE 
NORTH 9. 12 CHAINS, MORE OR LESS, TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
PARCELF 
COMMENCING AT APOINT28 RODS, MORE OR LESS. NORTH AND 11 RODS, MORE OR LESS, EAST OF THE 
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 12 SOUTH, RANGE 44 
EAST OF THE BOISE MERIDIAN. BEAR LAKE COUNTY, IDAHO, RUNNING THENCE NORTHEASTERLY 69 
RODS, MORE OR LESS, TO 40 ACRE LINE; THENCE NORTH 39 RODS, MORE OR LESS, TO 40 ACRE LINE; 
THENCE EAST ALONG SAID LINE BO RODS; THENCE NORTH ALONG 40 ACRE LINE 27 RODS; THENCE 
SOUT11WESTERLY 112 RODS AND B LINKS TO THE LAND OF GEORGE PERKINS; THENCE SOUTHWESTERLY 
ALONG THE LINE TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
PARCELi 
BEGINNING AT THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER 
OF SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 12 SOUTH, RANGE 44 EAST OF THE BOISE MERIDIAN, BEAR LAKE COUNTY, 
IDAHO, AND RUNNING THENCE WEST 1239 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 34" WEST 175 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 35• 
30' EAST 1494 FEET; THENCE NORTH 75° EAST 3851 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO THE WEST LINE OF U.S. 
HIGHWAY 30 NORTH RIGHT OF WAY; THENCE NORTH 15° WEST ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY 888 FEET; 
THEN~E SOUT1175• 30' WEST 318 FEET; THENCE NORTH 15• WEST 218 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 75° 30' 
WEST 2764 FEET; THENCE NORTH 164 FEET TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
A PERPETUAL EASEMENT OR RIGHT OF WAY OVER A STRIP OF LAND 20 FEET IN WIDTH LEADING FROM 
THE COUNTY ROAD TO THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY: 
THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 22 IN TOWNSHIP 12 SOUTH OF 
RANGE 44 EAST OF THE BOISE MERIDIAN, BEAR LAKE COUNTY, IDAHO. 
AND RUNNING THROUGH A PART OF THE SOUT11EAST QUARTEF.{ OF THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF 
SECTION 21 AND THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 22, TOWNSHIP 
12 SOUTH OF RANGE 44 EAS> OF lHE BOISE MERIDIAN, BEAR LAKE COUNTY, IDAHD. 1 
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WARRANTY DEED • 3 
p 
lO 0 
NO, 
THE DISTIUCT COURT OF 
OF IDAHO, AND 
an ) 
) 
) CV-09-1 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
ROGER ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) COMPLAINT 
an ) 
) 
Party ) 
) 
) 
\ } 
) 
) 
) 
Party Def end ant ) 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT ·Page l 
can be granted. 
denies 
specifically admitted or 
to state a cause of action 
of Plaintiff's not 
1. Defendant admits the allegations of the following paragraphs Plaintiff's 
Complaint: 1, 3, 4, 13. 
2. allegations contained in the following paragraphs 
Plaintiff's Complaint: 10, 1 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 29, 
3. In answer to paragraph 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant selling to 
Plaintiff prope1iy in Bear County of approximately acres for the 
sum of $800,000. All other allegations of paragraph 6 are 
a 
of 
allegations of paragraph 7 are ~1v1.uv•cL. 
In answer to 8 of Complaint, adrn he 
notified Plaintiff of the corrections to the legal description contained in the WaJTanty 
which corrections were by an individual in the Bear Lake Office 
and performed by Lori Thornock of Northern Title Company ofldaho, Inc. Title"), as 
reflected in the Corrected Warranty Deed. A true and coJTect copy of the Corrected Warranty 
Deed is attached hereto as "l ". 
6. In answer to paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits that a 
scrivener's error in the Warranty as detected by an individual the 
Office was Title, which had no upon the 
to Plaintiff, consisting of approximately 270 acres located west of U.S. Highway Defendant 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT Page 2 
/ 
7. 
or 
same. 
9 
to 
but denies all other allegations paragraph 14. 
8. Paragraphs 11, 17, and 28 do not allege facts and are not answered. 
Plaintiff is precluded from recovering, in whole or in part, Complaint 
because it with unclean hands and bad faith in connection with the matters refeITed to 
Complaint. By this the Defendants do not existence 
liability or 
SECOND DEFENSE 
If Plaintiff has injuries or damages, its injuries or 
whole or part by its own acts, omissions, negligence, or wrongful 
negligence, or wrongful conduct other than the Defendants. By 
this the do not admit of any or or 
Defendants were not the or cause 
damages claimed Plaintiff By asserting this the Defendants not admit 
any liability or damages alleged or otherwise. 
Plaintiff is from recovering, in whole or in part, under the of its 
of of Estoppe1, Latches, and/or Ratification. 
By asserting this defense, Defendants do not admit the 
alleged or otherwise. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - Page 3 
of any liability or damages 
By or 
m 
reserve answer to add ~~"·""·",,·~~ or supplemental uvJll..;H01.Ju to and 
serve 
Plaintiff's Complaint is without basis in law or fact and Defendant is entitled to an award 
of reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred pursuant to paragraph 27 of the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement, which states: "[i]f either party initiates or defends any arbitration or 
which are in any connected with this Agreement, the prevailing 
entitled to recover from the non-prevailing 
costs and on " 
action or 
shall be 
including 
Alternatively, Defendant requests an award of attorney to Idaho §1 
§ 1 1 
COMES 
through 
ofidaho, 
1. At all 
Utah residing in Utah. 
L Stephens 
Third Party 
alleges and states as follows: 
Mr. was and is now a 
2. At all material herein, Title was and is now an Idaho corporation 
doing business Bear Lake County, Idaho. 
3. Jurisdiction and venue are proper because the real property which is the subject 
matter this action is located in Bear Lake County, Idaho and the acts and conduct of Nmihern 
Title as hereinafter took place in Lake County, Idaho. 
4. On or about August 3, 2007, Mr. Stephens (as a trustee the 
Stephens Family Trust ("Stephens Family Trust")) sold real ""'"r''"""'.,..;.,., 
Lake County, Idaho to Steven Cummings. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - Page 4 
L. and 
Title was as the escrow 
6. 
Title Title and 
closing documents involved in the transaction between the Stephens Family Trust and 
Cummings. 
7. and were and had 
property being sold included only real property located west of and undertook to 
prepare and closing documents accordingly. 
8. Northern Title closed the transaction and on or about 3, recorded 
the Warranty Deed from the Family Trust to Steven Cummings as Instrument #199303 
m records of Bear Lake County, Idaho (Exhibit A to Plaintiffs Complaint) the purpose of 
transfening title 
9. On or about 
to the Buyer. 
8, 2007, 
County Assessor's office of an error on the legal of the Warranty as he was attempting to 
""'"""''rnr taxes~ 
10. 8, met 
Officer/Manager at "~''""''~ Title, who identified a C'f'rlUPnPr 
description was prepared by Northern Title. 
J 1. On or about 8, 2007, Northern 
Warranty 
records of Bear 
the Warranty 
County, Idaho (Exhibit" 1 "). 
1 On April 9, 2008, Northern its 
("Title Policy") to 
13. 
Cummings. 
Title Policy as to Cummings includes 
error on the 
#199911 in the 
west of Highway 30, as contained on conected Wananty Deed by Title as 
Instnnnent # 19991 ] in the Lake County, Idaho (Exhibit"] 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT - Page 5 
16. 
17. 
was 
recover 
If the 
Tille is 
1 
and 
Complaint, which acts and conduct of Northern 
costs and be 
the indemnity 
That should 
same along with all costs. 
Mr. restates and realleges paragraphs l as set 
Northern Title vanous ofinformation from 
-~~,,,~,;w Family Trust and 
supplied all information 
ANSVVER TO COMPLAINT Page 6 
and 
and 
changing and 
lS to 
full herein. 
closing documents involved the transaction between the Tmst and 
.,..,.""F~~ and for and re-recording the Warranty Deed. 
a direct and proximate ofNorthern Title' failure to ..... ""''"''"""' 
Stephens incmTed legal costs and may 
28. That should Mr. Stephens be damages, he is entitled to 
damages and attorney fees and costs as a direct and proximate result wrongdoing. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Stephens prays the Court to enter judgment in his favor as follows: 
That and that he recover nothing 
thereby; 
B. 
paragraph of lhe 
For such other and 
Idaho 
relief as the Court just 
WHEREFORE, Funk prays the Court to enter her as 
1; 
under 
For damages from Northern Title should Mr. Stephens be a:::.~.c:::.:,c;u the same 
cause; 
For costs 
For such other and further relief as Court deems just equitable. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT· Page 
to 
I 
Nathan M. 
Beard, St Clair, 
2105 Coronado 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT Page 8 
10. 
OF SERVICE 
that on this ~ day March, 
Appearance to the following by 
10, I a true and complete 
Mail/Postage prepaid. 
IT ''1'' 
TO ANSWER AND TJIIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
MCORDE.D TO: 
Stii'Vm B. Cummlrtf!$ 
43 North !!JD But 
P.merlc11n Fork, tlt 84fi03 
RJll--R'.!ilCORDlm 1'0 coaREC'X tlllC::AL'!<* 
WARRANTY 
Roser L, And Bub!i.rll L. Stephens 
Trust, Roger L. Stephens imd B11tbnra L. 
Step.bem, Tru5t;1;1s 
436 Cobhllmtone 
Providence, Utllh S43:112 
Steven B. Cummings 
43 North 100 Erurt 
American Fort, Ut 84003 
FOR OOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, the receipt ofwhloh i11hereby11eknowiedged1 
the Granter hereby sell$ md forever 'lt'llru>fum the following plll'®Li of real properzy to the 
including the OTitl:ttor's :right, title and inu:r~t therein: 
SEE EXHIBIT "A" ATTACHED HERETO AND 
INCORPORATED BY RBFE.Rh'NCE 
TOGETHER WITH one hundred (l 00) sbareJlc of water stock in Montpelier Irrigation Company imd 
nine h\llldred (901J) slwca of water stock in St.mUini;ton lrrig!Jtion Company. 
TOGETHER WITH aU pumpll'., motors, wheel llneii, main line tmd other irrigation equipment. 
TOGETHER WITH AND INCLUDING any and all fu:lurea and improvemenu. ruzy and all 
appurtenances, tenements, l:lrui bereditamcnts, and any !ttld ell renta, iamea, and profit~ that relate or 
otherwise pertain to the foregoing parcels ofr~ propeey. 
TO RA VE AND TO HOLD the foreg<.>mg p8r0els of real property unto the Grantee and iUI 
1111l;Ces80rJ! and aaslgru furever. 
The G:t:antor horeby Mvenll.llts that the Gramor ig th.Ci simple of the foregoing parcels of 
real property; that the foregoing pamol!i ofr~ property m free and clear of any and all mortgage&, 
liena, or other enc.mmh lmmces of riword in fue records ofBear Lake Councy, 
Idaho, curmnt l.!l'Xes., ordinances fedwlll m;id ~ rights and reservations, including, without 
P Oi 
1999 1 030 
otmoot taxi::;:&, otdirum~ 11t1d federal state reili!inrat1t'll'i!L iru:luding, 'Without 
flhortagi: fo ~ oo.c:roru::nmems 
~mrrtll or claims of aa!Rmlent not ahown 
limitation, patents, end mineral&, conflicti 
whati:oevcr. 
STATE 
County of 
use reirtrlcliong md building and imd ordinmU:al:B 
and that fue Granton> will wnnmt and defond the Bllmli' from 1rny and al! 
: SS 
ROGER L. AND BARBARA L. STEPHENS 
F A}J!L Y TRUST 
ROGER L. STEPHENS 
BAR.BARA. L. STEPHENS 
of 
On tMJa.L. day of 2007, before me, 11 Nob!J:y Public, p.irsoruilly 
appemid Roaer L. 8tepheru Stephen!, Truatoe11 of the Roger L. And Barbara L. 
Bteph~ Family Trust. known or identified ID me to be the pmon~ wba executed the Wmimty 
Der:rl, and duly iu:ilmnwiedge::d to me that tlrey executed this Wmnmty Dl:leci 
199911 
'"~'IHE F'OLLOWING PARCELS AP..E CONVEYED EXCEPTING THERE'.ll':IWM ANY 
PORTION LflNG EAS'rEULY OF U,S. lllGHW~Y 31l,*• 
E::XHISIT A 
f'AAOELO 
OOMMENC!Ni) /l.T A POINT 11. tG C~INS SA.ST F'ROM TrE NORTHl:AST (;ORNER OF THE SO\JTH5A!iT 
QUJl.f\reR OF lleoTION ill, 1QWIYSHIF' 12 BOVTK, !'!ANGE M WT Or THO: E'IOIGE! ME!PtrDIAN, El!:AR LAKE 
O.OUNTY, 10J<HO, RUNNING THlill'ICIO Wt a.D!l t:iHAIN!:: rHENCE SOUTH 1:1' 45' EAITi U7 CHAIN!!: lHElllCS 
SOUTH y5• weer 44,ea QWJNa: niSNCE NORTH ae• SS'Wl!ST 13.SS OHIJNS; TH9NCE NORTH 30' WCST 
a.54 OHAlNS; THEf\10!'. NORTH 1!' l!AST !ilHiO OHAINS TO THE F'LAC.S OF se~INNIN\l 
PAROE!.E 
SS!JINNING /..T THl'i NCRT'rlWl:!rr CORNER OF THIS liiOUTHeAST QUARTER OF THE !llOUTHWE!ii QUJ\l'\Tefl 
or $1!CTlQN 21, TOWNSHIP 11i SOUTH, AANGE 44 ilA$i 01' mi; BOl!il! MERIDIAN, ai:AA LAKE OOUNTY, 
lil*IHO, RUl'1NING i11!:NCC eA$T M.17 OliAIN!; THENCE $(.lUTH ,,, 1S' Wl'!ST auo CHAIN$: TKGWC;a 
NOF!TH 9. 12 CH.AlllllS, MOFl!i OIU!ill>!I, TO THE !>LACE OF SEiGINNlNC». 
PAACELF 
COMMl!NClNiliAT A i"OlNT lVS ROD$!.. MMi OF<t.li!Sli, NORTti AllD 11 ~ODS, MORE OR L.SSS, li!AfiT OF THI! 
SOIJl'HWi!ai 001'N!!R OF THE llOUrHWEST OUAltTSR OF SIIDTION 21, TOWNSHlP 12 SOUTH. lW>mE 44 
OOUNTY, IOAHO, ltUNNING THEN011 N0"1'H"11i>TI5Rl. Y 611 
UN!11 THENClli NO!mi 39 ROOS. MORE OR L.SS!l, TO 4ll ACR!i: LIN!:; 
RODS; TH!lNOii WORni Al.ONG Ml AOM LINE 27 F!OOS; THENCE 
E!Ol.t1'HWC LJN}(S TO 'rHS. LANO OF GiiOl'IQfi l>SRKINS1 TH!ilNClE SOUTHWESTEiRL Y 
ALOl'lla THE LINI> TO THI: pl.Jl.Ol; OF !ISC&INNIN<i, 
l!'AAO!a.I 
acGINNING AT THEi l>OUTHWasT CORNER OF '!He SOUTHEAST OUARTl5R OF THC. NORTHWl:$T OUAFrr!:R 
OF lllilQTION 21, TOWNSHIP 12 ~lJTH, AAN!lE: 411 liAilT OF TH~ llOJ!le; Mt:Rit'JlllN. BiAR I.AKI! ClCl.JNIT, 
IDAHO, AND KUNNINl?i TH!::NOlil MIST 1~15S Fm: THENO!ii GO!JTH 34• WCITT 171) FEET; THEiNCllil soun; 3$' 
i'ltl' WT 14&~ FS!T; T14Sl'loe NORTH 'I'S' ~r ~a1 FEET, MO~ OR Ll'!SS, TO IHC: wi:sr Uf.IL'; OF u.a. 
/'llll!HWAY 30 NORTH RIGHT OF WAY; T:HENCE NOJ'(fH ifl> WEST ALONG SAll:l RIGHT OF WAY au FEET; 
THSNOli SOUTH 75' :10' W!$T 318 FEET; THl'i!Ntll: NORTH 1i'r' WEST 21& FEl:!i; THl:NO!i SOUTH 76" 3'l' 
IN WIDTH L:ADIN~ FROM 
THE COUNT'!' ROAD , 
THI; SOIJ'llleAST QUARTER OF THE l>IOR11M'EST Q!JAATeR Or $1!0TION ~ IN TOWNSHIP 1£ $0UTH OF 
RAN!)E 44 WT OF THt: 1i!¢1$2 lilieRIDIAN, SIW!. LAK:E OO!JNT\', llll\HO, 
AND ~UNNIN~ 'rl4Fl:OUC&H A PART" OF nii $0Ul'HtWZT QUA~ Ol"TH!i NORTHEAST QUARTER 01' 
SceilON !U ANO il'ili 601.!'fi-MllOST ClLlAR'l"ER 01' TH!! NOFITHWEBT QUAA'raR OF !iE!CTlON 22, '!tl\NNSHll' 
12 SOUTH OP MN(.>£ 40 EAST OF THE 1:101~ MERIDIAN, !llill\R 1.AKe COUNiY. IMHO. 
200B 10: 30 ~ O~l 
21 ()5 Coronado StTeet 
lditho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Telephone: 171 
r · ·1 (?08 -,,9 9,_,1., .·aF~.nm e: _ ) ),., - r .. k 
ei1:,. il: 
Plaintiff 
DISTRICT SIXTH 
BEAR LAKE COUNTY 
STEVEN individual 
08: 1 a 
I.)'-,/ •I,, 
Case No.: CV-09-183 
vs. 
ROGERL 
in .,¥~""""' JOHN DOES 
I-X 
and 
to ldaho Rule of Procedure submits his 
motion is set the 
filed herev;ith. 
Oral 
Motion 
am 
10 l 0 l served a tme correct copy of the 
the 
Randall 
Brad >{,.,,,,.,..,,"''"' 
Beams,m & Peck 
the 
& 
399 N Main Sr.e 300 
UT 84321 
Fax: ( 135) 
J,ake 
PO !fox 190 
Pari.'1, fD 83'.:'.61 
Fax. ( 
Bannock 
E. Cenkr 
Pl1Gat51lo, lD 83201 
Fa~~ /f01) 236- 8 
, I/ ~H 
Courthouse 
I \i ·. fl\ ~<ltht1~\~\tc.-n~~'·-··-----
Ot Beard SL Clair Gaffney 
for the Plaintiff 
on 
upon 
US Mail Hand 
US Mail I land 
Mail Hand 
Motion 
ISB 
ST CJli,JR GAFFNEY P 
'105 Cortmado Stfeet 
ldaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Telephone: 523-5171 
Facsimile:: 529-9732 
email: nm.hmi'@.beardstclair.com 
1.Jr Plaintiff 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY IDAHO 
ST2\ EN an individual 
mg 111 Montana 
vs 
HL 
res'di ng in 
I-X 
attacheJ 
he .. ·ei na iter 
I lllJS 
and the 
or 3, 
No.: CV-09-183 
MEMORANDUM IN OF 
MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT 
the follov,ing memorandum in 
Defendant 
affidavit of Steven 
he low. 
FACTS 
Defendant, Roger 
in 
4 
i 
' 
J I ; 
, 
:_ 
"· 
consist on 
Ranch exec:ltted warranty deed in 
Ranch to the on 
4, 2007. A.} 
In a message 
were made to the 3, 2007. 
learned on November 8, deed been recorded 
with to the by 
two the were 1he same as 
was same 
ai the 
revised 83 acres on the east side of 30 
from 
to been out 
A motion for summary and 
on is no tssue as 
to any and lS to as <l matter of law. 
1 HJ1 
court 
must G&M 
lrriga1ion 1'. Dist, 125 fdaho 
(Ct Title Ins. 1 :21 Idaho 
rLe moving bears the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue 
125 Idaho (Idaho 1 
must issue the elements the 
Olsen v .. JA. 
317 (l v 101, 
AliGllMENT 
were into the Deed. 
as tbe contrnc1 
to con viy. the contract V. 
khho 704 tenns of the deed may vary from those 
to determine the of the 
contract the 
anJ upon a contract to convey.'' 
Em~ v. B; 11J', l 
ln this case, '°'"'"'"'~'"' on 4, 2007, 
!hr l to 
DO th acres on the east side of the 
08 06-2010 121 
H. covemmted to defend and for 
a are covemams the to 
the l ro convey, the 
covenant ot assurances. 
the 
a perscq, of the Elkhorn at Sun 100 
Idaho 79\, ( l the covenant can occur because act" from 
tbe of person. 
, 63 Idaho a breach of the covenant occurs even 
i~. (Histed from of Townsite l'. Morris-
rs !'c1 npany, 33 Idaho 1 lO (1 
de! llf 
any 
rather 
has 
expenses incurred in 
~1· on Ner, included by the are court cosls 
aiJc! attorne.; incurred the breach. oefker 
V. 127 262 ( The 
Memorandum in of Motion for 
8 1 
Jn lhis the warranty deed was breached a revised deed recorded 
in November of2007 83 from the 
the control and use 
and use of and to 
the Cummings is entitled to for the lost value ofthe property, a recovery of the 
his and any to determined at trial. 
is 
lo summary should 
be 
to for summary 
to 
Of BEARD ST. CLAIR PA 
for 
m 
2010 1 a true and correct copy of 
FOR tr I 
Randall Budge 
Racine Olson 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204· 1 
(208) 232-61 
Brad Beamson 
Beamson & Peck 
Main 
Logan, UT 84 3 21 
Fax: (435) 
Bear 
PO Box 190 
ID 83261 
(208) 
Honorable 
Chambers, Bannock 
624 Center 
ID 83201 
18 
M. Olsen 
upon the 
& 
Courthouse 
Of Beard St Clair Gaffney PA 
frlr the Plaintiff 
9 /21 
Idaho and that 
OFMOTIO/';r 
the 
US Mail 
Hand delivered 
Mail Hand delivered 
US Mail 
ll1 
Ti 
P.A. 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho [[) 83404~ 749'\ 
171 
for Plaintiff 
an 
Case No.: CV-09-183 
ROGER L OF 
ll1 
STATE UF UTA!I 
Si~ven been sworn on states: 
l. I am the action. 
1 am over to and do so 
On or about the ranch in Bear lake 
l 
06-2010 n 121 
was 1han a week. I 
real estate on the 
l examined both the legal description contained 
the 
been C\r• 1'"'1·~·11 with 
and correct of the 
4, W07. 
on both 
The legal 
of Highway 30 near Idaho. 
a 
to me. Attached as Exhibit /1, is a true 
on 
ln i\Jovember a message 
ms. ie to the on 2007. 
l l, arned that on 
ord.ed wirh ··µQnP..·~r 
B is a true correct 
been of 83 acres that \Vas recorded deed on 
A and l have to included in the 
l('Vt'H C 
1 /2'1 
Affidavit of 3 
1 /21 
10 I 
Randall Iviail 
391 
us Ifand 
30ll 
Hand delivered 
Hand 
of 3 
WHEN RECORDED MAIL 
Stllven B. Cu1nm1ngs 
43 North lOO East 
American Ut 84003 
Roger L. And Barbara L. sn:·ohens 
Trust, Roger L. Stephens and Barbara L, 
Ste1t1heJilS, T:rustfies 
lnc:i' .. t,,,...,..,.nt # 
!!f!Alt I.AK! COUNTY 
Jrofl7-0B.cl 02;57:41 Nil. tit Paglls: 
l'U!cim:!ed fl)f': NORTHeRlll rm;:: co. 
IUHU<Y HADDOCK 
FOR GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION, the of which is 
0 /21 
the Grantor hereby sells and transfers the follo'wing parcels ofreal property to the ""'" .. ""'-• 
including the right, title and interest therein: 
"'A" HERETO AND 
rNCORPORA TED BY REFEREN'CE 
mw (100) in JV1cm>r1em;ir irnai:.nrm Comp:any and 
nine hundred (900) shares of water stock in Bennington Irrigation L~rnmpany 
wrrn: all pumps, 
WITH AND INCLUDING any and all nxt!ll!M 
appurtenances, tenements, and hereditaments, and any and all 
otherwise pertain to foregoing of real property, 
TO HA VE TO HOLD the foregoing parcels of real property unto the 
successors and assigns ,_""'"'",,... 
its 
The Grantor hereby covenants that the Grantor is the owner in fee simple of the foregoing parcels of 
real property; that the foregoing parcels of real property are free and clear of any and all :mortgages, 
liens, or other encumbrances, excepting encumbrances of record i.ti the records of Bear Lake County, 
Idaho, current taxes, and federal and state · and reservations, including .. ·without 
EXHIBIT 
WARRANTY DEED~ l 
STATE OJ ) 
: SS 
) 
Grantors hereunto set their hands 
"~'V,_,;.J, ... L. AND BARBARA 
FAMILY TRUST 
Step he ,s F a1nily Trust, known or identified to me to be the persons who executed the 
Deed, md July to me that they executed this 
1990 0 
of 
02 
199030 
A 
PARCEL A 
ElfGlNNING ATTHe SOUTHWEST GORNER OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF THE NORIHWEST t!UAATER 
OF S5CTIOl\I 21, TOWNSHIP 12 SOUTH, RANGE 4-4 E.A.ST OF IHE BOISE MERIDIAN, SEAR LAKE COUNTY, 
IDAHO, RUNl\!lNG THENCE NORTH 80 RODS; THSNCE EAST 621i r!ODS: THENCE NORTH 80 RODS; THENCE 
EAST 257.:i RODS, THENCE SOUTH SO RODS; THENCE WEST 2530 Fe!rr; TH~NCE SOUTH 15" EAST 952 
'!HENCE sourn 15" 30' \lllE5T316 FEET; THENCE NORTH 15" WEST 21 ac FEET; THENCE SOUTrl 75" 
FEET; THENCE NORTH 164 FEET TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
EXCEPT ALL OF THAT PORTION OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED LAND LYING EASTERLY OF U.S, HIGHWAY 
30. 
PAACELD 
COMMENCING AT A POINT 11.18 CHAINS EASrFROM THE. NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE SOUTHEAST 
QUARTER OF SeCTIOr~ 21' TOWNSHIP 12 SOUTH, RANGE 44 EAST OF THE BOISE MERIDIAN; SEAR LAl"E 
COUNTY, IOAHO, RUNNING THeNCE1 eAST 3.160 CHAINS; THe:NCE SOUTH 13• 45' EAST U7 CHAINS: THeNCE 
SOUTH 75" WEST 44.63 CHAINS; THENCE NORTH a~ 55' WEST 13.66 CHAINS; THENCE NORTH 30" Vi/EST 
6.54 CHA.If.JS; THENCE NOR11i 75• EAST 52.50 CHAINS TO THE Pl.Ace Of EIEGINNING, 
PARCELE 
68G!lNNING AT THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER 
OF SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 12 SOUTH, RANGE «-EAST OF THE BOISE MERIDIAl'l, BEAR LAKE COUNTY, 
IOAHO, RUNNING THENCE EAST 34.fT CHAINS; THENCE SOUTH 75" 15' WEST 35.30 CHA1NS; THENCE 
HORTH 9;!2 CHAINS, MORE OR LESS, TO THI: PLACE OF SS:GINNIHG. 
PARCELF 
COMMENCING AT A POINT 26 RODS, MORE OR LESS. NORiH AND 11 ROOS. MvRE OR Less, EAST OF THE 
SOUTHWEST CORNER OF THE 50lJiHWESi QUARTER OF SSCTION 21, TOWNSHIP 12 SOUTH, RANGE 44 
EAST OF THE: BOISE M!ERIDIAN. BEAFI LAKE COUNTY, IDAHO, RUNNING THENCE NORTHEASTERLY 69 
RODS, MORE OR LESS, TO 40 ACRE LINE; THENCE NORTH 39 ROOS, MORE OR TO 4U ACRE LINE; 
THENCE EAST ALONG SAID UNE 00 ROOS; THENCE NORTH ALONG 4t! AORe LINE THt:NCE 
SOL!FHW£Si'E:RLV 112 i:toos AND a LINKS TO THE t.J<NO OF GEORGI: PERKINS; THENCE SOUTMVVESTERL y 
ALONG THE LINE TO THE. PLACE: OF BE.GINNING. 
PARCELi 
BeGtmllNG AT THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF THE SOIJTHEAST QUARTER OF THE NORTrlWEST QUARTI."R 
Or SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 12 SOUiH, RANGE 44 EAST.OF THE BOISE MERlOIAN, BEAR I.AKE COUNTY, 
IDAHO' AND RUNNING THENCE: wesr 1239 FCET; THENCE SOUTH 34~ WEST 175 f'EET; THENCE sourn 35" 
30' EAST 1494 FEET; THENCE NORTH 75a EAST 36:$1 FEET, MORE OR LESS, TO THE WEST Lll>JE OF U.S. 
HIGHWAY 30 NORTH RIGHT OFWAY; THENCE NORTH !5•WEST ALONG SAID RIGHT OF WAY 388 FEET; 
THENCE SOUTH 75• :;o• weer :l18 FEET; THENCE NORTH 15° WEST 21f.I FEET; n-IENCE SOUTH 75• 30' 
WEST 2764 FEET; THENCE NORTH 1e4 FEET ro THE Pi..A.CE OF BSG!NN!Na 
A PERPETUAL EASEMENT OR RIGHT OF WAY OVER A STRIF' OF LAND 20 FEET IN WIDTH lE.A.OlNG FROM 
THE COUNTY ROAD TO THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED REAL PROPERTY: 
THE SOUlHEAST QUARTER OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 22 IN TOWMSHlP 12 SOUTH Of 
RANGE 44 EAST OF THE SO!Se MER!Dlt\N, SEAR LAKE COUNTY, !OAHD. 
AND RUNNING THROUGH A PART OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OP THE NORTHEAST QUARTER OF 
SECTION 21 ANO THE SOUTHWEST QUAATER OF IHE NORTHWEST QUARTER OF SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 
1' SOUIH OF IWIGE <4 E"51' Of TI<E OOISC M""')~N. OEAR l AKE COUNTY, K>AHO. ~ 
~-;~{b 
WARRAhTY DEED 3 
16 /21 
1 L '; :39PM THE llPS H.l 
W1-fEN RECORDED MAIL 
Steven B. 
43 North l 00 East 
ao1 7 3 ns '? 
Instrument # 
aEAR U\l{f'. c OU vffY 
21107 -11.nt! -02'::33:54 lfo, of 
R'lftiO!dtKI !or: NORTHER{!; mtE c:o 
KERRY HADDOCK 
' 1 
Ameri~1111 Ut 84003 f!l!-Ol'llsro Rec:ordar E!~!;~t~.~~·~'~«\--,-
TO CORREC'I' 
Provkience, Utah 84332 
FORGOODANDVALUABLE the ofwhlchis 
the Gnmtor hereby sells and forever transfers the following parcels of reai property to the Gtantee, 
including the Grru:itor' s title and "'"""''" 
TCXiETHER (1 DO) shares 
rime hundred (900) shares of water stock in oei:imng1:011 
TOGETHER 
TO HA VE AND TO HOLD real unto 
forever, 
The Grantor hereby covenants that the Graotor is the ovmer in foe 
real propeity; that the foregoing property are 
or \}ther excepting of record in the records 
Idaho, current ordirrrmce$ and foderal and state and 
EXHIBIT 
ompany an 
fill)' and al! 
that rdate or 
and 
pr 1 
STATf OP 
of 
,.----
' I 
I 
j [; u 
I iO 
m. 08~05 2010 121 
TORE 
Granton~ herecmto set their of 
L STEPHPNS 
ROGER STEPHENS 
BARBARA L STEPHENS 
) 
) 
rru 
l ! u f:! CJ J '? 
EXHIB11 A 
PARCEL A 
BEGINl\lltJG AT THE SOUTHWEST COf~l·JER OF THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF THE NClRTffv\/ESr QUARTf'R: 
OF SECTiON 21 TOWNSHIP 12 SOUTH. RA~JGE 44 EAST OF THE BOISE MEf~ID!AN, BEAR LAKE COUNTY 
!DAHO, THENCE ~JORTH SO RODS; THENCE EAST $2..5 RODS; TH!~NCE NORTH 00 ROOO: THENCE 
EAST 257.5 RODS, THENCE soum tlO ROOS; "!HENGE WEbl 2530 FEET: THENCE SOUTH 15" EAS! 952 
THENCE SOUTH 7o" lO' WEST 318 THENCE: t~ORTH 1:5°WEST 218 FEET; THENCE SOUTH 75" 
2754 FEET; THENCE NORTH TO TH~ PLt..CE OF BEGINNING . 
.¥~fllmllllil:li::k'l<~~11JR~~l!:!~W~ili?$~~~~~x'il~ll:x~ma:)'.~§'r:M~ii!W~1X 
~ 
PARCEL D 
COMMENCING AT A POINT t 1.18 CHAINS EAST FROiJl THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THI; SOLITrlEA8T 
QU.!IFITER OF SECTION 21, IOW~SHIP 12 $bUTH, Rll,NGE 44 EAST Of Tt!E BOISE MERIOIAt.J, BEP.R LAKE 
COUNTY, IDAHO, RUNNING THENCE EAST 3 90 CHAINS: THENCE SOUTH 13° 46' EAST IJ.&7 CHAINS; THENCE 
SOUTH 15¢ WEST 44.53 CHAIN$; THENCf NORTH 89" 55' WEST 13.66 CHAINS; THENCE NOR!H 30'· WE:ST 
6.54 CHAINS; THENCE NORTH !B" EAST 52,50 CKA,INS TO THE F'LJi,,CE OF BEGINNING. 
PARCEL E 
BEGINNING AT THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF THE. SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER 
OF SECnON :l!' TOWNSHIP 12 $01.JTH, RANGE 44 EAST OF THE BOISE MERIDIAN, BEr\R LAJ<E COUNTY 
IDAHO. RUNNING THENCE EAST 34.17 CHAINS; THENCE SOUiH 7fJ" 15· WEST 35. 30 CHAINS; THEt../CE 
NORTH 9. i 2 CHAINS, MORE OR LESS, ro THE PLACE OP f!EGINllllNG. 
PAACELF 
COMMENCING AT A POINT 28 NORTH AND 11 RODS. MORE ClR LESS, EAS'f '!'HE 
SOUTH\NESf COR~JER OF THE SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 12 sourn, RANGE 44 
EAST OF THE BOISE BEAR LAKE OOIJNTY, IMHO, RUl'INING THENCE 58 
RODS, MOOE OR U'!SS, TO 40 UNi:; THENCE NORTH :'l9 RODS, MORE OR TO 40 !<.ORE UN€'; 
Trll:NCE EAST ALONG SAID LINE 80 ROOS; THENCE l.JOR'fH ALONG 40ACRE LINE 27 THENCE: 
SOUTHWESTERLY 112 ROOS AND 11 LINKS TO THE LAND OF GEORGE PERl\!t~S: THENCE 
ALONG THE LINE TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
PARCELi 
BEGINNING Ar HiE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF THE SOlJTHE.J'.'\.ST QUARTER OF TdE NORTHWEST OUAFTER 
OF SECTl0h'21 TOWNSHIP 12 SOUTH, RANGE 44 EAST Of'TME BOtSE MERID!AN, 38\R LAKE COUNT( 
llJAKO, AND RUMNING THENCE li\IEST 12J!l i"ECT; THENCE SOUTH 34° WEST f!EI FSET; THENCE SOUTH 
30' EAST 1494 FEET: THENCE NORTH T5" EAST ~851 MORE OR LESS, TO TrlE WEST UM:' OF U.S. 
HIGHWAY 30 NORTH RIGHT OF WAY; THENCE NORTH 15' A.LONG SAID RfGHl' OF WP.Y 888 FEE f, 
THENCE SOUTH 75, 30' ll)IEST 316 HiENCE NORTH 15' \NEST 218 FEET: THENCE SOUTH 30' 
WEST 2764 FEET; THENCE NORTH 164 THE PLACE OF BEGINNING. 
A PERPETUAL EASEMENT OR RIGHT OF WAY OVER A STRIP OF LAND 20 FEET fN Wil'.JTH LEAUING FROM 
TriE COUf~TY R.OAD TO THE FOLLOWING OESORIBED REAL P'ROPERT\': 
THE SOUTHEAST QUARTER Of THE NORTHWEST OOAATER Of SECTtON 22.1"1 TOWNSHIP t2 SOUTH 
fZANGE ~4 EA.Sf OF n1E BOISE MERIDIAN, BEAR LAKE COUNT(, iDAHO, 
AND RUNNING THROUGH A PART OF THe SOUfHEMT QUARTER OF THE ~•Offi"Hr.!/\ST QU/lJffER DF 
SECilON 21 AND THE SOUTHWEST QUARTER Df 'fHE NORTHVVcST QUARTER OF SECTION TOvVN~id!P 
I 2 SOUTH OF RJ..NGE 44 EAST OF THE BOISE iAER!DIAN, BEAR LAKE COUNTY, IDAHO. 
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m 
6, 10, a 
On 10, Defendant a on 
Plaintiff's Motion for so 
The parties hereto, 
Defendant's 5 6( f) 
Motion. The by and through counsel, that the on Motion 
Judgment will 
at 
Budge 
OLSON, 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
ttnt'T'\P.,.rc- for Defendant L. 
Honorable David 
Idaho, on 'JVLVL'v 
cAJlAJ "~"1 can be heard. 
10. 
10, at the 
Judgment be 
and through 
for 
for 
a Rule 56(f) 
and 
stipulate to the 
3, 2010 and granting 
that the 
a 
Judgment will be ;vuun.·u to heard before the Honorable David C 
District Judge, at the 
of 10:00 a.m., or soon 
DATED this of 
By----~--~-~·~~-
Randall Badge 
RACINE, OLSON, 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
Attorneys for Defendant L. 
Courthouse, Idaho, on October 
can 
2010. 
Nathan M. Olsen 
BEARD CLAIR 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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mutual mistake or one party's unilateral mistake which is known to the party, the 
true " V. , 141 Idaho 
111 1 App. see 1 Idaho at 39 P3d at 5 
(stating that "Lp ]arol evidence is also admissible to that reason mistake the 
written at,rreement does not the parties' true intent."). "Whether a particular subject 
negotiations is embodied in the 'lvriting depends on the intent of the parties, revealed by their 
conduct and language, and by the surrounding circumstances." Belk, 136 ldaho at 8, 39 P.3d at 
598. "Parol evidence may also be used to show what that true intent was." Bailey v. Ewing, 105 
Idaho 636, 641, 671P.2d1099, 1104 (Ct. App. 1983). 
1. The Original Warranty Deed Was Properly Modified Due To A Mutual 
Mistake Of the Parties. 
The Plaintiff and Defendant made a mutual mistake in assuming that the legal description 
prepared by Northern Title contained real property located only west of Highway 30. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals has held that "[a] mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of 
contracting, share a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based 
their bargain." Bailey, 105 Idaho at 639, 671 P.2d at 1102. A mutual mistake is further defined 
"to include situations in which the parties labor under d?ffering misconceptions as to same 
basic assumption or vital fact." Id. (emphasis in original). 
The record establishes that both Plaintiff and Defenda:r1t were aware prior to the closing 
that the Property for sale was located solely west Highway 30. Prior to the closing of the 
transaction, Northern Title and the real estate agents were of the understa:r1ding and belief that 
Plaintiff was aware that the property he was purchasing from Defendant \Vas only located west of 
Highway 30. Northern Title and its officers prepared the legal descriptions used for the Title 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SOPPORT OF MOTION FOR SOMMAR\' JUDGMENT - Page 14 
Origi1'1al W arrac"'lty Deed, and other closing 
m Stephens and 
t..~e tra..11saction mclude only real property located west Highway 30. The title 
commitments and closing documents included a plat map of the Property clearly shmlling only 
property located west of Highway 30. 
In addition, the real estate agents who met with Plaintiff and who drove around the 
Property wit.fi Plaintiff: (a) verbally told Plaintiff that the Property did not include any property 
located east of Highway 30, (b) specifically provided Plaintiff with a map showing that the 
Property only included property located west of Highway 30, and (c) physically showed Plaintiff 
on the maps where the Property was located, and that it was only located west :Highway 
Both of the real estate agents and Defendant accompa.'1.ied Plaintiff when he drove around the 
Property located orJy on the '\Vest Highway 30, and Plaintiff never questioned whether any 
. property located east of Highway was included or requested to around ar.1d view any 
property located east :Highway 3 0. 
The conduct of both Plaintiff a.11d Defendant and the surrounding circumstances 
demonstrate that the parties intended the sale to include property located only west of Highway 
30. The parties did not intend for the OrigL_rial Warranty Deed to contain a legal description for 
any property located east Highway 30. The legal description to the Original Warranty Deed 
did not reflect the tme intentions of the parties and the parties believed that the legal description 
contained only property located west of Highway 
As a matter oflaw, the inclusion of property located east of Highway 30 in the legal 
description of the Original \Vac"Tanty Deed constituted a mistake because the inclusion was "an 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMJ\iARY JUD~MENT Page 15 
~~-~"·-~·" ~u·~ act or omission arising from ignorance, su...rprise, or misplaced confidence." 
at 9 at . Because was 
negotiations and prior discussions as well as other relevant parol evidence permissible to 
show the [Original Warranty Deed] contai.11ed an error and did not reflect the true intentions 
the p&'i:ies." See id. at 658, 39 P.3d at 598. The erroneous legal description of the Original 
W a.rranty Deed was a mutual mistake. The Original W ru"'Tanty Deed was properly modified by 
Northern Title. 
2. The Original Warranty Deed Was Properly Modified Even If the Mistake 
Was A Unilateral Mistake. 
Even if the mistake contained in the legal description of the Original Warranty Deed is 
deemed to have been a unilateral mistake made by the Defendant, the doctrine merger does not 
apply and Defendant is entitled to a reformation OrigL.rial Warranty Deed. 
reason to know that Defendant intended to include only property located west Highway 30 
the sale of the Property. 
A unilateral mistake is similar to a mutual mistake 'Nith the addition one two 
~i· em"'rrts · ( 1 \ "th"' effie0 t v vl . l; v .L v the mistake is such enforcement of the contract would be 
unconscionable", or (2) "the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the 
mistake." Restatment (Second) of Contracts § 153. The Supreme Court Idaho has held that 
"[a] contract containing a unilateral mistake may be rescinded or modified if there has been a 
misrepresentation or ki.1owledge the mistake by the other party." Belk, 136 Idaho at 657, 39 
P.3d at 597. Further, "[e)xtrinsic evidence should be allowed where there has been a unilateral 
mistake made by a party and the other party has knowledge of the mistake. This type of 
unilateral mistake is a ground for reformation where extrinsic evidence may be admissible to 
DEFEN1lANT'S M:EMORA.~'DUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMAR\' JUDGMENT - Page 16 
the intent the parties." at 658, 39 at 598; see 141 Idaho at 482, 111 P 
at 1 to 
reason either mut1al mistake or one party's unilaterai mistake wbich is kno-vvn to other 
party, the ·written agreement does not express the pac-ties' true intent"). 
The facts of this case are somewhat similar to Belk. 1.1 that case, a lease contained a 
unilateral rrJ.stake regarding the rental amount See Belk, 136 Idaho at 655, 39 P.3d at 595. 
Although the parties to the lease had originally agreed to a rental fee of $14,768.00, the rental 
provision of the lease provided for a rentai fee of $1,476,80. See id. at 655-56, 39 P.3d at 595-
96. The lessors of the lease did not review the lease prior to signing the lease. Belk, 136 Idaho at 
655, 39 P.3d at 595. The lessee, however, had knmvledge that the rental provision in the lease 
was different from what the parties had agreed upon and asserted that he thought the lessors had 
changed their minds as to the rentai ru'TIOunt See at 658, 39 P.3d at 596, 598 
Supreme Court Ida_li.o affirmed the reformation the rental provision the lease to 
$14, 768.00. See id. at 658-59, 39 P.3d at 598-99. 
The record establishes that Plaintiff was aware that Defendant intended to sell 
property located west Highway As the the Complaint indicates, 
aware that the legal description of the Original 'll arranty Deed contained property located east 
High1vay 30. Although Defendant did not reaiize that the legal description of the Original 
W arrant)r Deed contained a mistake, it is proper to allow extrinsic evidence to be presented by 
Defendant to show that the Original Warranty Deed did not reflect the true intentions of the 
parties as to the Property that was being sold. See Belk; 136 Idaho at 657-58, 39 P.3d at 597-98. 
The Originai Warranty Deed contaL,ried an mistake and Plaintiff was aware of the mistake. See 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR Slll\1MARY JUDGMENT - Page 17 
at 658, 39 P.3d at 598. The Original Warranty Deed ·was properly modified 
COlJRT 
WARRA..l'{TY DEED. 
The Plaintiff alleges that the recording th.e Correction W ru"'Tanty Deed ( 1) was a breach 
Defendant's covenants owed to Plaintiff under the Original Warranty Deed, (2) transferred 
property back to Defendant by conversion, and (3) slandered Plaintiff's ritle. However, the 
Original WarrruJ.ty Deed contained a mistake and Plaintiff was aware of the mistake. The 
Correction Warranty Deed properly reformed the Original Warranty Deed to reflect the true 
intentions of the parties as to the Property being to Plaintiff by Defendant 
This Court can and should uphold the proper reformation of the Original Warranty Deed. 
See Bailey, 105 Idaho at 640, 671 P.2d at 1103; Belk, 136 Idaho at 658, 39 P.3d at 598 (findL_11g 
that \Jirhen a is knovvn to the other party, the equitable remedy ofreformation is available 
even when the mistake was a product negligence). A court properly reforms an instnh'llent 
when the evidence does not reflect the true intentions of the parties. See (citing v. 
Parkinson, 96 Idaho 294, 296, 527 P.2d 1252, 1254 (1974)); Belk, 136 Idaho at 658, 39 P.3d at 
parties would have m.ade for the mistake." Id.; see Belk, 136 Idaho at 658, 39.P.3d at 598. 
In this case, the Original Wa,_1anty Deed was corrected by Northern Title to properly 
reflect the intention th.e pai.-ties. Such substai1tial and competent evidence allows the to 
reform the Original Warran.ty Deed. See Belk, 136 Idaho at 659, 39 P.3d at 599. The Court 
should th.erefore affirm the reformation of the Original Warranty Deed in order to give effect to 
th.e contract wliich Plaintiff and Defendant did in fact make, but which was not expressed in the 
Original Warranty Deed by reason of mistake. 
DEFEJ\1DA1'1T'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Page 18 
I :< 
C. ATTOM"EY FEES. 
Defendant's an costs 
pursuant to paragraph 27 the Purchase ac1d Sale Agreement and sections and 
Idac11o Code. Defendant's claim for attorney and costs is reserved CL11d will be separately 
pursued once the issues dispute have been finally determined the Court. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
the foregoing reasons, Defendant requests that the Cow-t enter summary judgment in 
his favor as a matter of law declaring that ( 1) the Original Warranty Deed contained a mistake in 
the legal description, (2) the Origin.al Warranty Deed did not reflect foe trJ.e intentions 
and Defendant, (3) the Original Warranty Deed was properly corrected by Northern 
Title, and ( 4) the Correction Warranty Deed properly modified the Original W ru'Tanty Deed and 
is valid and enforceable. 
Respectfully submitted. 
DATED this_]}___ day September, 2010. 
RACIJ\TE, OLSON, 1'TYE, RUDGE 
&BAJLEY, 
~ALi:U~ 
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CERTIFICATE 
Nathan M. 0 lsen 
Beard, St Clair, Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Brad Bearnson 
Bearnson & Peck, LC. 
399 North Main, Ste 300 
Logan, Utah 84321 
SERVICE 
U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ) Fax 
[v{ .S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Fax 
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!~ 
OCT-1 10 R ~ LA\~ 
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Case No. CV-09-183 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF~S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY J(JDGMENT 
COMES NOW DefoJ;l.dant Roger L. Stephensi an individt~al ("Defenda..11t"), by and 
through counsd, and submits this Response to Plaintiff Steven Cummings' s ("Plaintiff') Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Defendant set fort.h an Tnirnduction and Statement of Undisputed Facts 
bis Defendant's Memorandum Support of Motion for Sumrna..ry Judgment filed on 
22, 10 Judgment Memorandum"), which are incorporated 
herein as if set forth fully. This Response is supported by the pleadings filed in this case, 
Defendant's Summary Judgment Memorandum and all supportL11g affidavits, t.lie Affidavit of 
Randall C. Budge filed here~1th (to which is attached a copy of the transcript of the deposition of 
Steven Cummings ("Cummings Dep.")), and the record herein, each incorporated by reference. 
ARGUMENT 
A. DEFENDANT INCORPORATES ALL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
CONTAINED IN.DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM. 
Plaintiffs argument that the terms of any agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant 
were merged into the Warranty Deed recorded by Northern Title Company ofidaho (''Northern 
Title") on August 3, 2007 as Instrument 99303 ("Original Warranty Deed") has already been 
addressed and refuted in Defendant's Summary Judgment Memorandum. All argument and 
authority contained in Defenda..11t's Summary Judgment Memorandum are hereby incorporated by 
reference as if fully set forth herein. Additional argument and authority concerning the issues 
raised by Plaintiff in his Motion for Summary Judgment, and his memorandu..rn in support 
thereof, is found below. 
B. THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL 
WARRANTY DEED CONTAINED A l\IIlSTAKE. 
Plaintiff argues that the doctrine of merger entitles him to all of the real property ovvned 
by the Roger L. and Barbara L. Stephens Family Trust ("Stephens Family Trust") described in 
the Original Warranty Deed, including all real property located east of :Highway 30. However, 
the doctrine of merger does not apply because the legal description of the Original Warranty 
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Deed was not intended to include any real property located east of Highway 30. The Original 
Warranty Deed was properly modified. See section 
Memorandum. 
of Defendant's Summary Judgment 
Plaintiff, in his deposition, states that he understood he was purchasing the entire 
"StephensRanch." See Cummings Dep. 63:8-23, 65:19-66:2; 139:25-140:11. Plaintiff also 
testified that once he saw any "excepting language, yes, it put up major flags." See Cummings 
Dep. 115:16-24. Plaintiff claims that such "major flags" went up because the owner's policy he 
received from Northern Title contained "exception language," while the legal description of the 
original purchase and sale agreement that he claims to have received did not contain a_11y 
"exception language." See id., 114: 12-23; Exhibit "20" to Cummings Dep. 
However, the record clearly establishes that Plaintiff, prior to the closing, W?-S specifically 
told and shovvn that the real property he was purchasing included only real property located on 
the west side of Highway 30. See Defendant's Summary Judgment Memorandum. Plaintiff also 
refers to the Original Warranty Deed as "transferring portions of Stephens Ranch to the 
Plaintiff" See Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
August 6, 2010, page 2 (emphasis added). Plaintiff was aware that he was not purchasing the 
entire "Stephens Ranch," and understood prior to closing that the portion of the "Stephens 
Ranch" for sale was located only on the west side of Highway 30. 
fa addition, Plaintiffs testimony that he was unaware of any real property being excepted 
from the sale is inconsistent with the facts and his ovvn testimony. Plaintiff insists that he was 
not aware of any property owned by Defendant that would be excluded from the sale. See 
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Cummings Dep. 63 139:25--140:11 In order to purchase the real property from 
Defendant, however, Plaintiff had to buy out the interests of another potential purchaser who had 
previously signed a purchase and sale agreement See Cummings Dep. 56:14-59:4. As part of 
that buyout, Plaintiff was required to sign an Assignment Agreement. See Cummings Dep. 
98: 16-99 :5; Exhibit "7" to Cummings Dep. The legal description attached to the Assignment 
Agreement contains "exception language." See Cummings Dep. 63:24--64:3, 139:25-140:11; 
Exhibit "7" to Cummings Dep. Such "exception language" on the Assignment Agreement was 
the type of language Plaintiff claimed would have raised a major flag as to what he was 
purchasing. See Cummings Dep. 63:24--64:3, 139:25-140:11; Exhibit "7" to Cummings Dep. 
Although Plaintiff claims that the legal description of the Assignment Agreement was not 
something he recognized before the closing, Plaintiff would have seen the legal description when 
he signed the Assignment Agreement, which was prior to the closing. 
Plaintiff was aware prior to the closing that the agreement with Defendant was to 
purchase real property located only west of Highway 30. See Defendant's Summary Judgment 
Memorandum. A mistake was clearly made on the legal description of the Original Warranty 
Deed. See id. The doctrine of merger does not apply and Plaintiff is not entitled to the real 
property located east of Highway 30. 
C. ANY COVENANTS TO DEFEND THE TITLE DO NOT APPLY BECAUSE NO 
TIDRD PARTY IS INVOLVED. 
Plaintiff argues that the Original Warranty Deed was breached when a corrected Warranty 
Deed was re-recorded by Northern Title on November 8, 2007 as Instrument #199911 
("Correction Warranty Deed"). Plaintiff contends that such alleged breach requires Defendant to 
defend the title of the real property due to the covenants of seisen, right to convey, quiet 
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enjoyment, warranty, and further assurances. However, such covenants do not apply where no 
third party is involved. Regardless, the Original Warranty Deed was not breached by Defendant 
because it contained a mistake that was properly corrected. See Defendant' Summary Judgment 
Memorandum. 
Even if the correcting and re-recording of the Original Warranty Deed was improper, 
which it was not, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that in order to "sustain[] a claim for breach 
of a covenant of title," "a grantee must prove that a third party had a valid interest in the 
property." Kaelker v. Turnbull, 127 Idaho 262, 265, 899 P.2d 972, 975 (1995). The Court in 
Kaelker stated that: 
It is axiomatic that the plaintiff in an action for breach of covenants of title has the 
burden of proving that he was evicted or prevented from using the conveyed 
property by a person asserting title paramount to that of the plaintifrs . ... 
"[A] covenant of warranty of title does not extend to apparent or unfounded titles 
in land, but only against hostile titles, superior in fact to those of the grantor." 
L_56 20 Am.Jur.2d, [Covenants, Conditions, & Restrictions], Section 56. [The 
grantees'] inability to prove that there was in fact a valid easement in a third 
party's favor at the time the [grantees] purchased the property from the [grantor] 
was fatal to their claim that [the grantors] breached the warranties of title made to 
[the grantees] at the time of the conveyance. 
See id. (emphasis added) (quoting Roper v. Elkhorn at Sun Valley, 100 Idaho 790, 794-95, 605 
P .2d 968, 972-73 (1980)). The Court added that"[ a]t issue in Roper was whether the grantee 
was prevented from using the property by a third party with a valid interest," that "[w]hether a 
grantee is or is not evicted from the property is important only to the extent it reflects a legal 
determination of whether third parties had valid interests in the property," and that "the covenant 
of title is breached when there are 'hostile titles, superior in fact to those of the grantor."' 
Kaelker, 127 Idaho at 265-66, 899 P.2d at 975-76 (emphasis in original). 
This case does not involve a third party asserting title superior to that Defendant (the 
DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFP'S MOTION POR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 5 
grantor). It instead involves a grantor who never intended to sell certain real property that was 
mistakenly included on the Original Warranty Deed. See Defendant's Summary Judgment 
Memorandum. The facts indicate that Plaintiff was aware that the real property mistakenly 
included in the Original Warranty was not intended to be part of the sale. See id.; Cummings 
Dep. 63:24-64:3, 139:25-140:11; Exhibit "7" to Cummings Dep. Plaintiff has produced no 
evidence that a third party claims superior title to any of the real property contained on the legal 
description of the Original Warranty Deed. Thus, Plaintiffs inability to prove that a third party 
claims superior title "at the time [Plaintiff] purchased the property from the [Defendant is] fatal 
to [Plaintiffs] claim that [Defendant] breached the warranties of title made to [Plaintiff] at the 
time of the conveyance." Kaelker, 127 Idaho at 265, 899 P.2d at 975 (quoting Roper, 100 Idaho 
at 794-95, 605 P .2d at 972-73 ). Plaintiff is not entitled to relief for any "lost value," recovery of 
the purchase price, or his attorneys fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests that the Court deny Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment for the reasons that ( 1) the doctrine merger does not apply because the Original 
Warranty Deed contained a mistake in the legal description, (2) the Original Warranty Deed was 
properly corrected by Northern Title, (3) Defendant did not breach the Original Warranty Deed, 
and ( 4) Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for breach of a covenant of title because no third pai1y 
claims a valid superior interest in any of the subject properties. 
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DATED this 11- day of October, 2010. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
By~-~~N-D-A~~-L+r+---.B-U-~-G-':;-J~~~-
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Nathan M. 0 lsen 
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2105 Coronado Street 
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Brad H. Bearnson 
Bearnson & Peck, L.C. 
399 North Main, Ste 300 
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[ ] 
[ ] 
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Overnight Mail 
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Fax 
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Nathan M. Olsen, ISB 7373 
BEARD ST CLAIR GAFFNEY P.A. 
21 0 5 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
email: nathan@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
DISTRICT coun 
SIXTH JIJO!CIAL DISHtlCT 
9EAR LAJ\E COUNTY. !DAMO 
ZDIOOCT 14 PH r: 5~ 
K RY D 
Ji::PUTY _____ CASE NG. 
DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BEAR LAKE COUNTY IDAHO 
STEVEN CUMMINGS, an individual 
residing in Montana 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROGER L. STEPHENS, an individual 
residing in Providence, Utah, JOHN DOES 
I-X 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-09-183 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, Steven Cummings, (Cummings), offers the following response in 
opposition to the Defendants' Roger L. Stephens and John Does I-X (Stephens Et Al) 
motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(e), Cummings further urges the 
Court to strike affidavits of Dorothy Julian, Evan Skinner insofar as to their representations 
of the property boundaries, acreage or condition (with the exception of Exhibit 1 ), Lori 
Thornock and Roger Stephens' s affidavits that were submitted by the Defendants in 
support of their summary judgment. This memorandum is supported by the pleadings on 
file, the affidavit of Nathan Olsen and the arguments stated below. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Defendants' disingenuous motion for summary judgment in fact, a disguised 
response to Cummings' motion for summary judgment. The Defendants are attempting to 
subvert the clear and unambiguous language of the warranty deed granting Cummings the 
Stephens Ranch consisting of acreage on both sides of Hwy 30 near Montpelier by 
suggesting that there is a "mutual mistake." However, the Defendants fall woefolly short 
in proving the strict standard for setting aside the clear language of a deed, which is that 
there be clear and convincing evidence of a mistake as to a material fact of the contract by 
both parties at the time of the agreement. 
Cummings has repeatedly and consistently stated that he was relying on the 
property legal description that was attached to the purchase agreement and the title 
commitment, which consisted of the Stephens ranch located on both sides of HWY 30, and 
which was later reflected in the warranty deed recorded on August 2007, 
(notwithstanding the exclusionary language). Thus, Defendants do not have any factual 
basis from Cummings suggesting a mistake, and their motion should be denied for that 
reason alone. 
Further, according to a signed realtor customer agreement, Cummings was 
instructed not to rely on any statements of the Defendants' agents for boundary lines or 
acreage, but rather the writing itself and his own due diligence. Thus, the testimony of Exit 
Realty agents Evan Skinner and Dorothy Julian submitted by the Defendants 
(notwithstanding their inconsistencies and lack of credibility) cannot be relied on and are 
irrelevant and should be excluded by the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(e). Moreover, the 
affidavit of Lori Thornock should be excluded because she was not involved whatsoever in 
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the negotiation the agreement and the closing instructions to Cummings from Northern 
Title Company of Idaho (Northern Title) also indicate that verbal representations were not 
to be relied upon. The affidavit of Roger Stephens should also be excluded because his 
testimony is not contemporaneous with the negotiation of the agreement, but rather several 
months after the transaction had closed. 
The Defendants' motion should be summarily denied because on its face it alleges 
material issues of fact Moreover, because there is simply no basis or admissible evidence 
supporting the extraordinary measure of setting aside the clear language of the deed, 
Cummings' motion for summary judgment should be granted. In addition, the Defendants' 
motion and is frivolous, without basis, and therefore Cummings should be awarded 
attorney fees and costs under I.C. 12-121 for having to respond to this baseless motion. 
MATERIAL FACTS 
Below are some supplemental facts to the statement of facts in Cummings' initial 
motion for summary judgment that are relevant to Cummings' response to the Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment: 
As a part of his due diligence in purchasing the Stephens Ranch, Cummings 
contacted agents from Exit Realty to obtain a copy of the Three Bar Ranches purchase 
agreement, a written legal description of the property, and a title commitment. (Cummings 
Dep. 80-84, Sep. 27, 2010.) In response, Exit Realty agents faxed him a copy of the Three 
Bar Ranches purchase agreement, a copy of the addendum to that agreement containing a 
legal description, as well as a copy of the title commitment that included the legal 
description. 1 (Id.) (See Exit Realty faxes dated Jul 27, 2007, Olsen Aff. Exh. 1.) The legal 
1 The Court should note that the Defendants failed to produce a copy of the purchase agreement in support of 
its motion for summary judgment. This crucial omission should speak volumes to the Court about the 
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description addendum is a replicate copy of what was contained in Exit Realty's file that 
has been produced in this case. (Olsen Ex. Cummings then compared the legal 
description with plat maps kept by Bear Lake County Idaho to confirm that the description 
included parcels of the Stephens Ranch contained on both sides of HWY 30. (Cummings 
Dep. 82-84) 
The east side parcels of Stephens Ranch were of particular importance to 
Cwnmings because of their CRP value and his ultimate intention to develop the 
recreational value of the east side property. (Id. at 63-66, 135, 140) Cummings would not 
have proceeded with the purchase of the property without the parcels contained on the east 
side of HWY 30, and would have purchased a different more attractive property. (Id. at 
140) 
The agents for Exit Realty had Cummings sign a "Buyer Due Dilligence Checklist" 
date July 26, 2007 (Skinner Aff. Exh. 1, Olsen Aff. 2) Section "3" of that document 
states in part the following: 
Buyer (Cummings) acknowledges that the Company (Exit Realty) should not be 
relied upon for any determination as to the boundaries of the Property or any 
encroachments within or over the actual boundaries of the Property. (Id.) 
The document further states in all caps: 
BUYER IS ADVISED NOT TO RELY ON THE COMPANY, OR ANY OF ITS 
AGENTS OF THE COMP ANY FOR A DETERMINATION REGARDING THE 
PHYSICAL OR LEGAL CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY. 
Section "9" of the document further states: 
If the square footage or acreage of the Property is of material concern to Buyer, 
Buyer is advised to verify the square footage or acreage through any independent 
complete lack of written evidence supporting their allegation that this was supposedly a mutual mistake. 
Simply put, the signed purchase agreement, as provided to Mr. Cummings on July 26, 2007, (as indicated 
by the fax headers), and as kept in the records of Exit Realty, without question prove that Cummings was 
purchasing Stephens Ranch with parcels on the east side of HWY 30. 
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sources or means deemed appropriate by Buyer. In the event that the Company 
provides any numerical statements regarding these items, such statements are 
approximations only. Buyer is advised not to rely on seller, the Company or any 
agents of the Company for a determination regarding the square footage or 
acreage of the Property. (emphasis added) (Id.) 
Cummings had no personal contact with Roger Stephens prior to closing the 
purchase on the Stephens Ranch. Prior to the closing, Cummings had no contact with 
agents for Northern Title other than to confirm times and locations of where he would sign 
the closing documents. 
In the "Escrow General provisions" provided to Cummings by Northern Title is the 
following statement in Section "3:" 
The parties agree that the only representations of Escrow Agent (No1ihern Title) 
upon which they are entitled to rely or act are those that are in writing and executed 
by Escrow Agent and that the parties are not entitled to act or rely on conflicting 
oral or written terms or directions given to Escrow Agent prior to closing. 
(emphasis added) (0 lsen Aff. Ex. 4) 
The paragraph further states that "the terms of this paragraph shall not affect the parties' 
rights between themselves." (Id.) The warranty deed that was prepared by Northern Title 
and recorded on August 3, 2007, described Stephens Ranch on both sides of HWY 30 
(notwithstanding the exclusionary language.) 
In short, virtually all of the relevant written documents in this case explicitly 
indicate that the sale involved the Stephens Ranch including parcels east side of HWY 30, 
or they indicate that oral statements made by the Defendants or their agents suggesting 
otherwise were not to be relied upon to determine the acreage or boundaries of the property 
subject to the sale. 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
motion for summary judgment shall granted the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 
IDAHO R. C1v. P. 56( c ); G&lif Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-17 (Idaho 
1991). It is recognized that when assessing the motion for sumrnrn-y judgment, the court 
must draw all facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party. G & lif Farms v. Funk 
Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho at 517; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874 
(Ct. App. 1994); Haessley v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 121Idaho463 (Idaho 1992). 
The moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of 
material fact. Tingly v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89 (Idaho 1994). The non-moving party 
must establish a genuine issue of material fact regrn-ding the elements challenged by the 
moving party's motion. Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720 (Idaho 1990) 
(citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)); see also Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 
102 (Idaho 1988). 
ARGUMENT 
L The express terms of a written deed cannot be reformed unless there is clear 
and convincing evidence at the time of the transaction of a mutual mistake. 
"For over 100 years, the (Idaho) supreme court has held that a contract for the sale 
of real property must speak for itself and that a court may not admit parol evidence to 
supply any terms of the contract." Ray v. Frasure, 145 Idaho 625, 628; 200 P.3d 1174, 
1177 (2009). The Defendants are requesting that the Court take the extraordinrn-y step of 
altering the contract and deed to exclude no less than 87 valuable road side acres from the 
sale, alleging that there was a "mutual mistake." However, in making such a bold 
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argument, Defendants have conveniently omitted the crucial evidentiary burden of proving 
mutual mistake that there be "clear and convincing evidence" of a material mistake both 
paiiies at the time of the transaction for which they have the burden of proving. 
The supreme court has repeatedly emphasized in the strongest of terms the 
Defendants' evidentiary burden in setting aside the written deed: 
A gra11tor seeking to show that an absolute conveyance is not what it naturally 
purports to be has the burden of making strict proof of such fact. Having given the 
transaction the form of a bargain sale, slight and indefinite evidence should not be 
permitted to change its character. The writing itself stands as the clearly ascertained 
intention of the parties which must be enforced unless it is shown by convincing 
evidence that it was under a different mutual intention of the parties that the 
instrument was delivered and accepted. From an examination of the authorities it 
appears that, while the same formula of words has not always been used, the rule 
has been uniformly announced, in such cases, to be that the proof must be clear, 
satisfactory and convincing. This court has repeatedly held that one who seeks to 
prove that an instrument which purports on its face to be an absolute conveyance of 
title is in fact a mortgage must do so by that degree of proof. Hill v Daugherty, 63 
Idaho 12, 18 (Idaho 1941) (citations omitted) 
Moreover, 
A party seeking reformation of an instrument bears a heavy burden of proof. The 
evidence must be clear and satisfactory, leaving but little, if any, doubt of the 
mistake. It must be made out by the clearest and most satisfactory testimony, such 
as to leave no fair and reasonable doubt on the mind that tl1e writing does not 
correctly embody the real intention of the parties. A mere preponderance of the 
evidence will not suffice, and the burden of proof is on the party alleging the mutual 
mistake. Collins v. Parkinson, 98 Idaho 871, 874 (Idaho 1978) 
See also, O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909 (Idaho 2008)(citations 
omitted), (The mistake must be common to both parties, and must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence) and Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 482 (Idaho 2006) (citations 
omitted) (The party alleging the mutual mistake has the burden of proving it by clear and 
convincing evidence.) 
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In addition to being proven by clear and convincing evidence, the mistake must be 
common to parties at the tirne of contracting. v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, P.2d 
20, 26 (1997). See also, Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 482 (Idaho 2006) 
Further, the party alleging the mistake has the burden of proving it Collins v. Parkinson, 
96 Idaho 294, 296 (Idaho 1974) 
II. The alleged mistake, if any, was not mutual, and is contrary to virtually every 
writing, including the purchase agreement, title commitment, and deed. 
The entire basis of the Defendants' alleged mistake is that Mr. Cummings was 
"told" by agents from Exit Realty that the sale only included property from the west side of 
HWY 30. However, at no point has Cummings ever indicated that he believed that the east 
side property was being excluded from the sale. Before the Court can even consider 
whether there is mutual mistake worthy of reforming the contract, there must be clear and 
convincing evidence of a material mistake by both parties that leaves "little, if any doubt of 
the mistake." Collins v. Parkinson at 874. Cummings affidavits and deposition provides 
little or no doubt that there was not a mutual mistake. 
When Mr. Cummings visited the property, he was attracted by the east side 
property, in particular to the CRP on the east side and the potential development value. 
Cummings testified in his deposition that when he was shown the property he was told that 
approximately 100 acres of the original ranch had been deeded to the seller's son, but that 
there was a remaining piece that was part of a CRP. (Cummings Dep. 63-66, 135, 140) A 
typical example of that testimony is as follows: 
Q. Earlier in your statement you mentioned that at the time you met with Evan 
Skinner that he discussed the CRP that was on the east side of the highway, the 
property that was in the CRP. What kind of a factor was the CRP in your 
decision to purchase the property? 
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A. Well, there were a couple of things going on. Typically I purchase land, all land 
on the east side, almost that's just typical the way I do it, the highway. And 
the CRP was something that I was not experienced with but that I heard could 
help bring in income. Like I said, I looked for ways to generate income and I 
was going to add new income to it. (13 5 Ins 6-23) 
Cummings also testified that he chose the Stephens property over another property that had 
more acreage specifically because of the CRP land on the east side. (Id.) 
More importantly, Cummings has repeatedly testified that pursuant to his many 
years in real estate transactions that he relied primarily on the writings to determine the size 
and boundaries of property, which he did in this case. (Id. at 95:2-3, 19-20) When 
questioned about what due diligence he took in determining the boundaries of the property, 
Cummings indicated that he sought and received a copy of the legal description of the 
property, which he obtained both in the purchase agreement with Three Bar Ranches and 
the title commitment. (Id. at 81-83) He then compared the legal description with a plat 
map to determine the size and scope of his property, which included parcels on both sides 
of the highway: 
A. At the time when I performed the due diligence I mentioned that I went to 
the county records and pulled up a plat map and roughly put that against the 
legal description, at that time is when I verified it. (Id. 83: 14-16) ... 
Q. And that comparison of the plat map, then would have been after you got 
(the legal description sent by Exit Realty) as part of your due diligence you 
went to the courthouse and looked it up? 
A. I used a map against the legal description, yes. (84: 14-19) 
In short, the Defendants have a stringent evidentiary burden to demonstrate that the 
alleged mistake was common. O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909. Not 
only have the Defendants fallen well short of such a burden, they have not offered one 
scintilla of evidence emanating from Cummings suggesting that Cummings believed or 
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understood that he was not purchasing the acreage on the east side of HWY 30 that was 
contained in the legal description in the documents he reviewed prior to the sale. The 
Defendants' frivolous motion should be dismissed and Cummings' motion granted. 
III. The testimony relied on in support of the summary judgment motion should 
be excluded pursuant to the agreement of the parties or because it was not 
"at the time of contracting" 
The testimony offered by the Defendants in support of its allegation of mutual 
mistake is not admissible even for the purposes of determining whether there was a mistake 
because such testimony is irrelevant or is excluded under agreement by the parties. l.R.C.P. 
56( e) requires that affidavits be considered on summary judgment only where they are 1) 
made "on personal knowledge," 2) "set forth such facts a would be admissible in 
evidence," and 3) "show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated therein." Affidavits may not be based on evidence that would not be admissible at 
trial. State v, Shama Resources, Ltd., 127 Idaho 267, 271, 889 P.2d 966, 981 (1995) 
Regardless of any oral representations about the boundaries and acreage of the 
property by Exit Realty agents Evan Skinner and Dorothy Julian, such statements are 
specifically excluded from consideration by agreement. According to the "Buyer Due 
Dilligence Checklist" dated July 26, 2007, that Cummings testified that he received and 
signed (Cummings Dep. 93-94) and Mr. Skinner also attested to (Skinner Aff Ex. 1, Olsen 
Aff. Ex. 3), Cummings was not to rely on any oral representations made by the seller or 
seller's agents about the description of the property. In fact, the agreement states in three 
different places and in ALL CAPS that Cummings as buyer was not to rely on the agents' 
representations but upon the writings and his own due diligence. (Id.) 
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The Defendants cannot on the one hand inform Cummings not to rely on 
representations from the agents or seller about the description of the prope1iy at the time 
the transaction, and then themselves rely on such alleged statements as evidence before the 
Court. The parties specifically agreed that such statements were irrelevant or immaterial to 
the size, scope and condition of the property. Ms. Julian's and Mr. Skinner's testimony 
with regard to the description of the property should be excluded even from consideration 
as to whether there was a mutual mistake. As agreed by the parties, such statements have 
no bearing whatsoever with regard to the boundaries and size of the property, and are 
therefore irrelevant and inadmissible pursuant to I.R.E. 402. 
Moreover, Northern Realty agent Lori Thornock' s statement cannot be relied upon 
as well to determine the legal description of the property. Notwithstanding the obvious fact 
that Ms. Thornock had no direct involvement in the negotiation of the contract, the closing 
instructions provided to Mr. Cummings also indicated that he was not to on conflicting 
oral or written terms or directions given to Escrow Agent prior to closing, and further that 
the closing instructions were not to affect any of the legal rights between the parties. (Olsen 
Aff. Ex. 4) Thus, the Defendants are simply prohibited from utilizing testimony from Ms. 
Thornock as the closing agent to allege "understandings" that are contrary to the written 
agreement between the parties. Her testimony becomes irrelevant under LR.E. 402 and 
should be excluded even to testify with regard to mutual mistake. 
Finally, the Defendants are attempting to rely on the testimony of the seller Roger 
Stephens, who never had any contact with Cummings prior to closing, and who did not 
speak or meet with Cummings until months after the transaction had closed. The 
defendants are under the strict burden of proving mutual mistake of a material fuct in the 
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contract at the time o.f contracting. Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho at 853. Thus, Mr. Stephens' 
testimony of contact with Cummings well-after-the-fact is also irrelevant in determining 
whether there was mutual mistake and should be excluded under I .R.E. 402. 
The entire basis for the Defendants' arguments consists of oral representations that 
belie the written documents, and which by contract or law are not admissible. It is yet 
another example of the completely baseless ru·gument being propounded by Defendants to 
deprive Cummings of the property that he purchased and should be rejected by this Court. 
IV. The Court should not reform the contract based on a "unilateral mistake" 
because Cummings has not "admitted" that there was a mistake and 
because he read and relied upon the writing. 
In perhaps an act of desperation, the Defendants attempt to misapply the holding of 
Belk v. Martin, 136 Idaho 652 (Idaho 2001) in support of its position that somehow the 
deed should be reformed even if the mistake was unilateral. Belk does stand for the 
proposition that under very rare circumstances an agreement can be changed if there is a 
unilateral mistake, "where there is misrepresentation or knowledge by the other party" (of 
the mistake). Id The facts in Belk, however, are inapposite to the facts of this case. In 
Belk, which involved a dispute over the rent amount in a lease, the party that did not make 
the mistake not only admitted that he knew what the correct rent was supposed to be, he 
also testified that he had never read or reviewed the written lease containing the incorrect 
rent. Id. 
In this case, Cummings has not even come close to admitting that there was a 
mistake, and has moreover testified that he not only read the writing, but primarily relied 
on the written document to determine the size and scope of the property he was purchasing. 
The rare factors required for a court to reform a contract under a unilateral mistake are 
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simply not present See also Cohen v. Merrill, 95 Idaho 99, 104, 503 P.2d 299, 304 (1972) 
(A to a contract who makes a mistake unilaterally cannot rescind or modify the 
agreement absent misrepresentation or lrnovvledge of the mistake by the other party.) 
There is simply no factual or legal basis for the Court to reform the deed based on 
unilateral mistake. 
V. The Defendants' motion and defense is frivolous, entitling Cummings his 
attorney fees 
If the Co mi grants Cummings his summary judgment motion, the only remaining 
issue in this case will be damages. The Defendants will be required to reimburse 
Cummings his attorney fees and costs as part of indemnifying Cummings on the Stephens 
Warranty deed as a part of those damages. However, because of the Defendants' baseless 
defense, including their pointless motion, it is appropriate now for the Court to award 
Cummings his underidaho Code§ 12-121, andI.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). Under these 
provisions, when the coUii is left with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, 
or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the prevailing party is 
entitled to fees and costs. See also Michalk v. Michalk, 220 P.3d 580 (Idaho 2009). 
From the outset of this case, it has become more and more clear that the Defendants 
have no legal or factual basis or foundation for setting aside the clear \vritten language of 
the deed and the writings in which Cummings based his decision to purchase the Stephens 
Ranch for $850,000. None of the documents that Cummings reviewed as part of his due 
diligence prior to the sale indicate that all of the Stephens Ranch east of HWY 30 was to be 
excluded. Cummings has also testified that the east side property was a key component of 
his decision to purchase the property. The parties agreed that any oral representations by 
agents of the seller or even the seller of the size, scope and condition of the property were 
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not to be relied upon. Defendants have absolutely no evidence to suggest that there was a 
mutual mistake, not even close to obtaining the high burden of proof to set 
the deed. 
In short, the Defendants have no facts to support its defense, which it should have 
been aware of upon review of the facts and documents in this case. Upon learning that 
there was a problem that shorted Cummings acreage from the transaction, rather than team 
up with the third parties in this case to create additional costs and burdens to Cummings, 
the defendant Roger Stephens should have followed his obligations under the August 3, 
2007, Warranty Deed and provided Cummings the full property that was included in the 
bargain. 
If Northern Title or any other third party is truly at fault in this case, then Stephens 
should seek relief from these 3rd parties. It is utterly inappropriate for Stephens to instead 
conspire with and combine efforts with these liable 3rd parties to escape his obligations 
under the Warranty Deed and cause Cummings to incur additional legal fees and delays to 
obtain relief. Such abuse of the system is the type of conduct envisioned under LC. l 
121, and the Court should award Cummings his fees and costs accordingly and impose any 
other appropriate sanctions as the Court deems fit. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing, the Defendants motion for summary judgment should be 
denied, Cummings motion granted, and Cummings should be awarded fees for the 
Defendants' frivolous defense. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
STEVEN CUMMINGS, an individual 
residing in Montana, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
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) 
) 
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ROGER L. STEPHENS, an individual ) 
residing in Providence, Utah, JO~IN DOES ) 
I-X. ) 
Defendants. 
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Case No. CV-09-183 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendant Roger L. Stephens, an individual ("Defendant"), by and 
through counsel, and hereby submits this Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Defendant set forth an Introduction and Statement of Undisputed Facts in 
Defendant's Memorandurn in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed September 22, 
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2010 ("Defendant's Summary Judgment Memorandum"), which are incorporated herein as if set 
forth fully. This Reply is supported by Defondanfs Summary Judgment Memorandum, 
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed October 1 2010 
("Defendant's Response Memorandum"), all supporting affidavits, and the record herein, each 
incorporated herein by reference. 
ARGUMENT 
A. DEFENDANT INCORPORATES ALL ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
CONTAINED IN DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM 
AND DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE MEMORANDUM. 
Any and all argument by Plaintiff Steven Cummings ("Plaintiff') that the terms of the 
Warranty Deed recorded by Northern Title Company of Idaho ("Northern Title") on August 3, 
2007 as Instrument# 199303 ("Original Warranty Deed") control has already been addressed and 
refuted in Defendant's Summary Judgment Memorandum and Defendant's Response 
Memorandum. Additional argument and authority is found below. 
B. THE CORRECTION WARRANTY DEED IS THE l<'INAL AND FORMAL 
AGREEMENT BETWE.EN THE PARTIES. 
Plaintiff continually argues that the doctrine of merger entitles him to all of the real 
property owned by the Roger L. and Barbara L. Stephens Family Trust ("Stephens Family Trust") 
described in the Original Warranty Deed, inciuding all real property located east of Highway 30. 
However, the ev1dence is clear that the re-recorded and corrected Warranty Deed by Northern 
Title on November 8, 2007 as Instrument #199911 ("Correction Warranty Deed") is the "final 
and formal contract executed by the partiesn that was "delivered and accepted as performance of 
the contract to .;onvey!' See Estes v. Barry, 132 Idaho 82, 85, 967 P.2d 284, 287 (1998) (quoting 
Jolley v. ldah(J Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 382, 414 P.2d 879, 884 (1966)). 
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T:1e Original Warranty Deed was recorded on August 3, 2007. See Exhibit "8" to 
Cummings Dep. The Correction Warranty Deed was recorded November 8, 2007. See Exhibit 
"11" to Cummings Dep. Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he first received a copy of the 
Original Warranty Deed at the same time he received a copy of the Correction Warranty Deed. 
which was in approximately April 2008. See Cummings Dep. 100:18-101 :6, 112:16-21. 
Alf 1ough it is unclear whether Plaintiff received a separate copy of the Original Warranty Deed 
or if he received only a copy of the Correction Warranty Deed (which shows on its face that the 
Original Warranty Deed was recorded on August 3, 2007), it is clear that Plaintiff received both 
deeds at the same time. See id. It is also clear that any copy of the Original Warranty Deed 
received by Plaintiff was received after the Correction Warranty Deed was recorded. The 
Correction Warranty Deed is the final and formal agreement that was delivered and accepted as · 
performancCJ of the contract to convey, and Plaintiff has the burden of showing that it does not 
accurately reflect the intent of the parties. 
C. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS ALLOWED WHERE THERE WAS A MISTAKE, 
AN.L> PLAINTIFF WAS AW ARE PRIOR TO AND AT THE CLOSING THAT 
THJ: LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS CONTAINED A MISTAKE. 
Jf the Court determines that the Correction Warranty Deed is not the final agreement 
betwee11 the parties, the Original W arrMty Deed dearly contained a mistake. Plaintiff argues 
that the Coun should not allow any parol evidence to supply terms of the Original Wan·anty 
Deec, a:1c that Defendant has not met his burden of proving either a common mutual mistake or 
a unilt:tteral mistake by clear and convincing evidence. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, has 
stated that extrinsic evidence is allowed to show the existence of a mistake. Additionally, the 
e:>Jrmsic evidence submitted by Defendant does not attempt to modify the terms of any 
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ag1eement The extrinsic evidence instead demonstrates the existence of a mistake. Such 
evidence allows the Court to find that Plaintiff clearly knew ( 1) the real property he was 
pi.rcbasing induded only real property located west of Highway 30, and/or (2) a mistake was 
n .ade on the respective legal descriptions on which Plailltiff claims he was relying. 
The Idaho Supreme Court stated in Belk v. Martin that "[pJarol evidence ... is alJowed to 
c adfy that a te1111 of the contract was a mistake." 136 Idaho 652, 657, 39 PJd 592, 597 (2001); 
see Posey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 141Idaho477, 482, 11IP.3d162, 167 (Ct App. 2005). 
·r ne Court in Belk also stated that "[p)arol evidence is also admissible to prove that by reason of 
. mutual mistake the written agreement does not express the pai1ies' true intent," and that 
·'f.:: Jxtrinsic evidence should be allowed where there has been a unilateral mistake made by a 
~1brty and the other party has knowledge of the mistake." See id. at 657-58, 39 P.3d at 597-98. 
s.,ch extrinsic evidence is "admissible to show the intent of the parties." See id at 658, 39 P.3d 
at 598. PlainW f argues that Belk is inapposite to this case and that Defendant has misapplied its 
holding. HoVvever, Belk does not require that a party admit they knew of a mistake. Belk instead 
!'eQuires the evidence show that a party had knowledge of the mistake. See id. at 657-58, 39 P.3d 
ctt 597-98. n.us, although Plaintiff has not admitted thel'e was a mistake, the extrinsic evidence 
shows that PlaintitY did have knowledge at the time of the closing that a mistake was made. 
The extrinsic evidence clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff was aware that the real property 
he was purchasing was located only west of Highway 30. See Defendant's Summmy Judgment 
MemoranduII,; Defendant's Response Memorandum. Plaintiff, prior to closing, was told 
·
1erba}ly by the real estate agents that the real pl'operty for sale was located only west of Highway 
'0, was giver, a copy of a USDA Farm S0rvice Agency map displaying the property as lying all 
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on th0 west side of Highway 30, was physically shown on a map that the property for sale was 
lV'-'""'-'" only west of Highway 30, and at the courtesy closing had a copy of a plat map shov.ring 
that the property he was purchasing was located only west of Highway 30. See id.; see also 
Cummings Dep. 70:22-71: 1 (wherein Plaintiff admits that he saw a copy of the USDA Farm 
Service Agency map prior to closing). 
The extrinsic evidence also clearly shows that a mistake was made on each document 
allegedly relied on by Plaintiff. The legal descriptions attached to the real estate purchase and 
sale agreement dated July 25, 2007 ("PSA") and the initial Commitment for Tltle Insurance 
referenced as Order No. NTBL· l 183 on or about July 31, 2007 ("Title Commitment") clearly 
include a mistake as shown by the continuous progression of the following documents from 
containing no exception language, to containing exception language in the ·wrong location, to 
containing exception language in the correct location: ( 1) the PSA (containing no exception 
language); (2) the Title Commitment (containing no exception language); (3) the revised 
Commitment for Title Insurance ("Second Title Commitment") (containing exception language 
in the wrong location); (4) the Original Warranty Deed (containing exception language in the 
wrong location); (5) the Correction Warranty Deed (containing exception language in the correct 
location); and (6) the Owners Policy of Title Insurance ("Title Policy") (containing exception 
language in the correct location). See Defendant's Summary Judgment Memorandum; 
Defendant's Response Memorandum; Exhibit "20" to Cummings Dep.; Exhibits "1 '', "2","5'', 
"6", and "7" to Thornock Aff. The fact that each document contained a different version of the 
legal description in and of itself evidences that something was wrong and that the legal 
descriptions attached to the PSA and Title Commitment contained a mistake. 
DEFENDANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY .mDGMENT • Pa~e 5 
10111il2010 13:40 FAX 201:1 23 5109 RACINE, OLSON li1J 007 /0012 
Additionally, Plaintiff cannot claim that he was relying on the PSA and Title 
Commitment legal descriptions and then turn around and ask that the Original Warranty Deed be 
enforced "notwithstanding the exclusionary language." The PSA and Title Commitment legal 
descriptions clearly differ from the Original Warranty Deed legal description. The PSA and Title 
Commitment legal descriptions also include more real property than the Original Warranty Deed 
legal description (including real property not belonging to Defendant). If Plaintiff did in fact rely 
on and verify the PSA and Title Commitment legal desc.riptions, then the differing Original 
Warranty Deed legal description does not reflect Plaintiffs understanding of the transaction. In 
addition, because the PSA and Title Commitment legal descriptions contained real property not 
belonging to Defendant, Plaintiff would have seen that those legal description were erroneous 
and contained a mistake. 
Based on the testimony of all witnesses produced by Defendant, including the seller of 
the real property and the individuals who prepared the respective legal descriptions, no real 
property located east of Highway 30 was ever intended to be included in the sale or on the legal 
descriptions. The extrinsic evidence clearly demonstrates that the intent from the beginning was 
for the legal descriptions and the sale to include real property located only west of Highway 30. 
The record shows that a mistake was made on the legal descriptions attached to the PSA, the 
Title Commitment, the Second Title Commitment, and the Original Warranty Deed. The record 
also shows that Plaintiff was aware, at the time of the dosing, that (I) the real property he was 
purchasing from Defendant was to be located only west of Highway 30, and/or (2) the legal 
descriptions on which he claims he was relying contained a mistake. 
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D. THE AFFIDAVITS SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANT ARE ADMISSIBLE. 
Plaintiff argues that the affidavits of Dorothy Julian, Evan Skinner, Lori Thornock, and 
Defendant are not relevant or based on evidence that would be admissible at triaL Such 
affidavits, however, produce testimony and documentation admissible as extrinsic evidence in 
showing Plaintiff's knowledge that the real property he was purchasing was intended to include 
property located only west of Highway 30, as well as the existence of a mistake on the legal 
descriptions attached to the documents involved in this case. See Belk, 136 Idaho at 657-58, 39 
P.3d at 597~98; Posey, 141 Idaho at 482, 111 P.3d at 167. The affidavits submitted by Defendant 
are relevant and admissible and should not be excluded. 
E. THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF IS NOT CREDIBLE. 
If the Court determines that the Correction Warranty Deed is not the final agreement 
between the parties, Defendant submits that the testimony of Plaintiff is not credible, and that it 
will be found to be not credible by this Court. It instead appears that Plaintiff, in executing a 
rushed 1031 exchange and learning of a mistake in the legal description after the fact, is now 
attempting to receive more real property than that upon which the parties agreed. 
Plaintiff testifies that at the time of the closing he did not understand that the prope1ty 
was located only west of Highway 30. See Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed October 13, 2010 ("Plaintiffs Response Memorandum"). 
Plaintiff testified that when he received the Correction Warranty J?eed and the Title Policy that 
he "knew there was something going on" because of the "excepting language." See Cummings 
Dep. 114:2-23, 115:16-24, 139:25-140:11. However, the Assignment Agreement Plaintiff 
signed prior to closing and the Original Warranty Deed that Plaintiff is asking the Court to 
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uphold also contrun such "excepting language." See Exhibits "7" and "8" to Cummings Dep.; 
section B of Defendant's Response Memorandum. If Plaintiff truly believed that no reai property 
was to be excluded, then such "excepting language" would have also "put up major flags" for 
Plaintiff See Cummings Dep. 115: 16~24. Plaintiff would also be asking this Court to conform 
the legal description attached to the Original Warranty Deed to the legal description as containe<l 
on the PSA and Title Commitment. Plaintiffs lack of action when signing the Assignment 
Agreement demonstrates his understanding that the property located east of Highway 30 was to 
be excepted, and that the PSA and Title Commitment legal descriptions contained a mistake. 
In addition, Plaintiff contends that he relied on and used the PSA and Title Commitment 
legal descriptions to determine the size and boundaries of the real property he believed he was 
purchasing. See Plaintiff's Response Memorandum, page 9. The legal descriptions attached to 
the PSA and Title Commitment, however, include real property located east of Highway 30 that 
did not belong to Defendant. See section C. above. The PSA and Title Commitment legal 
descriptions also include more real property than the legal description attached to the Original 
Warranty Deed. See id. If Plaintiff did "compare[J the legal description with a plat map to 
detem1ine the size and scope of his property," see Plaintiff's Response Memorandum, page 9, it 
is likely that his "many years in real estate transactions" would have alerted him to the fact that 
the legal descriptions were erroneous and contained a mistake by including real property that 
should not have been part of the sale. 
F. DEFENDANT'S MOTION AND DEFENSE ARE NOT FRIVOLOUS, AND 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendant has no legal or factual basis or foundation for setting aside 
the Original Warranty Deed and the Miting in which Plaintiff based his decision to purchase the 
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real property from Defendant. However, this reply memorandum, along with Defendant's other 
memoranda and legal authority submitted in this case, demonstrate otherwise. Defendant has a 
basis for setting aside the Original Warranty Deed because (1) the Correction Warranty Deed is 
the final agreement between the parties, (2) the Original Warranty Deed legal description 
contained a mistake, and/or (3) Plaintiff had knowledge of the mistake at the time the Original 
Warranty Deed was executed. 
If the Court determines that the Correction Warranty Deed is not the final agreement 
between the parties, then it appears that the discovery performed in this case sets forth competing 
factual contentions by the parties potentially making summary judgment inappropriate for either 
party. In such a case, it will be up to the Court to weigh the conflicting evidence and testimony 
and determine the credibility of the witnesses. See Belk, 136 Idaho at 659, 39 P.3d at 599; Cline 
v. Hoyle & Associates Ins., Inc., l 08 Idaho 162, 164, 697 P .2d 1176, 1178 (1985). 
Thus, Plaintiff cannot be found as the prevailing party. Instead, Defendant would be the 
prevailing party if the Court grams Defendant summary judgment as to the Correction Warranty 
Deed being the final agreement between the parties. If the Court determines that the Correction 
Warranty Deed is not the final agreement, there is conflicting evidence and testimony as to the 
existence of a mistake. Plaintiff is not entitled to fees and costs, and any request for sanctions is 
inappropriate. 
!X!NCLUSION 
The Correction Warranty Deed is the controlling final and formal agreement between the 
parties and was delivered and accepted as performance of the contract to convey. Alternatively, 
Defendant requests that the Court enter summary judgment in his favor declaring that ( 1) 
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Plaintiff had knowledge prior to closing that tbe real property for sale included prope11y located 
only west of Highway 30, Plaintiff had knowledge prior to the dosing that the legal 
descriptions upon which he was relying contained a mistake, (3) the Original \Vammty Deed 
legal description contained a mistake, ( 4) the Original Wananty Deed was properly corrected, 
and (5) the Correction Warranty Deed properly modified the Original Warranty Deed and is valid 
and enforceable. 
1t>+v) 
DATED this _i_o day of October, 2010. 
RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHARTERED 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _jbday of~iinber, 2010, I served a true and 
complete copy of the foregoing document on the following persons in the manner indicated: 
Nathan M. Olsen cr;{/ U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney PA [ ] Hand Delivery 
2105 Coronado Street [ y Overnight Mail 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 [YJ Fax 
Brad H. Bearnson 
Beamson & Peck, L.C. 
399 North Main, Ste 300 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Honorable David C. Nye 
Bannock County Comthouse 
624 Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
[~ U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[~ Fax 
[ . L, .. r" U.S. Mail/Postage Prepaid 
[ 11' Ha.rid Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ) Fax 
RANDALL C. BUDGE 
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DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BEAR LAKE COUNTY IDAHO 
STEVEN CUMMINGS, an individual 
residing in Montana 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROGER L. STEPHENS, an individual 
residing in Providence, Utah, JOHN DOES 
I-X 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-09-183 
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO 
DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, Steven Cummings, (Cummings), offers the following reply to Defendants' 
Roger Stephens and John Does I-X (Defendants) response to Plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment. Pursuant to LR.C.P. 56(e), Cummings furthernrges the Court to strike 
Section "B" of Defendants' response in that the section is based purely on the pleadings 
and Defendants' representations of sworn testimony and documents that were not verified 
to the Court. This memorandum is supported by the pleadings on file, the affidavit of 
Nathan Olsen and the arguments stated below. 
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 1 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Defendants misrepresent Cummings' Testimony 
In section "B" of its Response, the Defendants make several characterizations of 
Cummings' testimony, However, because the Defendants' failed to provide the Court the 
actual deposition transcript including the referenced documents, Defendants have not 
established foundation for its arguments and representations. Pursuant to 1.R.C.P. 56(e), an 
adverse party to a motion for summary judgment cannot merely rely on allegations or 
denials of the party's pleadings to refute the motion. Rather, the response must rely on 
affidavits to set forth specific mets showing that there is a genuine issue for triaL The 
Court should not merely rely on the Defendants' summary or representation of Cummings' 
testimony and/or documents. Thus, Section B of the Defendants' response should be 
disregarded by the Court. 
In any case, the Defendants have attempted to splice and contort lvf:r. Cummings' 
testimony to somehow suggest that Cummings understood that the east side property was 
excluded from the sale. For instance, Defendants mischaracterize an "Assignment 
Agreement" as Cummings' agreement to purchase Three Bar Ranches' interest in the 
property. (See Def, Resp, at 3) In fact, the Assignment Agreement was part of the 
documents and procedures involved with a 1031 Exchange that Cummings testified he 
doesn't recall reviewing until after closing. (Cummings Dep. 98: 16-25, 99: 1-5) In any 
case, the legal description contained with the Assignment Agreement notwithstanding the 
exclusion language still described at least 83 acres on the east side of HWY 30 that was 
part of the sale. (See Cummings Dep, Ex. 7) Thus, Defendants' argument with regard to the 
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 2 
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Assignment Agreement is a complete red herring and should be treated as such by the 
Defendants then try to pull bits and pieces out Cummings' testimony and affidavits, 
connecting them completely out of context to misrepresent his testimony. Upon review of 
Cummings' full testimony, the Court will easily conclude that Cummings believed that he 
was purchasing the Stephens ranch on both sides of HWY 30, with the exception of about 
100 acres that had been previously deeded to one of the Stephens' sons. (Cummings Dep. 
62-66) As part of his due diligence, Cummings obtained a purchase agreement and title 
commitment with a legal description. (Cummings Dep. 80-84) He then compared the legal 
description with a plat map at the county to confirm the property boundaries including 
portions on both sides of the highway. (Id.) There is simply no basis whatsoever within 
Cummings' whole testimony that he believed or understood that he was purchasing the 
ranch on only one side of the highway. Further, he testified about his reliance on the 
writings, making any alleged representations by reaJtors irrelevant. 
II. The Warranty Deed does require Stephens defend Cummings' title to the 
property even from Stephens' own acts. 
Defendants propound the absurd notion that Stephens is somehow exempt from his 
obligations Ui1der the warranty deed from his own subsequent actions that threaten the title. 
Aside from the lack of common sense in such an argument, Idaho has acknowledged that 
grantors are responsible for subsequent acts committed by the grantor. This was the case in 
the decision cited by Cummings in his original memorandum Elliot v. Thompson, 63 Idaho 
3 95 ( 1941 ). In Elliot, at the time of conveyance, the grantor "had a good, clear and fee 
simple title." Id. at 406 However, "the whole trouble arose from a subsequent act 
committed by the (granter)." Id. The eourt held that the grantor "cannot excuse or justify 
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 3 
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himself for reconveying the land" (even when the grantee has failed to record the deed!). 
Id. As this case, such subsequent acts by the grantor reconveying title are covered under 
the warranty of title. 
Defendants are liable even under Keolker decision cited by Defendants. Kaelker v. 
Turnbull, 127 Idaho 262 (1995). Although Keolker involved facts that involved third party 
interests, the same principles established in Keolker apply in this case. By recording a 
subsequent deed reconveying the east side property away from Cummings, the Defendants 
created a "hostile and superior" title to the land that had originally been conveyed to 
Cummings. Defendants must indemnify Cummings and remedy the breach. 1 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing, the Cummings' motion for summary judgment should be 
granted. The only remaining issues to be resolved are damages and relief. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1 Defendants have also failed to address Cummings "conversion" claim, Working in consortium with the title 
company and county treasurer, Defendants essential transferred away 83 acres that had been sold to 
Cummings, Cummings has been deprived his property, and Defendants are liable regardless of the 
warranty of title. 
Plaintiff's Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I am a licensed attorney in the State ofldaho and that on October I! 
2010 I served a true and correct copy oftl1e PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO DEY/WANTS' 
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT upon the 
following by the method of delivery designated: / 
Randall Budge UJI US Mail IQ Hand deliveredt)fj Facsimile 
Racine Olson Nye Budge & Bailey 
PO Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204-1391 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Brad Bearnson 
Bearnson & Peck 
399 N. Main Street, Ste 300 
Logan, UT 84321 
Fax: (435) 787-2455 
Bear Lake County Courthouse 
PO Box 190 
Paris, ID 83261 
Fax: (208) 945-2780 
Honorable David C. Nye 
Bannock County Chambers 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 Center 
Pocate , 83201 
Fax: ( 8) 6-74 
Nath M. Olsen 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
li:lJ US Mail li:lJ Hand delivered ~1ile 
lil US Mail lblJ Hand delivered ~mile 
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SIX TH JUDICIAL DISTf(ICT 
BEAR UKE COUNTY. iDl.HO 
20 II JAN - 4 PH I: I 3 
KERRY DDOCK.CLERK 
JEPUTY CASE NO. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
STEVEN CUMMINGS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROGER L. STEPHENS, JOHN DOES 
I-X, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV-2009-183 
DECISION ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court for oral argument on Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment. Nathan M. Olsen was present on 
behalf of the Plaintiff, Steven Cummings. Randy C. Budge was present on behalf 
of the Defendant, Roger Stephens. Stephanie Morse was the Court Reporter. 
Cummings has submitted his Affidavit and an Affidavit of Counsel. Stephens has 
submitted his Affidavit, Affidavits from Dorothy Julian and Evan Skinner (the two 
real estate agents involved in the transaction), an Affidavit from Lori Thornock 
(an officer of the Title Company involved in the transaction), and an Affidavit of 
Counsel. Additionally, the Court has the deposition of Steven Cummings. At the 
Decision 
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hearing the Court heard oral argument from both parties and took the matters 
under advisement. The Court now issues decision. 
BACKGROUND 
The Affidavits and Deposition submitted establish these facts along with 
others discussed below. Defendant Roger Stephens is the Trustee of the Stephens 
Family Trust. The Trust owned property situated both east and west of Highway 
30 in Bear Lake County. In January 2007 Stephens listed real property owned by 
the Stephens Family Trust with Exit Realty. Stephens asserts that Dorothy Julian 
and Evan Skinner of Exit Realty knew that the property being sold was situated . 
west of Highway 30. Allegedly, prior to the closing, Julian and Skinner provided 
Northern Title Company of Idaho with instructions that the transaction between 
Plaintiff and Defendant only include the property located west of the highway. 
Stephens also asserts that the Escrow Office Managers at Northern Title were of 
the understanding that Cummings was aware that the property he was purchasing 
from Stephens was only that located west of the highway. 
Northern Title and its officers prepared legal descriptions used for a 
Commitment for Title Insurance, the original warranty deed and other closing 
documents involved in the transaction between the Stephens Family Trust and 
Cummings. Northern Title also prepared the legal descriptions used for the title 
commitments and other closing documents intending to reflect that the property 
sold by Stephens to Cummings included only the real property west of the 
Case No. CV-09-183 
Decision 
2 16 
highway. Within a day or two of delivering the initial Title Commitment to Exit 
Realty, Julian contacted N011hern Title to confirm that the Title Commitment 
included only the property west of the highway. It was discovered at that point 
that the required exclusionary language was not included in the legal description 
of the property. The legal description in the Title Commitment included property 
on both sides of Highway 30. 
Before the August 3, 2007 closing, Northern Title issued a revised 
Commitment for Title Insurance and inserted some exclusionary language. The 
exclusionary language was not placed at the top of the entire legal description and 
did not exclude all property east of Highway 30. The revised commitment 
contained a map that showed the property involved, with an arrow that pointed 
only to the property west of the highway. The revised Title Commitment was 
used for the closing of the property. 
Allegedly, Cummings spoke with Julian about the 278 acres of property for 
sale west of the highway. Julian also provided Cummings a map of the property 
for sale and took Cummings to the property and supposedly emphasized that no 
property east of the highway was included in the sale. Additionally, Stephens 
alleges that Julian informed Cummings that the price of the property had been 
reduced to $800,000.00 to reflect the exclusion of all property east of the 
Highway. 
Case No. CV-09-183 
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After viewing the property, Cummings allegedly met with Skinner, who 
showed Cummings the property map and infonned Cummings that the 
property for sale was only that on the west side of the highway. 
On July 26, 2007, Skinner, on behalf of Exit Realty, provided Cummings 
with a buyer due diligence checklist which Cummings initialed and signed on July 
26, 2007. Cummings argues that the Due Diligence Checklist stated: 
Buyer acknowledges that the Company (Exit Realty) 
should not be relied upon for any determination as to the 
boundaries of the Property or any encroachments within or 
over the actual boundaries of the Property. 
The document further states: 
"BUY1~R IS ADVISED NOT TO RELY ON THE 
COMPANY, OR ANY OF ITS AGENTS OF THE 
COMPANY FOR A DETERMINATION REGARDING 
THE PHYSICAL OR LEGAL CONDITION OF THE 
PROPERTY." 
Finally, Cummings argues that the document states: 
If the square footage or acreage of the Property is of material 
concern to Buyer, Buyer is advised to verify the square footage or 
acreage through any independent sources or means deemed 
appropriate by Buyer. In the even that the Company provides any 
numerical statements regarding these items, such statements are 
approximations only. Buyer is advised not to rely on seller, the 
Company or any agents of the Company for a determination 
regarding the square footage or acreage of the Property. 
The escrow officer/manager at Northern Title, Lori Thornock, assisted in 
the closing of the transaction on August 3, 2007. Northern Title closed the 
transaction and recorded the warranty deed. 
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Stephens and the lessor of the property drove Cummings to the property 
that was involved in sale. Cummings was again shown where the portions 
the property laid and the boundaries. Stephens claims that the boundaries that he 
showed Cummings were all west of the highway. However, this drive-around 
occurred after the sale was closed, sometime in the fall of 2007. 
On November 8, 2007, Stephens went to Bear Lake County Courthouse to 
pay his real property taxes. Stephens learned from the Assessor that the exception 
language on the original warranty deed did not exclude all of the property east of 
the highway. Stephens claims the Assessor encouraged him to go to Northern 
Title and have them prepare and record a Correction Deed to move the exception 
language to the top of the legal description. 
Stephens went to Northern Title. While Stephens and Thornock reviewed 
the documents, Thornock identified the alleged scrivener's error. The claim is that 
the error was made in the placement of the language: "EXCEPT ALL OF THAT 
PORTION OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED LAND LYING EASTERLY 
OF U.S. HIGHWAY 30." This language is found on the warranty deed after the 
paragraph titled "Parcel A." Parcel A is a description of section 21, which is 
property that sits both east and west of U.S. Highway 30. 
Stephens alleges that this language should have been placed at the top of 
the Warranty Deed to encompass all property in the document. This placement 
would exclude the east part of Parcel A as well as all other property sitting to the 
No. 
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east of the highway. Thornock corrected the legal error on the original warranty 
deed by placing marks through the exception language and also by adding the 
following at the top of the document: "THE FOLLOWING PARCELS ARE 
CONVEYED EXCEPTING THEREFROM ANY PORTION LYING 
EASTERLY OF U.S. HIGHWAY 30." These corrections were made to reflect 
the understanding of Northern Title as to the property involved in the transaction. 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
Plaintiff, Steven Cummings, in opposing Stephens' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, ''urges the court to strike affidavits of Dorothy Julian, Evan Skinner 
insofar as to their representations of the property boundaries, acreage or condition 
(with the exception of Exhibit 1), Lori Thornock and Roger Stephens' affidavits 
that were submitted by the Defendants in support of their summary judgment." 
See, Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, page 1. The grounds given by Cummings for this motion to strike is 
that (1) Skinner and Julian's affidavits "cannot be relied on and are irrelevant and 
should be excluded by the Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(e)"; (2) Thornock was not 
involved whatsoever in the negotiation of the agreement and the closing 
instructions to Cummings from Northern Title indicate that verbal representations 
were not to be relied upon; and (3) Stephens testimony is not contemporaneous 
with the negotiations of the agreement but rather several months after the 
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transaction had closed. See, Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, pgs. 2-3. 
The requirements of IRCP 56( e) "are not satisfied by an affidavit that is 
conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by personal knowledge." State v. 
Shama Res. Ltd P'ship, 127 Idaho 267, 271, 899 P.2d 977, 981 (1995). See also 
Sprinkler Irrigation Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 696-97, 
85 P.3d 667, 672-73 (2004), and Oats v. Nissan Motor Corp. in US.A., 126 Idaho 
162, 166, 879 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1994). 
The Court must look at each affidavit and determine whether it alleges 
facts, which if taken as true, would render the testimony admissible. Dulaney v. St. 
Alphonsus Reg'l Med Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816, 819 (2002). "[T]he 
question of admissibility under Rule 56( e) is a threshold question to be analyzed 
before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inference rules required in 
summary judgment." Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 
1227 (1994); Rule 56(e). 
The Court has reviewed the Affidavits of Dorothy Julian and Evan Skinner. 
They were real estate agents involved in the transaction for the property involved 
in this litigation. The facts stated in their affidavits are based upon their personal 
knowledge and are relevant to issues raised by the parties, including the issues of 
mutual mistake and unilateral mistake. The representations in these affidavits as 
to boundaries and acreages are relevant to their understanding of the facts and 
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relevant to the representations made to Cummings. The Motion to Strike is denied 
as to these two affidavits. 
The Court has also reviewed the Affidavit of Lori Thornock. She is the 
representative from Northern Title and handled the transaction involved in this 
litigation. The facts stated in her affidavit are based upon her personal knowledge 
and are relevant to issues raised by the parties, including circumstances 
surrounding the procurement of title insurance and the reasons for amendments to 
the title commitment. The Motion to Strike is denied as to this affidavit. 
Finally, the Court has reviewed the Affidavit of Roger Stephens. He is the 
trustee of the trust that owned this property. The facts stated in his affidavit are 
based upon his personal knowledge and are relevant to the issues raised in this 
litigation. Paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of this Affidavit relate to events occurring after 
the warranty deed was issued but are still relevant to explain the conduct of the 
parties and the existence of the changed warranty deed. The Motion to Strike is 
denied as to this affidavit. 
The Court will give the facts and testimony in the various affidavits the 
weight they are entitled to and will not consider those facts or testimony where 
they are not relevant 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON SU!'v1MARY JUDGMENr 
Both parties filed a Motion for Summary Judgment Rule 56( c) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows that summary judgment "shall be rendered 
ase No. CV-09-183 
Decision 
8 // 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Smith v. 
Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996) 
(quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)); see also Idaho Building Contractors Association v. City 
o.f Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740, 890 P.2d 326 (1995); Avila v Wahlquist, 126 
Idaho 745, 890 P.2d 331 (1995). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
rests at all times with the party moving for summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 
143 Idaho 894, 896-97, 155 P.3d 695, 697-98 (2007). Generally, the record is to 
be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, 
with all reasonable inferences drawn in that party's favor. Id. If reasonable 
persons could reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the 
motion must be denied .. Id. However, the nonmoving party must submit more than 
just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to withstand 
summary judgment. The nonmoving party's case must be anchored in something 
more than speculation, and a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a 
genuine issue of fact. Id.; Tuttle v. Sudenga Industries, Inc., 1 Idaho 14 5, 86 8 
P.2d 473 (1994). 
Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party, when 
the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that 
No. 
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pariy's case upon which that party bears the burden of proof at triaL Thomson v. 
Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 1, 887 P.2d 1034, 103 8 (1994); 
Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101 Idaho 102, 765 P.2d 126 (1988)). The party 
opposing the summary judgment motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set fort specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(e); Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 
409 797 P.2d 117 1990)). If the nonmoving party does not come forward as 
provided in the rule, then summary judgment should be entered against that party. 
State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 267, 270, 899 P.2d 977, 980 
(1995). 
This case is set for a Court trial without a jury. This Court, as the trier of 
fact, is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed 
evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences. JR. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 
167 P.3d 748 (2006). 
DISCUSSION 
1. The lvferger Doctrine. 
Stephens alleges that at the time the contract was entered into, the deed 
contained a mutual mistake or at least a unilateral mistake. Because of the 
mistake, Stephens asserts that modification of the warranty deed is the proper 
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remedy and that his "self-help" modification was appropriate. Cummings argues 
that all terms of the agreement were merged into the warranty deed at the time the 
parties entered into the contract and that the Court needs only to look at the deed 
to determine the rights of the parties. Cummings is also asserting breach of 
warranty deed. The Court will first determine the language of the deed recorded 
on August 4, 2007. 
When interpreting a deed, the goal of the court "is to carry out the real 
intention of the parties." Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 482, 129 P.2d 1223, 
1231 (2006); citing C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 766, 25 P.3d 76, 79 
(200 I). In the interpretation process, the Court will look to see whether the 
document is ambiguous or not. The determination of whether a document is 
ambiguous is a question of law over which the court exercises free review. C & 
G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001). "In the absence of 
ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, 
according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument." Id. 
The issue here is whether the transaction unambiguously conveyed any 
property east of Highway 30 to Cummings. Cummings argues that the Court 
needs only to look at the language of the warranty deed which was recorded on 
August 4, 2007 to determine the rights of the parties because the doctrine of 
merger applies. 
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After reviewing the warranty deed, the Court finds that the deed is 
unambiguous on its face and it does contain exclusionary language. The 
exclusionary language is placed after the description of Parcel A. Specifically, the 
exclusionary language states: 
EXCEPT ALL OF THAT PORTION OF THE FOLLOWING 
DESCRIBED LAND LYING EASTERLY OF U.S. HIGHWAY 30. 
See, Exhibit A attached to Warranty Deed, which is Exhibit "5" to Affidavit of 
Lori Thornock. The exception by its clear and unambiguous language applies 
only to property listed following or below the exception. 
Therefore, as read on its face, the warranty deed does not exclude any 
property which is described in the paragraph labeled Parcel A, whether it be east 
of Highway 30 or not. The only property east of Highway 30 that is conveyed by 
this deed to Cummings is that port.ion of Parcel A that lies east of the Highway. 
According to the plain language of the deed, Cummings purchased all of the 
Trust's land west of the highway and that portion of Parcel A that is east of the 
highway. 1 
2 Whether the Merger Doctrine Applies. 
Cummings argues that the doctrine of merger applies and that the Court 
should only look to the Warranty Deed and its Exhibit A. Cummings seeks 
1 Cummings claims ownership to 83 acres east of the highway. The record is not clear 
whether that would be only the property in Parcel A or would include all of Stephens 
Ranch east of the highway. However, the deed is clear and unambiguous that the only 
portion of Stephens Ranch east of the highway that was deeded to Cummings is the 
property in Parcel A. 
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summary judgment because he claims the Deed is clear and unambiguous. 
Stephens argues that the doctrine of merger does not apply because there was a 
mistake present. So, even though the Court finds the language of the warranty 
deed recorded on August 4, 2007, to be unambiguous, the Court must now 
determine whether the doctrine of merger applies in order to determine whether 
parol evidence might be allowed to determine the rights of the parties. If parol 
evidence is allowed in, then the issue becomes a factual dispute. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of merger: 
It is a well established rule of law that prior stipulations are merged 
in the final and formal contract executed by the parties, and this rule 
applies to a deed or a mortgage based upon a contract to convey. 
When a deed is delivered and accepted as performance of the 
contract to convey, the contract is merged in the deed. Though the 
terms of the deed may vary from those contained in the contract, the 
deed alone must be looked to to determine the rights of the parties ... 
In the absence of fraud, mistake, etc., the following stipulations in 
contracts for the sale of real estate are conclusively presumed to be 
merged in a subsequently delivered and accepted deed made in 
pursuance of such contract. 
Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc., 90 Idaho 373, 382-83, 414 P.2d 879,884 (1966). 
As stated by Jolley, the doctrine of merger does not apply if there is 
evidence of mistake present in the case. Stephens argue that there was a mistake, 
either unilateral or mutual, and therefore the doctrine of merger does not apply. 
Case No. 
Decision 
13 112 
Cummings the existence of a mistake and claims he would not have bought 
it did not include the portion east the highway. 
"A mistake is an unintentional act or omission arising from ignorance, 
surpnse, or misplaced confidence. The mistake must be material, that is, so 
substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties." Bailey v. 
Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639, 671 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Ct.App. 1983). "A mutual 
mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a 
misconception regarding a basic assumption or vital fact upon which the bargain is 
based." Hughes,- quoting Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20, 26 
(1997). "The court acts properly in reforming the instrument to reflect the 
agreement the parties would have made but for the mistake." Bailey at 640-641, 
671 P.2d at 1103-1104. "What the parties actually intended is a question of fact." 
Id. "The party alleging the mutual mistake has the burden of proving it by clear 
and convincing evidence." Id. citing Collins v. Parkinson, 96 Idaho 294, 296, 
P.2d I 1254 (1974). "If an instrument does not reflect the true intent of the 
parties due to mutual mistake, then reformation of that instrument may be the 
proper remedy." Id. citing Bilbao v. Krettinger, 91 Idaho 69, , 415 P.2d 
712, 71 16 (1966). 
Stephens claims that the placement of the exception language on the 
Warranty Deed constitutes a mutual mistake. Before analyzing that claim, it must 
be pointed out that proof of a mutual mistake, 
No. 
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clear and convincing evidence, 
allows the Court to reform the instrument It does not allow either party to 
unilaterally refonn the instrument Stephens had no right to record the amended 
warranty deed without the express consent of Cummings. Therefore, the amended 
deed is not proper and cannot be relied upon by Stephens. 
2. Whether there is a Mutual Mistake. 
Stephens claims that the facts of this case show that both parties held a 
mutual mistake that the legal description in the deed contained only property 
located west of Highway 30. Cummings claims that he would never have entered 
into the sale if he was not also buying the property on the east side of Highway 30. 
The Court has carefully reviewed the affidavits and other material 
submitted by the parties. The following facts are derived from the record. 
Stephens listed property for sale with Exit Realty in January 2007. Affidavit of 
Roger L. Stephens, p. 2, ii 4. That property included only property west of 
Highway 30. Stephens' Affidavit, p. 2, ii 5 All property owned by Stephens west 
of Highway 30 was leased to Phelps Farms. Id., p. 2, ii 6. All property owned by 
Stephens east of Highway 30 had been previously conveyed to a 3rd party except 
for an approximately 85 acre parcel. Id., p. 2, ii 7. The approximate 85 acres was 
not conveyed or leased to anyone at that time. Instead, it was enrolled in the 
Conservation Reserve Program ("CRP"). Id., p. 2, ii 7. On August 3, 2007, 
Stephens signed paperwork to close a transaction with Cummings that Stephens 
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believed was only for the sale of property west of Highway 30. Stephens' intent 
was to not include the 85 acres in this sale. Id., p. 3, ~ 8. 2 
Evan Skinner is a real estate agent. In July of 2007 he worked for Exit 
Realty. Affidavit ofEvan Skinner, p. 2, ir 4. At that time, he showed Cummings 
several properties in Montpelier and the surrounding areas. Skinner Affidavit, p. 2, 
if 6. Skinner showed the Stephens property to Cummings and told him that the 
property was about 270 acres and did not include property located on the east side 
of Highway 30. Id., p. 2, if 8; p. 3, iii! 12 and I 3. 
Dorothy Julian was also a real estate agent in 2007. She worked for Exit 
Realty. Affidavit of Dorothy Julian, p. 2, if 2. She listed the Stephens property for 
sale, but only that property on the west side of IIighway 30. Julian Affidavit, p. 2, 
if 4. On or about July 31, 2007, Julian received a copy of the Commitment for 
Title Insurance from Northern Title Company of Idaho on the Stephens property 
and verified with Northern Title that the property for sale only include Stephens 
property west of Highway 30. Id., p. 2, iril 5 and 6. However, Exhibit A to this 
Title Commitment included all of Stephens property on both sides of Highway 30. 
See, Exhibit "I " to Julian's Affidavit. Prior to the August 3 closing, Julian 
received a second copy of the Commitment for Title Insurance from Northern 
Title on the Stephens property listed for sale. Exhibit A to the 2°c1 copy included 
all of Stephens property west of Highway 30 and that portion of Parcel A east of 
2 Events listed in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of Stephens' Affidavit occurred after the 
paperwork was signed and the property conveyed so they have no relevancy on the 
parties' intent at the time of the sale. 
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Highway 30. All other property east Highway 30 was excluded from the 
commitment See, Exhibit " to Julian's Affidavit. Near the end of July, 2007, 
Julian received a telephone call from Cummings regarding the Stephens property. 
She told Cummings that only the land west of Highway 30 was for sale. Julian's 
Affidavit, p. 3, ~ 9. Julian took Cummings to the Stephens property and told him 
that the sale did not include any property east of the highway. Id, p. 3, ~ 4. Julian 
gave Cummings a copy of a map from the USDA Farm Service Agency showing 
the land for sale was only land west of Highway 30. See, Id, p. 4, ~ 14 and Axhibit 
"3" to Julian's Affidavit. 
Lori Thornock was the Escrow Officer/Manager at Northern Title in 2007. 
Affidavit of Lori Thornock, p. 2, ~ 3. She assisted in the closing of the sale of the 
Stephens property to Cummings on or about August 3, 2007. Thornock Affidavit, 
p. 2, ~ 4. Earlier, on or about July 16, 2007, Evan Skinner requested a title 
commitment covering the Stephens property west of Highway 30 for a potential 
sale to an undisclosed buyer. Id, p. 2, ~ 5. Northern Title prepared the legal 
description for that title commitment, intending it to cover only the Stephens 
property west of Highway 20. Id, p. 2, ~ 6. However, the title commitment 
issued on or about July 31, 2007, covered all of the Stephens property on both 
sides of the highway. Id, p. 2, ~ 7. Once the error was determined, Northern Title 
issued a revised or 2nd copy of title commitment, which included the insertion of 
exclusionary language after Parcel A. Id, p. 3, ~ 9. The exclusionary language 
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should have been inserted at the top of the document, above Parcel A. Id 
Thornock confirmed verbally with Julian that the legal description identified only 
the property located west of Highway 30. Id., 4, ii 10. However, the warranty 
deed that was recorded on August 3, 2007, and the 2nd copy of Title Commitment 
both included a legal description that does not exclude that portion of Parcel A that 
is east of Highway 30. Thornock was not aware of this mistake until several 
months after the warranty deed was recorded. Id., p. 5, ii 15. Thornock, on 
November 8, 2007, recorded a "corrected" Warranty Deed that moved the 
exception language to the top of the deed, which excluded that portion of Parcel A 
that was east of Ilighway 30. Id, p. 6, ,-i 19. The Title Policy ultimately issued to 
Cummings covered only property located west of Highway 30. Id., p. 6, ii 20. 
Steven Cummings purchased the property from Stephens Ranch for 
$800,000. Affidavit of Steven Cummings, 1, il 3. Fie never had direct contact 
with Stephens prior to closing. Cummings Affidavit, p. 2, ii 4. He also paid 
$50,000 to Three Bar Ranches to buy out its right to purchase the property. 
Cummings' Deposition, p. 57, ll. 12-22. Prior to closing, he examined the legal 
description in the buy/sell agreement and in the title commitment. Both described 
land on both sides of Highway 30. Cummings Affidavit, p. 2, il 4. The warranty 
deed executed by Stephens at closing is attached to Cummings' affidavit as 
Exhibit A and the legal description is different than what is in the buy/sell 
agreement and the title commitment in that the warranty deed contains exception 
No. 
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language after the description of Parcel A. Cummings never states that he 
examined the warranty Cummings claimed he always understood the 
acre parcel east of the highway was part of the property he purchased. Id, p. 2, il 
8. Cummings holds a real estate license in Utah. Cummings' Deposition, pp. 1 
14. He never had the property appraised. Id, pp. 39-40. 
Cummings claims that Skinner showed him the property and told him that 
the ranch went on both sides of the Highway. Cummings' Depa., p. 63, fl, 7-23. 
He further claims that he never saw the USDA Farm Service Agency map attached 
to Julian's Affidavit as Exhibit 3 prior to closing. Cummings' Depa., p. 134, I-
10. In fact, Cummings denies ever meeting Julian prior to closing. Id, p. 135, ll. 
1-2. Cummings states that the CRP income was a major reason he bought this 
particular property because that income would help pay the property tax. Yet, he 
testified that he had no communication with the Farm Service Agency prior to 
closing and did not obtain any assignment of the CRP contract at closing. Id, p. 
142-43. 
Based upon Stephens' version of the facts, supported by the Title Company 
and the Real Estate Agency, Stephens argues that the parties all knew and 
understood that only land west of Highway 30 was involved in this transaction. 
Stephens further argues that the inclusion of the portion of Parcel A east of 
Highway 30 in the Warranty Deed is a mutual mistake and that the Warranty Deed 
should be refonned by moving the exception language to the top of the deed. 
No. 
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Alternatively, based upon Cummings' version of the facts, Stephens argues 
that all parties, including Cummings, Title Company and the Real Estate 
Agency, knew and understood that Stephens' intent was that only land west of 
Highway 30 was involved in this transaction. Stephens further argues that the 
inclusion of the portion of Parcel A east of Highway 30 in the Warranty Deed is a 
unilateral mistake and that the Deed should still be reformed. 
There is a clear factual dispute on the issue of mutual mistake. All 
participants involved in this transaction except Cummings have testified that 
everyone including Cummings knew that all property east of Highway 30 was not 
involved in this transaction. Cummings denies this claim and states that the 
inclusion of that portion of Parcel A east of Highway 30 was a major factor in this 
transaction in that he intended to use that portion's CRP income to pay the taxes 
on all the land. This dispute will tum on the credibility of the witnesses and 
cannot therefore be determined at summary judgment. The Court denies that 
portion of Stephens' Motion for Summary Judgment based on mutual mistake. 
3. Whether there was a Unilateral lvfistake. 
A unilateral mistake usually does not offer grounds for relief, although it 
may in certain circumstances.'" Belk v. lvfartin, l 36 Idaho 652, 65 39 PJd 592, 
597 (200 I); quoting Leydet v. City of A1ountain Home, 119 Idaho 1041, I 044, 812 
P.2d 5, 758 (Ct. App. 1991 ). "A contract containing a unilateral mistake may 
be rescinded or modified if there has been a misrepresentation or knowledge of the 
No. 
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mistake by the other party." Id.; citing Dennett v. Kuenzli, I 30 Idaho 21, 28, 936 
P.2d 219, 226 (Ct.App.1997); Cline v. Hoyle & Assoc. Insur., , 108 Idaho I 
164, 697 P.2d 1176, 1178 (1985). 
Stephens argues unilateral mistake in that he argues that prior to the closing 
of the transaction, Northern Title and the real estate agents were of the 
understanding and belief that Cummings was aware that he was purchasing 
property located only west of the highway. However, Cummings argues that he 
was interested particularly in the eastern side of the highway. The dispute as to 
what the parties intended the outcome of the transaction to be is factual. 
"If the written agreement is a complete upon its face and unambiguous, no 
fraud or mistake being alleged, extrinsic evidence of prior or contemporaneous 
negotiations or conversations is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to or 
detract from the terms of the contract." Belk v. l\fartin, 136 Idaho 657, 39 
P.3d 592, 597 (2001). "Parol evidence ... is allowed to clarify that a tenn of the 
contract was a mistake." Id. "Extrinsic evidence should be allowed where there 
has been a unilateral mistake made by a party and the other party has knowledge 
of the mistake. This type of unilateral mistake is ground for refonnation where 
extrinsic evidence may be admissible to show the intent of the parties." Belk at 
598, 39 P.3d at 658. "Preliminary negotiations are presumed to merge into the 
contract and are not allowed to contradict the plain tenns of the contract; however 
this only applies to complete, integrated contracts. Whether a particular subject of 
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negotiations is embodied in the writing depends on the intent of the parties, 
revealed their conduct and language, and by the surrounding circumstances." 
Id. 
In Belk, the court held that a unilateral mistake was alleged and because the 
mistake was known by the opposing party (Martin), the parties' prior relevant 
discussions were permissible to show that the lease contained an error and did not 
reflect the true intentions of the parties. The mistake in Belk was that the lease 
contained a dollar amount of $1,476.80 rather than the intended $14,768.00 that 
the parties agreed on prior to entering the contract. In such a case, the Supreme 
Court agreed that extrinsic evidence is permissible. 
Here, all conflicting views happened before the parties entered into contract 
on August 3, 2007. Cummings claims that the eastern pmiion of Parcel A was 
particularly attractive to him while Stephens argues that Cummings was shown 
and told that the eastern portion was not included. It seems clear that Cummings 
knew that the Warranty Deed included that portion of Parcel A east of Highway 
30. The issue is whether the evidence shows that Cummings knew Stephens had 
no intention of including that portion in the transaction. Cummings denies ever 
meeting with Dorothy Julian. However, he does not deny talking with her over the 
telephone. Skinner testified that he took Cummings to the property near the end 
of July, 2007 He further testified he stood on the Stephens Property with 
Cummings and told him that the sale did not include any property east of Highway 
No. 
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30. Skinner testified that he had several conversations with Cummings where he 
told him that the property for was west of the highway and that he 
showed Cummings on a map that the land sat west of the Highway. Cummings 
Affidavit does not address any conversations with Skinner. In his Deposition, 
Cummings acknowledges that Skinner took him to the property before closing and 
told him the property was on both sides of the highway, that Stephens sold about 
100 acres of the property east of the highway to another buyer, and that there was 
CRP income from land east of the highway. See, Cummings Depa., pp. 64-65. At 
no time does Cummings deny that Skinner said the sale was limited to property 
west of the highway. Instead, he infers that the CRP property, which is east of the 
highway, was part of what interested him in the sale. 
The undisputed facts, and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, 
make it clear that Stephens intended to sale only land west of the highway, that 
Stephens did not know the warranty deed included land east of the highway, that 
Cummings knew that Stephens had no intent to include land east of the highway 
and that Cummings knew that the deed included land east of the highway. This is 
a unilateral mistake for which reformation is appropriate. The Court grants 
summary judgment on that portion of Stephens' Motion for Summary Judgment 
relating to unilateral mistake. 
Decision 
2. Whether There Was A Breach Of Covenants. 
When a warranty deed is transferred certain covenants are incorporated 
along with the deed: covenant of seisin, the covenant of the right to convey, the 
covenant of quiet enjoyment, the covenant of warranty, and the quiet of further 
assurances. A covenant is breached when the grantee is "prevented from using the 
conveyed property by a person asserting title to that of the (grantee)" Roper v. 
Elkhorn at Sun Valley, 100 Idaho 790 (1980). A breach of the covenant may also 
occur when the grantee is ousted from only part of the property. Bliss Townsite 
Company v. Morris-Roberts Company, 33 Idaho 110 (1920). 
"[I]t is axiomatic that the plaintiff in an action for breach of covenants of 
title has the burden of proving that he was evicted or prevented from using the 
conveyed property by a person asserting title paramount to that of the 
plaintiff's ... " Roper v. Elkhorn at Sun 100 Idaho 790, 794-95, 605 P.2d 
968, 972-73 (1980). 
The Plaintiff argues that he was "ousted" from the 83 acres because the 
property has remained under the control and use of the Defendants. Because of 
this, Plaintiff argues that he has been damaged due to the deprivation of ownership 
and use of the property which lead to the filing of this action. Plaintiff is seeking 
relief for the lost value of the property, recovery of the purchase price and his 
attorney fees. 
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This Court has held that there is a unilateral mistake that requires 
reformation of the deed. The deed is refom1ed by moving the exception language 
to the top of the document above the paragraph relating to Parcel A. This 
reformation means that the breach of covenant issue is moot 
CONCLUSION 
After review of the affidavits submitted on behalf of Dorothy Julian, Evan 
Skinner, Lori Thornock and Roger Stephens, the Court finds that all affidavits 
were created with the personal knowledge of each witness and each affidavit is 
relevant to the case. Therefore, the Court DENIES the Motion to Strike. The 
Court will not consider the facts in those affidavits that are not relevant to the case. 
The Court determines, as a matter of law, that the deed is unambiguous on 
its face and that typically the merger doctrine would preclude any parol evidence 
from entering into the interpretation of the doctrine. However, the merger doctrine 
does not apply when there is evidence of mistake. The Defendant has argued both 
mutual and unilateral mistake. The Court finds that there is a factual dispute 
concerning whether or not mutual mistake exists and that the matter of mutual 
mistake focuses on the credibility of the witnesses, which will not be decided on 
summary judgment. The Court finds that the undisputed facts clearly show that 
the Defendant had no intention of including the property that is east of the 
highway and that the Plaintiff knew that the Defendant had no intent to include the 
property in the sale. Therefore, the Court holds that a unilateral mistake does 
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exist, which precludes the merger doctrine from applying. As a result, extrinsic 
evidence is allowed in to interpret the deed. Accordingly, this is a unilateral 
mistake for which reformation is appropriate. The Defendant must submit a 
reformed deed to the Court along with the judgment which places the exclusionary 
language to the top of the deed. 
Regarding the Plaintiffs breach of covenant claim, this Court has held that 
there is a unilateral mistake that requires reformation of the deed and therefore the 
issue of breach of covenant is now moot. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: January 4, 2011. 
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Case No.: CV-09-183 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
Plaintiff, ,,,..·upn Cummings, (Cummings), and through counsel record, Beard 
St Clair Gaffney PA and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(2)(B) the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, respectfully moves this Court for an order reconsidering its January 4, 2011 
Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment. The supporting memorandum and a request 
for oral argument will be filed within 14 days as set forth I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(C). Cummings 
will also provide additional evidence that \Vas not before the Court when it made its 
decision. 
The basis for this motion, in part, is that there are disputed material facts as to what 
Steven Cummings "knew" of any alleged mistakes. Cummings would note that at no point 
in his deposition was he asked to refute or even address representations by Evan Skinner 
Plaintiffs l'vfotion to Reconsider l 
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about the property. Cummings understanding of what he was purchasing is in direct 
contrast alleged by Skinner. additio~ Cummings \viU to 
the Comt challenging the credibility of both Evan Skinner and Dorothy Julian, who are the 
only agents of the Defendant that Cummings had any interaction with prior to purchasing 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
STEVEN CUMMINGS, an individual ) 
residing in Montana, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
ROGER L. STEPHENS, an individual ) 
residing in Providence, Utah, JOHN DOES ) 
I-X. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case CV-09-183 
MOTION FOR ORDER AWARDING 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
COMES NOW, Defendant Roger L Stephens ("Defendant"), by and through counsel, 
and moves the Court for an order awarding costs and attorney's fees against Plaintiff Steven 
Cummings ("Plaintiff') as more fully described in the Memorandum of Costs and Fees and 
supporting affidavits filed herewith. This motion is made pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), Idaho Code§] 121, and the Court's Decision on 
MOTION POR ORD!rn. A WAllDING ATTORNEY'S FEES ANU COSTS - Page 1 
Motion for Summary Judgment dated January 4, 2011 This motion is supported by the 
Affidavits of Randall and Brad H. Bearnson in Support of and 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to the Court's Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment dated January 4, 
2011, the Court denied Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, denied Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Consequently, the 
Defendant is the prevailing party on all counts of this action and is entitled to recover his costs as 
a matter of right pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Defendant 
contends he is also entitled to recover his attorney fees pursuant to Rule 54( e )(1) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and Idaho Code§§ 1 120(3) and/or 1 121 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. As the prevailing party, Defendant is entitled to receive his fees and costs 
pursuant to the terms of the Contract with Plaintiff. 
Rule 54( e )( 1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court in its discretion to 
award attorney fees when provided by a statute or contract. The Real Estate Purchase and Sale 
Agreement involved in this case states that "[i]f either party initiates or defonds any arbitration or 
legal action or proceedings which are in any way connected with this Agreement, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled Lo recover from the non-prevailing party reasonable costs and attorney's 
fees." See Exhibits , "19", and "20" to the Deposition of Steven B. Cummings, at iJ 
Defendant is entitled as a matter of law to an award of attorney fees. 
B. The nefendant should be awarded his attorney fees as provided under Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3). 
Additionally, Idaho Code § 12-120(3) "mandates an award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party in a suit involving a commercial transaction." Jlayden Lake Fire Prat. Dist. v. 
Alcorn, 141Idaho307, 313 (2005). The term "commercial transaction" is defined in Idaho Code 
§ 12-120(3) as "all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." 1n 
addition, "[a]n award of attorney fees under [Idaho Code§ 1 120(3)] is proper if the 
commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is 
attempting to recover." Beco Constr. Co. v. J-U-JJ Eng'rs, Inc, 145 Idaho 719, 726 (2008) 
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(citing Blimka v. Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho , 728 (2007)). 
In this case, Defendant sold real property to Plaintiff through the use a 
and and a \Varranty Such agreements are commercial 
transactions. See Heritage E\cavation, Inc. v. Briscoe, 141 Idaho 40, 44, 1 P.3d 700, 704 (CL 
App. 2005). The information included in the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement and 
Warranty Deed is integral to the claims in this case and constitutes the basis for recovery. 
Defendant is entitled to recover attorney fees in this action as a matter of law. 
C. Defendant is entitled to recover his costs as a matter of right under Rule 
54( d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 54(d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "costs shall be allowed 
as a matter of right to the prevailing parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." Additionally, 
the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement specifically entitles the prevailing party to recover 
costs from the non-prevailing party. See Exhibits "3", "19", and "20" to the Deposition of 
Steven I3. Cummings, at ir 27. It is clear from the Court's Decision on Motion for Summary 
Judgment that the Defendant is the prevailing party on all issues. 
Defendant is entitled to receive both costs as a matter of right and discretionary costs 
because he prevailed on all issues and incurred costs that were necessary and reasonable. S'ee 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(A), (C), and (D); Idaho Code§ 1 101. The Afiidavils of Randall C. 
Budge and Brad H. Bearnson in Support of Fees and Costs filed herewith set forth the costs 
incurred by the Defendant. 
D. The Defendant should alternatively be awarded his attorney fees under 
Idaho Code § 12-121. 
Idaho Code § 12-121 provides that "[i]n any civil action, the judge may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties." This statute has been construed to warrant an 
award of attorney fees where the court finds that the case has been "brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 61 (CL 
App. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). A case is frivolous if it is "not supported in fact or 
warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law." Idaho Code§ 1 123. The decision of what 
MOTION FOR ORDER AWARDING A TTORNI~Y'S FEES AND COSTS Page 3 
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constitutes frivolous conduct is committed to discretion of the trial court Drew v. 
133 Idaho 
Defendant 
543, 989 p ( 1999). 
that the Courl consider Plaintiff's awareness that no intent 
to include land located east ofllighway 30 as part of the real property sale, and Plaintiff's 
awareness that the warranty deed included land east of liighway 30. Plaintiff appears to have 
attempted to take advantage of and benefit from the scrivener's error that was made to the legal 
description of the warranty deed in order to claim ownership of additional property to which he 
was not entitled. 
III. CONCI,USION 
The Defendant is the prevailing party on all issues in this action and therefore ClSks that 
his costs be awarded as a matter ofright pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l) and the express terms of 
the Contract between the parties. Defendant also asks that his attorney fees be awarded pursuant 
the express terms of the Contract between the parties, LR.C.P. 54(e)(l), Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), 
and/or Idaho Code § 12-121. In addition, the Defendant anticipates that additional attorney's 
fees will he necessary to collect and enforce the judgment. Defendant therefore reserves the right 
to supplement his ongoing attorney's fees and costs and request that he be allowed to seek 
additional attorney's fees and costs for work perf()rmed in obtaining a decision on this motion 
and to collect and enforce on the judgment. 
DATED this -----~day of January, 2011. 
J{ACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
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S.Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 529-9732 
U. S Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
]}j/__ Yfj/)_/ fM, 
RANDALL C. l;t/E{GE 
MOTION FOR ORDER A WARDING ATTORNEY'S liEES AND COSTS Page 5 
I 
Randall Budge (ISB J 949) 
Mark S. Shaffer (lSB No. 7559) 
RACINE, OLSON, BUDGE & 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391; 20 I Center Street 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: 208-23 2-610 l 
Facsimile: 208-232-6109 
rcb@racinelaw~rn~1 
Brad II. Bearnson 
Bearnson & Peck, LC. 
399 North Main, Ste 300 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN TlIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE or IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
STEVEN CUMMINGS, an individual ) 
residing in Montana, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
ROGER I,. STEPHENS, an individual ) 
residing in Providence, Utah, JOHN DOES ) 
I-X. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Case No. CV-09-183 
MEMORANDUM OF 
FEES AND COSTS 
COMES NOW Defendant Roger L. Stephens ("Defendant"), by and through counsel, 
pursuant to Rule 54(cl)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and submils the within 
Memorandum of Fees and Costs itemizing each claimed expense, cost and disbursement incurred 
by Plaintiffs in these proceedings. 
The costs as a matter of right incurred in this action on behalf of the Defendant in 
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defending the action against 1he above named Plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1 )(C) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil are as 
Description 
Filing fees Appearance 
Filing fees - Answer and Third Party Complaint 
Filing fees - Notice of Appearance of Co--counsel 
TOTAi, COSTS AS A MATTER OP RIGHT: 
$ 
$ 
$ 
58.00 
14.00 
58.00 
The following items of discretionary fees and costs were also necessarily and reasonably 
incurred in this action on behalf of the Defendant in defending the action against the above 
named Plaintiff, pursuant to Rules 54(d)(1)(D) and 54(e)(l), (5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Idaho Code § I 120(3 ), and/or Idaho Code § 1 121: 
Description 
RT Mileage for hearing on motions for summary judgment 
Attorney fees (see Affidavit of Randall C. Budge) 
A1torney fees (see Affidavit of Brad IL Bearnson) 
TOTAL DISCRETIONARY FEES AND COSTS: 
$ 98.00 
$ 35,728.00 
$ 16,636.25 
To the best of the undersigned's knowledge and belief: the costs listed above are coJTect 
and are claimed in compliance with the applicable Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, including, but 
not limited to, LR.C.P. 54(d)(5). 
DATED this 1.,,7 day of January, 2011 
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RACINE, OLSON, NYE, BUDGE 
BAILEY, CIIARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I lhal on this of January, 11, I 
of the foregoing document on the following m manner 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney 
21 0 5 Coronado Street 
Idaho falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Brad Bearnson 
Bearnson & Peck 
399 N. Main Street, Ste 300 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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U.S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 529-9732 
U.S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
Randall Budge (ISB 1949) 
Mark S. Shaffer (lSB No. 7559) 
RACINE, BUDGE 
BAILEY, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 1391; 201 E. Center Street 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-1391 
Telephone: 208-232-6101 
Facsimile: 208-232-6109 
rcb@racinel aw .net 
Brad Il Bearnson 
Bearnson & Peck, L.C. 
399 North Main, Ste 300 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TilE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
STEVEN CUMMINGS, an individual ) 
residing in Montana, ) 
) 
Plaintiff: ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
ROGER L. STEPHENS, an individual ) 
residing in Providence, Utah, JOHN DOES ) 
~. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF IDAIIO ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF BANNOCK ) 
Case CV-09-183 
AFFUJAVIT OF RANDALL C. BUDGE 
IN SUPPORT OF Ji'EES AND COSTS 
RANDALL C. BUDGE, being first duly sworn under oath deposes and states as f{.)Jlows: 
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Affiant is a citizen of the United States of America; a resident Bannock County, 
Idaho; of legal age; competent to be a 
2. !San licensed to law in or andifcalle<l 
upon to testi could testify to the following, all of which are within his own personal knowledge 
or based upon his professional judgment. 
3. Affiant has been engaged in the active practice oflaw since September 24, 1976, 
holding Idaho State Bar License No. 1949 and a Martindale-Hubble AV rating, and is a partner 
with the law film of Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered ("llacine Olson") m 
Pocatello, Idaho. A substantial portion of affiant' s practice has involved commercial litigation, 
including, but not limited to, business and real estate transactions, wills, trust and estate planning, 
water law, and administrative law. Alliant is familiar with the prevailing rate for attorneys in the 
southern Idaho area engaged in the similar practices. A usual and customary hourly rate in 
southern Idaho for legal services of this kind is in the range of $135.00 to $245.00 per hour, 
varying based on experience. Affiant's current rate is $205.00 per hour for all work performed. 
In this matter Racine Olson billed Defendant at an hourly rate of $205.00 per hour for all work 
performed by partners, and $150.00 per hour for all work performed associates. 
4. During the period commencing January 19, 20 l 0 through December 31, 10, 
there has been a total of .30 hours of billed work expended on behalf of the Defendant, all of 
which was necessary and reasonably incurred in pursuing the action against the above named 
Defendant, for total attorney fees of $35,728. The itemization of the work performed, time 
expended, and fees incurred through December 31, 2010, is reflected in a copy of the Racine 
Olson Detail Transaction File List (set forth on a daily basis), a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. These fees and costs are 
summarized in the Memorandum of Costs filed herewith. 
5. During the period of January 19, 2010 through December 31, 2010, there has been 
a total of $130.00 costs as a matter of right expended on behalf of the Defendant in defending the 
action against the above named Plaintiff Said costs as a matter of right include, as reflected on 
page 9 of Exhibit "A": (a) $58.00 court filing fee for filing Racine Olson's Notice of 
Appearance; (b) $14.00 court filing fee for Racine Olson's Answer and Third Party Complaint; 
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and .00 court filing for filing the Notice of Appearance of Co-counsel for the law firm 
of Bearnson Peck, LC. Logan, Utah. 
6. During of January 19, 0 Lhrough 31, 2010, has 
a total of $98.00 discretionary costs expended on behalf of the Defendant in defending the action 
against the above named Plaintiff. Said discretionary costs include, as reflected on page 9 of 
Exhibit "A", $98.00 for the round trip cost of counsel for Defendant traveling to and from the 
hearing on Plaintiff's and Defendant's motions for summary judgment. 
7. Affiant has personal knowledge of the commencement and progress of the above-
captioned action, and, therefore, is familiar with the costs and expenses incurred in this action by 
the Defendant. Further, affiant has reviewed the time and costs records of Racine, Olson, Nye, 
Budge & Bailey, Chartered, maintained in the above-captioned matter, on behalf of Defendant. 
Those time records represent items of costs and attorney's fees that were reasonably and 
necessarily incurred in the defense of this action by Defendants. 
8. Defendant is entitled to recover his costs and attorneys' foes pursuant to the terms 
of Rules 54(d)(1) and 54(e)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), 
Idaho Code § 12-121, and the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement 
9. All costs and attorney's fees submitted herewith were necessarily and reasonably 
incurred in the representation of the Defendant in the above-entitled action. To the best of my 
knowledge and belief: these items of costs and fees are c01Tect and hereby submitted in 
compliance with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT 
DATED this _2_1__ day of January, 201 L 
taf-4l c,'~-
RANDALL C. BUDGE 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWOR1,T TO before 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO, 
Residing at Pocatello. 
My Commission Expires 8/J 8/2012. 
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I HEREBY that on this day of January, 2011, I a true and 
foregomg document on the following persons the manner 
Nathan M. Olsen 
Beard St. Clair Gaffoey 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Brad Bearnson 
Bearnson & Peck 
399 N. Main Street, Ste 300 
Logan, Utah 84321 
r )<I J 
lJ Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
Ifond Delivery 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 529-9732 
lJ. S. Mail 
Postage Prepaid 
Hand Deli very 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
-~Q~~-
RANDALL C. BUDGE 
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Date Atty Rate to Bill Amount 
1/ 19/2010 RCB 205 2.4 $ 492.00 
1/19/2010 MAS 150 0.2 $ 30.00 
1/22/2010 MAS 150 1.5 $ 225.00 
1/25/2010 MAS 150 3.2 $ 480.00 
1/27 /2010 MAS ISO LS $ 225.00 
1/28/2010 MAS 150 3.3 $ 495.00 
1/29/2010 MAS 150 2.1 $ 315.00 
2/1/2010 MAS 150 4.3 $ 645.00 
2/2/2010 MAS 150 0.2 $ 30.00 
2/4/2010 RCB 205 0.5 $ 102.50 
2/4/2010 MAS 150 1 $ 150.00 
2/5/2010 MAS 150 0.4 $ 6000 
2/9/2010 MAS 150 0.5 $ 75.00 
2/10/2010 MAS 150 2.4 $ 360.00 
2/ll/2010 MAS 150 5.4 $ 810.00 
2/12/2010 MAS 150 0.2 $ 30.00 
2/15/2010 MAS 150 15 $ 225.00 
2/17 /2010 MAS 150 0.4 $ 60.00 
2/18/2010 MAS 150 0.9 $ 135.00 
A4cf ~ ftHj 
RECEIVE AND REVIEW CUMMINGS COMPLAINT; TELEPI IONE 
CONFERENCE WITH R STEPHENS RE: CUMMINGS COMPLAINT/ANSWER; 
PREPARE FILE NOTICE OF APPEARANCE; LEDER TOR STEPHENS RE 
SAME; PREPARE DRAFT ANSWER TO COMPLAINT; REVEIW FILE AND 
PHIOR CORRESPONDENCE AND DOCUMENTS HE: CUMMINGS 2008 
CLAIMS 
REVIEW OF COMPLAINT AND SUMMONS; RESEAHCH IDAflO LAW RE: 
SERVICE OF A SUMMONS 
RESEARCH RE: FACTS AND HISTORY OF CASE 
REVIEW THE APPLICABLE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PAHTIES, FILE 
DOCUMENTS RE: PROPERTY LISTING, SALE, CLOSING 
DRAFT OF ANSWER AND EXHIBITS; DRAFT OF AFFIDAVIT OF ROGER 
STEPHENS 
DRAFT OF AFFIDAVIT OF ROGER STEPHENS; RESEARCH REGARDING 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROPERTY LISTED WITH REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY AND PROPERTY SOLD TO OPPOSING PARTY; TELEPHONE 
CONFERENCE WITH REAL ESTATE AGENT, BROKER, AND TITLE COMPANY 
REGARDING ORIGINAL LISTING AGREEMENT AND OTHEH 
DOCUMENTATION SHOWING SALE OF PROPERTY; 
REVIEW AND REVISE ANSWER 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCES WITH LORI THORNOCK, REALTOR, EVAN 
SKINNER, ASSESSOR, AND CHIEF DEPUTY REGARDING FACTS 
SUHROUNDING CASE AND PREPARATION OF AFFIDAVITS; CONTINUE 
DRAFT OF AFFIDAVIT OF ROGER STEPHENS; DRAFT OF AFFIDAVIT FOR 
EVAN SKINNER 
FINALIZE DRAFT OF AFFIDAVIT FOR EVAN SKINNER; FINALIZE DHAFT 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROGER STEPHENS; DRAFT OF AFFIDAVIT OF LORI 
TliORNOCI<; DRAFT OF AFFIDAVIT OF DOROTHY JULIAN-RALLS 
CONFERENCE RE: LISTING AGREEMENT AND ANSWER TO COMPLAINT; 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH BROKER RE: LISTING AGREEMENT 
EVALUATE LIABILITY AND THIRD PARTY CLAIM AGAINST BEAR LAKE 
STUART TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY RE: LEGAL DESCRIPTION ERROR 
ON WARRANTY DEED AND TITLE POLICY 
CONFERENCE RE: STATUS OF LISTING AGREEMENT AND ANSWEH TO 
COMPLAINT; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: LISTING 
AGREEMENT AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING CORHECTED 
WARRANTY DEED; TELEPllONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL 
RE: TITLE POLICY AND WARRANTY DEED 
RECEIVE AND REVIEW FAX FROM OPPOSING COUNSEL RE: TITLE 
COMMITMENT AND TITLE POLICY, AND POSSIBLE CLAIM AGAINST TITLE 
COMPANY; CONFERENCE RE: POSSIBLE LIABILITY OF TITLE COMPANY 
DHAFT OF AFFIDAVIT FROM TITLE COMPANY 
CONFERENCE RE: POSSIBILITY OF AND STRATEGY FOR BHINGING 
THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AGAINST TITLE COMPANY; RESEARCH IDAHO 
LAW RE: CORRECTED WARRANTY DEED 
CONTINUE RESEARCll OF IDAHO CASE LAW RE: CORRECTED DEEDS, 
RELATION BACK DOCTRINE AND FRAUD; CONFERENCE RE: AFFIDAVIT 
AND COMMUNICATION WITH TITLE COMPANY; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
WITH LORI THORNOCK OF TITLE COMPANY; REVISE DHAFTS OF 
AFFIDAVITS 
CONTINUE DRAFT OF AFFIDAVIT OF LORI THORNOCK 
REVISE DRAFT OF AFFIDAVIT OF R. STEPHENS; REVISE DRAFT AFFIDAVIT 
OF LOH! THORNOCK 
REVIEW AND HEVISE AFFIDAVIT FROM TITLE COMPANY; TELEPI !ONE 
CONFERENCE WITH LORI THORNOCK; HECEIVE AND HEVIEW LETTER 
FROM TITIE COMPANY 
FINALIZE DRAFTS OF AfflDAVIT FROM TITLE COMPANY, EVAN SKINNER 
AND CLIENT 
;1/5 
2/19/2010 RCB 205 0.6 $ 12300 
2/19/2010 MAS 150 3.4 $ 510.00 
2/25/2010 MAS 150 1.8 $ 270.00 
3/1/2010 MAS 150 34 $ 510.00 
3/2/2010 MAS 150 3.2 $ 480.00 
3/3/2010 MAS 150 3.4 $ 510.00 
3/4/2010 RCB 205 0.8 $ 164.00 
3/4/2010 MAS 150 2.4 $ 360.00 
3/8/2010 MAS 150 0.5 $ 75.00 
3/9/2010 MAS 150 0.9 $ 135.00 
3/10/2010 MAS 150 0.8 $ 120.00 
3/11/2010 MAS 150 0.1 $ 15.00 
3/12/2010 MAS 150 2.2 $ 330.00 
Jl.ffJ f)~( A+lt; 
I 
PREPARE, REVISE AND EDIT PROPOSED AFFIDAVITS OF LORI 
THORNOCK, ROGER L STEPHENS, EVAN SKINNER; MEETING WITH M. 
SHAFFER RE: STRATEGY FOR THIRD PARTY CLAIM AGAINST TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, ETC 
CONFERENCE REGARDING DRAFT OF AFFIDAVITS; REVISE AFFIDAVIT 
FINALIZE AFFIDAVIT DRAFTS OF TITLE COMPANY, EVAN SKINNEH, 
DOROTHY JULIAN-RALLS AND SEND DRAFTS TO AFFIANTS 
RECEIVE AND REVIEW LISTING AGREEMENT AND OTHER 
DOCUMENTATION FROM RYAN OLSEN (BROKER); TELEPHONE 
CONFERENCES WITH BEAR LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR; RECEIVE AND 
HEVIEW FAXES FROM BEAR IAKE COUNTY ASSESSOH HEGAHDING 
PARCELS INVOLVED IN THANSACTION AND THEIH LOCATION; 
CONFERENCE REGAHDING ANSWEH AND AFFIDAVIT FHOM TITLE 
COMPANY 
HECEIVE AND HEVIEW EMAIL MESSAGE FHOM LORI THORNOCK; 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH LOH! THORNOCK REGAHDING TITLE 
COMMITMENT; REVISE DHAFT OF AFFIDAVIT OF LOHI THOHNOCK; 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH RYAN OLSEN (BHOKER); TELEPHONE 
CONFERENCE WITH EVAN SKINNEH REGAHDING LISTING AGREEMENT 
AND OTHEH DOCUMENTATION GIVEN TO POTENTIAL PURCHASERS; 
CONFERENCE HEGAHDING STATUS OF ANSWER AND STATUS OF 
AFFIDAVITS; HEVISE DHAFT OF AFFIDAVIT OF CLIENT; DHAFT LEDER 
CLIENT 
HEVIEW AFFIDAVIT OF DOHOTHY JULIAN. DHAFT EMAIL TO JULIAN 
HE: AFFIDAVIT AND ADDITIONAL LISTING INFOHMATION TO POSSIBLY 
INCLUDE IN AFFIDAVIT. HEVIEW AND HEVISE AFFIDAVIT OF LORI 
THOHNOCK AND THE ATIACHED EXHIBITS. DHAFT OF EMAIL MESSAGE 
TO LOH! THOHNOCK HE: TITLE COMMITMENT USED FOR CLOSING AND 
HEVISIONS TO THE AFFIDAVIT. REVIEW AFFIDAVIT OF EVAN SKINNER 
DHAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO EVAN SKINNER RE: PUHCHASE AND SALE 
AGHEEMENT. DHAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO JULIAN RE: PUHCHASE 
AND SALE AGHEEMENT. HECEIVE AND HEVIEW EMAIL MESSAGE FHOM 
LORI THOHNOCIC REVISE AFFIDAVIT OF LORI THORNOCK. DRAFT EMAIL 
MESSAGE TO LORI THRONOCK RE: AFFIDAVIT. TELEPHONE 
CONFERENCE WITH DOHOTHY JULIAN HE: AFFIDAVIT; CONFERENCE HE: 
AFFIDAVIT OF TITLE COMPANY AND POTENTIAL CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST 
TITLE COMPANY. TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL 
RE: DRAFT OF ANSWEH AND POSSIBILITY OF BlllNGING IN TITLE 
COMPANY AS A PARTY TO COMPLAINT. 
REVISE AFFIDAVIT OF DOROTHY JULIAN AND AHACH EXHIBITS; DHAFT 
EMAIL TO JULIAN RE: HEVISED AFFIDAVIT FOH 
HEVIEW. CONFERENCE HE: STATUS OF POSSIBLE CROSS CLAIM 
AGAINST TITLE COMPANY. DHAFT OF LElTER TO TITLE COMPANY RE: 
TENDER OF CLIENT'S DEFENSE. 
REVIEW AND HEVISE AND EDIT AFFIDAVITS OF L THOHNOCK; REALTORS 
JULIAN AND SKINNER; R STEPHENS; HEVISE AND EDIT LEITEH TO 
NOHTHEHN TITLE TEND EHi NG LITIGATION DEFENSE AND HEQUESTING 
INDEMNIFICATION OF STEP! !ENS 
DRAFT OF DISCLOSURE OF PROPOSED EXHIBITS AND WITNESSES; 
CONFERENCE RE: PHOPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF lAW 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT HE; HEVISIONS TO DHAFT OF 
AFFIDAVIT. HEVIEW AND HEV!SE DHAFT OF AFFIDAVIT. SEND REVISED 
AFFIDAVIT TO CLIENT 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH DOROTHY JULIAN HE: REVISIONS TO 
DRAFT OF AFFIDAVIT REVISE AFFIDAVIT AND EXtllBITS ACCORDING TO 
CONVERSATION WITH DOROTHY. 
CONTINUE HEVISION OF AFFIDAVIT OF DOROTHY JULIAN. DHAFT LEHER 
TO DOROTHY JULIAN HE: REVISIONS AND ADDITIONS TO AFFIDAVIT 
CONFEHENCE HE: STATUS OF DOCUMENTATION NEEDED FOR MOTION 
FOH SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
HECEJVE AND REVIEW NOTICE OF INTENT TO TAKE DEFAULT; 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL; TELEP! !ONE 
CONFERENCE WITH PAUL DAVIS OF NOHTHERN TITLE; DHAFT OF 
ANSWEH AND THIHD PAHTY COMPLAINT 
3/15/2010 RCB 205 1.6 $ 328.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH B BEARNSON RE: NOHTHERN TITLE 
THIHD PARTY COMPLAINT AND HEQUEST FOH INDEMNITY; HEVISE AND 
EDIT ANSWER AND TlllHD PAHTY COMPLAINT; PHEPAHE SUMMONS AND 
ACCEPTANCE OF SEHVICE; I.ETTER TO B BEARNSON RE: SAME; LETTER 
TOR STEPHENS RE: SAME AND STATUS REPORT 
3/15/2010 MAS 150 1.4 $ 210.00 CONTINUE DRAFT OF ANSWEH AND THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT; 
TELEPHONE CONFEREl~CE WITH BRAD BEARNSON RE: AFFIDAVITS; 
DRAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO BHAD BEARNSON RE: AFFIDAVITS 
3/16/2010 MAS 150 0.8 $ 120.00 CONFERENCE RE: DRAFT OF ANSWER AND THIRD PARTY COMPIAINT; 
FINALIZE DRAFT OF ANSWER AND THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT 
3/24/2010 RCB 205 0.2 $ 41.00 REVIEW AND RESPOND TOR BERSTON LETTEH AND ACCEPTANCE OF 
SERVICE; ANSWER REQUIHEMENT 
3/29/2010 MAS 150 0.1 $ 15.00 REVIEW ACCEPTANCE OF SERVICE FROM ATTORNEY FOR NOlffHERN 
TITLE; CONFERENCE RE: POSITION OF NORTHERN TITLE 
3/31/2010 MAS 150 2.2 $ 330.00 CONFERENCE RE: NORTHERN TITLE'S AGREEMENT TO TAKE OVER 
DEFENSE OF STEPHENS; CONFERENCE RE; STRATEGY AND DIRECTION 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DRAFT INDEMNIFICATION AND HOLD 
HARMLESS AGREEMENT 
3/31/2010 RCB 205 2.8 $ 574.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE Willi B. BENSON RE: TITLE COMPANY 
ASSUMPTION OF DEFENSE AND INDEMNITY; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
WITH AND LETTER TOR. STEPHENS RE: TITLE COMPANY INDEMNITY 
AGREEMENT AND ASSUMPTION OF DEFENSE COSTS; PREPARE 
PROPOSED NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR B. BEARNSON; PREPARE 
MOTION FOR LIMITED ADMISSION PRO HAC VICE; PREPARE NOTICE OF 
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF NORTI IERN TITLE; PREPARED AND 
PROPOSED INDEMNITY AGREEMENT; LETTER TO B. BEARNSON HE: SAME 
4/1/2010 MAS 150 0.1 $ 15.00 FINALIZE INDEMNIFICATION AND HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT 
4/6/2010 RCB 205 0.2 $ 41.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW B BEARNSON LETTER AND PROPOSED REVISION 
TO INDEMNITY AGREEMENT; LETTER TO B BEARNSON RE: SAME 
4/7 /2010 MAS 150 0.2 $ 30.00 CONFERENCE RE: INDEMNIFICATION AND HOLD HARMLESS AGHEEMENT 
AFFIDAVITS PHOVIDED IN SUPPORT OF POTENTIAL MOTION rDR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND NEED 10 SET UP DEPOSITION OF OPPOSING 
PARTY 
4/26/2010 MAS 150 0.1 $ 15.00 CONFERENCE RE: SUMMAf<Y JUDGMENT BRIEF AND DEPOSITION OF 
OPPOSING PARTY 
5/4/2010 MAS 150 2.5 $ 375.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW OHDER FOR SUBMISSION OF INFOHMATION FOH 
SCHEDULING ORDER; FINALIZE NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL; 
DRAFT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
5/5/2010 MAS 150 4 $ 600.00 CONTINUE DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING 
COUNSEL RE: SCHEDULING OPPOSING PARTY'S DEPOSITION 
5/6/2010 MAS 150 0.2 $ 30.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL RE: SCHEDULING 
FOR HEARING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; TELEPHONE 
CONFERENCE WITH OFFICE OF CO COUNSEL FOR AVAILABILITY FOR 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING DATE 
5/7 /2010 MAS 150 0.2 $ 30.00 REVIEW IDAHO STATUTORY LAW RE: MERGER INTO WARRANTY DEED 
5/10/2010 MAS 150 2.5 $ 375.00 REVIEW IDAllO CASE LAW RE: WARRANTY DEEDS AND THE MERGER 
DOCTRINE. RESEARCH RE: COVENANTS THAT MERGER INTO WARRANTY 
DEEDS AND APPLICABILITY OF DOCTHINE WHEN A MISTAKE EXISTS 
5/11/2010 MAS 150 0.4 $ 60.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH CO-COUNSEL RE: DEPOSITION OF 
OPPOSING PARTY AND RESPONSE TO POTENTIAL PARTIAL MOTION FOH 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING 
COUNSEL RE: DEPOSITION OF OPPOSING PARTY AND 
NON-APPLICABILITY OF MERGER DOCTRINE WHEN MISTAKE INVOLVED 
5/12/2010 MAS 150 0.8 $ 120.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL RE: ORDER FOR 
SUBMISSION OF SCllEDULING ORDER. RESEAHCH IDAHO CASE LAW RE: 
MISTAKE DOCTRINE AND BUHDEN OF PROOF FOR A MUTUAL MISTAKE OH 
Affd I 
A UNILATERAL MISTAKE. 
5/14/2010 MAS 150 0.5 $ 75.00 CONTINUE TO DEVELOP ARGUMENT FOR DHAFT OF MOTION f-OR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
5/17/2010 MAS 150 0.5 75.00 CONFERENCE HE: MOTION FOH SUMMAHY JUDGMENT AND DEPOSITION 
OF OPPOSING PARTY; REVIEW AND HEVISE DRAFT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
5/18/2010 MAS 150 1.1 $ 165.00 REVIEW IDAHO CASE LAW RE: MUTUAL MISTAKE BURDEN OF PROOF; 
CONTINUE DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
5/19/2010 MAS 150 0.2 $ 30.00 CONFERENCE RE: ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION FOR 
SCHEDULING ORDER; DRAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO OPPOSING COUNSEL 
RE: JOINT STATEMENT 
5/20/2010 MAS 150 1.5 $ 225.00 DHAFT OF MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT; REVIEW IDAHO CASE !AW RE: DOCTRINE OF MERGER AND 
MISTAKE DOCTRINE 
5/21/2010 MAS 150 1.1 $ 165.00 CONTINUE DRAFT OF MEMOHANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOH 
SUMMAHY JUDGMENT 
5/24/2010 MAS 150 0.4 $ 60.00 DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM OF SUMMAHY JUDGMENT 
5/28/2010 MAS 150 0.2 $ 30.00 HECEIVE AND REVIEW LETTER FROM OPPOSING COUNSEL REGARDING 
SCHEDULING OF DEPOSITION FOH OPPOSING PARTY; DRAFT EMAIL 
MESSAGE TO CO-COUNSEL HEGARDING SCHEDULING OF DEPOSITION 
6/1/2010 MAS 150 0.2 $ 30.00 CONFERENCE RE: MEMOHANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOH 
SUMMAHY JUDGMENT; HEVIEW IDAHO CASE LAW RE: BURDEN OF PROOF 
TO ESTABL!Sfl MUTUAL OR UNILATERAL MISTAKE OF LEGAL 
DESCHIPTION 
6/2/2010 MAS 150 0.1 $ 15.00 CONFERENCE HE: DEPOSITION OF OPPOSING PARTY; Dl~AFT EMAll 
MESSAGE TO MARY ANDREASEN HE: flESCHEDULING OF DEPOSITION OF 
OPPOSING PAflTY 
6/3/2010 MAS 150 0.5 $ 75 00 RECEIVE AND flEVIEW EMAIL MESSAGE FROM MARY ANDREASON RE: 
SCHEDULING OF DEPOSITION OF OPPOSING PARTY; TELEPHONE 
CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL HE: LOCATION OF DEPOSITIO 
DHAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO MAHY ANDREASON RE: LOCATION OF 
DEPOSITION; HEVIEW !DAI 10 DEPOSITION RULES RE: LOCI\ TION OF 
DEPOSITION; CONFERENCE RE: DEPOSITION LOCATION; DHAFT EMA 
MESSAGE TO MARY ANDHEASON HE: NOTICE OF DEPOSITION IN 
POCATELLO 
6/4/2010 MAS 150 0.5 $ 75.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL; RECEIVE AND 
REVIEW LEHEH FHOM OPPOSING COUNSEL HE: OPPOSING PAfffY'S 
DESIHE TO HOLD DEPOSITION AT OPPOSING COUNSEL'S OFFICE; DHAFT 
LETTER TO OPPOSING COUNSEL HE: I !OLDING DEPOSITION IN 
POCATELLO 
6/7 /2010 MAS 150 4.4 $ 660.00 CONFEHENCE RE: DEPOSITION LOCATION; FINALIZE LEITER TO 
OPPOSING COUNSEL; HEVIEW IDAHO CASE LAW RE: MISTAKE DOCTRINE 
CONTINUE DHAFT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPOHT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
6/8/2010 MAS 150 1.8 $ 270.00 MEMOHANDUM IN SUPPOHT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
6/9/2010 MAS 150 5.4 $ 810.00 REVIEW IDAHO CASE LAW HEGARDING REFORMATION OF WARHANTY 
DEED; DRAFT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMOHANDUM 
6/10/2010 MAS 150 2.8 $ 420.00 REVIEW IDAHO CASE LAW HEGAHDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
WHEN COUHT IS TllE TRIER Of FACT; DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
6/11/2010 MAS 150 0.2 $ 30.00 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPOHT OF MOTION FOR SUMMAflY JUDGMENT 
6/16/2010 MAS 150 0.4 $ 60.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCES WITH ROGER STEPHENS RE: DEPOSITION; 
TELEPllONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL RE: CUMMINGS'S 
HEQUEST TO HESCHEDULE THE DATE OF THE DEPOSITION; DRAFT EMAIL 
MESSAGE TO MARY ANDREASEN HE: RESCHEDULING OF DEPOSITION 
6/22/2010 MAS 150 CJ.1 $ 15.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCES WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL RE: DATE FOR 
DEPOSITION OF CUMMINGS; DHAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO MARY 
ANDREASEN HE: DEPOSITION 
6/23/2010 MAS 150 0.2 $ 30.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL RE: AGAIN 
MOVING DEPOSITION TO DIFFERENT DATE; TELEPllONE CONFERENCE 
WITH MAHY ANDHEASEN HE: POSSIBLE CHANGE OF DATE FOH 
DEPOSITION; TELEPllONE CONFERENCE WITll OPPOSING COUNSEL RE: 
FINAL SCHEDULING OF DEPOSITION 
6/28/2010 MAS 150 0.8 s 120.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL REGARDING 
SCHEDULING OF OPPOSING PARTY'S DEPOSITION; CONFERENCE 
REGARDING DOCUMENTS Tl IAT WILL BE USED FOR DEPOSITION AND 
OPPOSING PARTY'S REOUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
PHIOR TO DEPOSITION; RECEIVE AND REVIEW EMAIL MESSAGE FHOM 
SHAWN BAILEY HEGARDING RESCllEDULING OF Tl IE DEPOSITION; Df\AFT 
EMAIL MESSAGE TO SHAWN BAILEY 
6/29/2010 MAS 150 0.4 $ 60.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTEHHOGATOHIES 
AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION; DRAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO MARY 
ANDHEASON HEGARDING DISCOVEHY REQUESTS 
7 /1/2010 MAS 150 0.1 $ 15.00 CONFERENCE RE: HESCHEDULING OF CUMMINGS DEPOSITION AND 
PHODUCflON OF HECORDS 
7 /8/2010 MAS 150 1 $ 150.00 DHAFT OF ANSWERS TO FIHST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
7 /9/2010 MAS 150 1.1 $ 165.00 CONTINUE DRAFT OF ANSWERS TO OPPOSING PARTY'S 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
7 /12/2010 MAS 150 3.4 $ 510.00 DRAFT LETTER TO CLIENT REGARDING DISCOVERY REQUESTS; 
CONFERENCE REGARDING POTENTIAL EXHIBITS; DRAFT OF f\NSWERS 
TO INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
7 /13/2010 MAS 150 1.8 $ 270.00 ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES AND HEQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION 
7 /14/2010 MAS 150 3.5 $ 525.00 CONTINUE PREPARING ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFF'S INTERROGATOHIES 
AND REQUESTS FOR PHODUCTION 
7 /15/2010 MAS 150 2.5 $ 375.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT RE: ANSWERS AND RESPONSES 
TO DISCOVERY REQUESTS; FINALIZED DRAFT OF ANSWERS AND 
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATOHIES AND REQUESTS FOH PRODUCTION 
7 /19/2010 MAS 150 05 $ 75.00 FINALIZE EXHIBITS FOR DRAFT OF RESPONSE TO DISCOVERY 
REQUESTS; CONFERENCE REGARDING RESPONSE TO FIRST SET OF 
DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
7/21/2010 RCB 205 0.8 $ 164.00 PHEPARE, REVISE AND EDIT DEFENDANT STEPHENS RESPONSES TO 
PlAINTIFF'S INTERROGATOHIES AND REQUESTS FOH PRODUCTION; 
LETTER TO B. BERNSON WITH PHOPOSED DISCOVEHY RESPONSES; 
LETTER TOR. STEPHENS RE: SAME 
8/6/2010 RCB 205 0.6 $ 123.00 RECEIVE AND HEVIEW CUMMINS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMEN r, 
CUMMINS AFFIDAVIT, SUPPORTING BRIEF, NOTICE OF II EARING; 
RESEARCH RULE 56(F) HE: CONTINUANCE TO PERMIT CUMMINS 
DEPOSITION; LETTER TO B. BERNSON RE: CASE STATUS, STRATEGY 
8/6/2010 MAS 150 1.5 $ 225.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW OPPOSING PARTY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPOHT OF MOTION FOH SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, AND AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN CUMMINGS; CONFERENCE RE: 
MOTION TO CONTINUE SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING; DRAFT OF 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
8/9/2010 MAS 150 2.9 $ 435.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL RE: CONTINUING 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; CONFERENCE RE: STIPULATION TO 
CONTINUE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DRAFT OF MOTION TO 
CONTINUE AND STIPULATION TO CONTINUE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH CLIENT HE: MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEPOSITION; DR.MT OF PHOPOSED ORDER 
8/10/2010 MAS 150 1 $ 150.00 CONFERENCE HE: STIPUI ATION AND PROPOSED ORDER; REVISE RULE 
56(F) MOTION, STIPULATION, AND PROPOSED ORDER; DHAFT OF 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL; DRAFT LETTER TO OPPOSING COUNSEL 
8/ll/2010 RCB 205 1.2 s 246.00 REVISE AND EDIT FILE MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT HEARING, SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT, PROPOSED STIPULATION 
AND ORDER; LETTER TO B. BERNSON RE: SAME; LETTER TO B. OLSON 
WITH STIPULATION AND ORDEH; LETTER TOR. STEPHENS RE: CASE 
STATUS/STRATEGY 
8/11/2010 MAS 150 0.2 $ 30.00 CONFERENCE RE: CONTINUANCE OF HEARING DATE FOR PLAINTIFF'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH JUDGE 
NYE'S CLERK RE: POSSIBILITY OF flOLDING II EARING IN POCATELLO 
8/18/2010 MAS 150 0 2 $ 30.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL RE: SIGNING OF 
8/19/2010 RCB 205 
8/19/2010 MAS 150 
8/20/2010 RCB 205 
8/23/2010 RCB 205 
8i24/2010 RCB 205 
8/24/2010 MAS 150 
8/21 /2010 RCB 205 
8/27 /2010 MAS 150 
B/31/2010 MAS 150 
9/2/2010 MAS 150 
9/8/2010 MAS 150 
9/9/2010 RCB 205 
9/9/2010 MAS 150 
9/13/2010 MAS 150 
9/14/2010 MAS 150 
9/15/2010 MAS 150 
1.2 $ 
0.2 $ 
3.5 $ 
STIPULATION AND VERIFICATION OF DEPOSITION; CONFERENCE HE: 
DEPOSITION PREPAHATION 
246.00 REVIEW FILE; HECOHDS AND PREPAHE EXHIBITS FOF< CUMMINS 
DEPOSITION 
30.00 PHEPAHATION OF EXfllB!TS FOH DEPOSITION 
717.50 PREPARE EXHIBITS FOR CUMMINS DEPOSITION; PREPAHE FOH CUMMINGS 
DEPOSITION; RECEIVE AND REVIEW N. OLSON LETifR WITH 
OBJECTIONS TO DUCES TECUM DEPOSITION NOTICE; TELEPHONE 
CONFERENCE WITH B. BERNSON RE: DEPOSITION, ETC 
2.4 $ 492.00 PREPARE OUTLINE FOR CUMMINS DEPOSITION WITH EXHIBITS; HEVIEW 
HECONCILE DEPOSITION EXHIBITS, LEGAL DESCHIPTION AND TITLE 
COMMITMENT AND REPORT DISCREPANCIES 
1.4 $ 287.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH N. OLSON RE: RESPONDING TO 
0.6 $ 
CUMMINS DISCOVERY REQUESTS, HESCHEDULE OF CUMMINS 
DEPOSITION, SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING, ETC; PREPARE AMENDED 
NOTICE OF TAKING DEPOSITION; LETIEH TO JUDGE NYE WITll 
STIPULATION AND ORDER RESCHEDULING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
HEARING; LETTER TOR. STEPHENS RE: SAME; LEDER TO B. BEAR 
RE: SAME AND RECONCILIATION OF TITLE COMMITMENT 
DISCREPANCIES, SUMMARY JUDGMENT STATUS/STHATEGY 
90.00 CONFEHENCE RE: TITLE COMMITMENTS; CONFERENCE 
RE: DEPOSITION EXHIBITS 
0.6 $ 123.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW B. BERSON LETTER IN INFORMATION 
0.2 $ 
0.6 $ 
0.5 $ 
RECEIVE AND REVIEW 
PLAINTIFF CUMMINS PROPOSED SUBPOENA'S TO NORTHERN TITLE, EXIT 
REALTY; I.ETIER l 0 N. OLSON RE: NOHTHEHN TITLE, EXIT REALTY 
SUMMONS RESPONSE 
30.00 HECEIVE AND REVIEW EMAIL MESSAGES REGARDING SUBPOENA DUCES 
TECUM OF EXIT HEAL.TY AND NORTHERN TITLE; CONFERENCE 
REGARDING DOCUMENTATION RECEIVED FROM EXIT REALTY 
CONTAINING ALI. CONTENTS OF ITS FILE 
90.00 HEVISE DHAFT OF AFFIDAVIT OF LORI THORNOCK 
7S.OO REVISE AFFIDAVIT OF LORI THORNOCK; REVISE AFFIDAVIT OF DOR 
JULIAN 
3.2 $ 480.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH MARY ANDREASEN RE: AFFIDAVIT OF 
DOHOTHY JULIAN; RESPONSE TO MOTION FOFl SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, AND LOCATION OF DEPOSITION OF CUMMINGS; REVI 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOROTHY JULIAN; REVIEW CONTENTS OF CASE FILE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; HEARING ON MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DEPOSITION OF CUMMINGS; DRAFT EMAIL 
MESSAGE TO MARY ANDRAESEN; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH BRAD 
BEARNSON RE: REVISIONS TO AFFIDAVIT OF LORI HIORNOCK; 
CONFERENCE RE: REVISIONS TO AFFIDAVITS OF THORNOCK AND 
JULIAN; RECEIVE AND REVIEW COPY OF LORI Tl IORNOCK'S FILE 
0.3 $ 61.50 REVIEW, REVISE AND EDIT STEPHENS, JlJILIAN, THORNACK AFFIDAVIT 
2.6 $ 390.00 REVIEW COPIES OBTAINED FROM LORI THORNOCl<'S FILE; REVISE DRAFT 
OF AFFIDAVIT OF LORI THORNOCK, DRAFT OF AFFIDAVIT OF DOHOTHY 
JULIAN, AND DRAFT OF AFFIDAVIT OF HOGER STEPHENS; CONFEHENCE 
RE: AFFIDAVIT REVISIONS 
1.8 $ 270.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS FROM LORI 
TllORNOCK'S FILE AT NORTl-IERN TITLE; CONFERENCE RE: AFFIDAVIT 
AND CONTENT OF LOHI THORNOCK'S FILE; DHAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO 
BRAD BERNSON RE: QUESTIONS 
1.5 $ 225.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW COPY OF TITLE OFFICER'S FILE FHOM NORTH 
TITLE; DRAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO BRAD BEARNSON HE: QUESTIONS 
FROM REVIEW OF TITLE OFFICER'S FILE 
5.5 $ 825 00 RECEIVE AND HEVIEW EMAIL FHOM BRAD BEARNSON RE: RESPONSES 
BY LORI THORNOCK TO QUESTIONS; HEVISE AFFIDAVIT OF LORI 
THORNOCK; DRAFT AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA BAIRD; DRAFT AFFIDAVIT 
BETH TAFOYA; DRAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO BRAD BEARNSON RE: 
AFFIDAVITS; DRAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO BRAD BEAHNSON RE: 
9/16/2010 MAS 150 
9/17/2010 MAS 150 
9/20/2010 MAS 150 
9/20/2010 RCB 205 
9/21/2010 RCB 205 
9/21/2010 MAS 150 
9/22/2010 MAS 150 
9/23/2010 MAS 150 
9/24/2010 MAS 150 
9/27 /2010 RCB 205 
9/27 /2010 MAS 150 
9/28/2010 RCB 205 
9/28/2010 MAS 150 
9/29/2010 RCB 205 
9/29/2010 MAS 150 
9/30/2010 MAS 150 
0.5 $ 
PLAT MAPS; DHAFT MEMOHANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
75.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH BHAD BEAHNSON RE: REVISIONS TO 
LORI THOHNOCK'S AFFIDAVIT; TELEPHONE CONFEHENCE WITH 
DOROTHY JULIAN RE: AFFIDAVIT; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH B 
BEARNSON RE: TITLE COMMITMENTS; 
CONFERENCE HE: AFFIDAVITS Of NORTI IERN TIT! E EMPLOYEES: 
RECEIVE AND REVIEW EMAIL MESSAGES FROM BRAD BEARNSON AND 
MARY ANDREASEN 
4.4 $ 660.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH LORI THOHNOCK HE: AFFIDAVIT; DRAFT 
EMAIL MESSAGE TO BRAD BEAHNSON RE: AFFIDAVIT OF LORI 
THORNOCK; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH DOHOTHY JULIAN RE: 
AFFIDAVIT; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH BRAD BEARNSON; 
DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
1.1 $ 165.00 DRAFT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; TELEPHONE 
CONFERENCE WITH ROGER STE PH ENS RE: AFFIDAVIT; REVISE DHAFT 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 
CONFERENCE RE: MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; REVISE EXHIBITS TO AFFIDAVITS 
0.3 $ 61.50 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH R STEPHENS RE: REVISED AFFIDAVIT 
CUMMINS AFFIDAVIT; SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUES AND STHATEGY 
J .2 $ 246.00 PHEPARE AND REVISE AND EDIT STEPHENS SUMMARY JUDGMENT BRIE 
AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVITS; PREPARE TITLE COMPANY RECOHDS 
RESPONSE; CORRESPONDENCE RE: D JULIAN DEPOSITION 
2.8 $ 420.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW EMAIL MESSAGE FROM OPPOSING COUNSEL RE: 
PRODUCTION OF NOHTllERN TITLE'S DOCUMENTS; CONFERENCE HE: 
PRODUCTION OF NORTHERN TITLE'S DOCUMENTS; FINALIZE EXHIBITS TO 
ATTACH TO AFFIDAVITS; FINALIZE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 
DRAFT OF NOTICE OF HEARING FOR MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
2.5 $ 375.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW EMAIL MESSAGE FROM MARY ANDREASEN; 
2.2 $ 
0.2 $ 
7.5 $ 
7.2 $ 
330.00 
30.00 
1,537.50 
1,080.00 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WI! H MARY ANDREASEN; DRAFT EMAIL 
MESSAGE TO MARY; DRAFT OF RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA DUCES 
TECUM; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITll BRAD BEARNSON HE: 
RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM 
RECEIVE AND REVIEW CUMMING'S RECORDS PURSUANT TO TllE 
DEPOSITION REQUEST; PREPARE EXHIBITS FOR DEPOSITION 
REVIEW CUMMING'S PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS RE: EXHIBITS FOR 
DEPOSITION OF CUMMINGS 
PREPARE FOH AND TAKE PLAINTIFF STEVE CUMMINS DEPOSITION 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITll BRAD.BEARNSON RE: DEPOSITION; 
CONFERENCE PREPARING FOH DEPOSITION OF CUMMINGS; ATTEND 
DEPOSITION OF STEVEN CUMMINGS; CONFERENCE RE: TESTIMONY OF 
STEVEN CUMMINGS 
0.6 $ 123.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW B BERNSON NOTES RE: D JULIAN; L THOHNOCK 
0.1 $ 
0.4 $ 
0.2 $ 
0.4 $ 
INTEHVIEWS; LETTER TO B BERNSON RE: CUMMINS DEPOSITION 
SUMMARY; SUMMARY JUDGMENT ISSUES; EXHIBITS FORD JULIAN 
DEPOSITION 
15.00 CONFERENCE HE: FOLLOW UP WITfl DOROTllY JULIAN AND EVAN 
SKINNER AS TO TESTIMONY OF CUMMINGS 
82.00 PROVIDE EXHIBITS TO 8 BERNSON FORD JULIAN DEPOSITION; RECEIVE 
AND REVIEW EXIT REALTY DOCUMENT PRODUCTION; LETTER TO 8 
BERNSON RE: SAME 
30.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL RE: DELAY OF 
DUE DATES FOR RESPONSE AND REPLY MEMORANDA TO MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENTS; DRAFT EMAIL MESSAGE RE: DELAY IN 
MEMORANDA FILING SC11EDULE 
60.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW SUBPOENAED DOCUMENTS FROM EXIT REALlY; 
DRAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO OPPOSING COUNSEL RE: REVISED 
SCHEDULE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PLEADINGS TELEPHONE 
CONFERENCE WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL 
10/5/2010 MAS 150 
10/6/2010 MAS 150 
10/7/2010 MAS 150 
10/8/2010 MAS 150 
10/11/2010 MAS 150 
10/12/2010 MAS 150 
10/14/2010 MAS 150 
10/15/2010 RCB 205 
10/15/2010 MAS 150 
10/16/2010 MAS 150 
10/18/2010 MAS 150 
10/19/2010 RCB 205 
10/19/2010 MAS 150 
0.5 $ 
0.6 $ 
75.00 REVIEW CUM MING'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; REVIEW IDAllO CASE LAW CITED BY CUMMINGS; 
90.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH BRAD BEARNSON RE: SUBPOENA OF 
CLOSING FILE FOR FIRST AMERICAN TITLE; CONFEHEMCE RE; 
PHODUCTION OF FIHST AMERICAN TITLE CLOSING FILE; DRAFT EMAIL 
MESSAGE TO MARY ANDREASEN; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH 
ALLYN PHELPS RE: EXPERIENCES WITH CUMMINGS 
5.6 $ 840.00 HECEIVE AND HEVIEW EMAIL MESSAGES FROM BHAD BEAHNSON AND 
MARY ANDREASEN RE: CUMMING'S PRODUCTION OF JOURNAL, FIRST 
AMERICAN TITLE'S PRODUCTION OF CLOSING FILE, DEPOSITION OF 
DOROTHY JULIAN, AND RESPONSE AND REPLY MEMORANDA; DRAFT 
EMAIL MESSAGE TO BRAD BEARNSON AND MARY ANDREASEN; RECEIVE 
AND REVIEW DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT OF CUMMINGS; REVIEW 
CUMMING'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT; DRAFT OF RESPONSE TO CUM MING'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
6.S $ 975.00 REVIEW IDAHO CASE LAW RE: MERGER DOCTRINE AND BREACH OF 
COVENANTS OF TITLE; DRAFT OF RESPONSE TO CUM MING'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1.8 $ 270.00 FINALIZE DRAFT OF RESPONSE TO CUMMING'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
04 $ 
JUDGMENT; DRAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO RANDY AND BRAD BEARNSON 
RE: RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
60.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW EMAIL MESSAGE FROM BRAD BEARNSON 
REGARDING LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS ALLEGEDLY RELIED UPON BY 
CUMMINGS; DRAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO BRAD REGARDING LEGAL 
DESCRIPTIONS AND RESPONSE MEMORANDUM; CONFERENCE 
REGARDING FINAL CONTENT OF RESPONSE MEMORANDUM; FINALIZE 
RESPONSE MEMORANDUM TO CUM MING'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
3.6 $ 540.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW CUMMINGS'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION TO AMEND COMPlAINT, 
AND AFFIDAVIT OF NATHAN OLSEN; CONFERENCE RE: REPLY 
MEMORANDUM; DRAFT REPLY MEMORANDUM 
0.8 $ 164.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH N OLSON RE: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
HEARING AND REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION; CllANGE OF LOCATION; 
RECEIVE AND REVIEW CUMMINS REPLY BRIEF; MEETING WITH M 
SHAFFER RE: REPLY BRIEF ISSUES; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH 
JUDGE NYE OFFICE RE: FILING OF SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT TO 
INCLUDE DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPT; PROPOSED CANCELLATION OR 
MOVEMENT OF HEARING TO POCATELLO ETC 
6.2 $ 930.00 DRAFT OR REPLY MEMOHANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOH 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT; CONFERENCE REGARDING CUM MING'S MOTION 
TO AMEND; CONFERENCE REGARDING MERGER DOCTRINE AND 
RE-RECORDED WARRANTY DEED; TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH BEAR 
LAKE COUNTY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE REGARDING SELF-HELP TOOLS TO 
COMPARE LEGALS TO PLAT MAP; DRAFT EMAIL MESSAGE TO RANDY AND 
BRAD REGARDING CONVERSATION WITH COUNTY ASSESSOR'S OFFICE 
6.7 $ 1,005 00 REVIEW IDAHO CASE LAW AND STATUTORY LAW RE: ATTOHNEY FEES, 
WARRANTY DEEDS AND EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE; FINALIZE DRAFT OF 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPOHT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
04 $ 
JUDGMENT 
60.00 CONFERENCE RE: REPLY MEMORANDUM AND RESPONSE TO 
CUMMINGS'S MOTION TO AMEND; FINALIZE AND FILE REPLY 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMAHY JUDGMENT; 
TELEPHONE CONFEHENCE WITH ROGER STEPHENS RE: HEARING ON 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
2.5 $ 51250 REVIEW AFFIDAVITS, MULTIPLE BRIEFS AND PREPARE FOH SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT HEARING 
1.3 $ 195.00 RECEIVE AND REVIEW CUMMINGS'S REPLY MEMOHANDUM; 
CONFEHENCE HE: SUBPOENA TO FIRST AMERICAN EXCHANGE; 
PHEPARATION FOR HEAHING ON SUMMAHY JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
10/20/2010 RCB 205 6 $ 1,230.00 COURT HEARING (PARIS) ON JOINT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PLAINflFF'S MOTION TO AMEND WITH 1RAVEL TO/FHOM PARIS 
10/20/2010 MAS 150 0.6 c 90.00 CONFERENCE RE: HEARING ON MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND .,, 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; REVIEW IDAHO RULES RE: 
SUBPOENAS FOR INTERSTATE DISCOVERY; DRAFT OF SUBPOENA 
DUCES TECUM FOR FIRST AMERICAN EXCHANGE COMPANY 
10/21/2010 RCB 205 0.2 $ 41.00 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE WITH R STEPHENS WITH CASE STATUS 
REPORT ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, TRIAL PREPARATION, ETC 
10/21/2010 MAS 150 0.6 $ 90.00 REVIEW UTAH RULES RE: SUBPOENAS FOR INTERSTATE DISCOVERY; 
CONFERENCE RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUBPOENA 
Fees 223.3 
1/19/2010 RCB $ 58.00 FILING FEE· NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
3/17/2010 RCB $ 14.00 FILING FEE ANSWER AND Tl JIRD PARlY COMP IA INT 
4/27 /2010 RCB $ 58.00 FILING FEE NOTICE OF APPEARANCE OF CO·COUNSEL 
9/22/2010 RCB $ 15.30 POSTAGE 9/22 
9/23/2010 RCB $ 22.80 POST/,GE 9/17 - DOHOTHY JULIAN 
9/23/2010 HCB $ 33.44 POSTAGE 9/17 HOGER STEPHENS 
9/30/2010 HCB $ 19.97 POSTAGE 
9/30/2010 RCB $ 17.25 POSTAGE 
10/15/2010 HCB $ 7.65 POSTAGE 
10/21/2010 RCB 98.00 RT MILEAGE POCATtLLO-PARIS 10/20 - HCB 
Expenses 344.41 
Mark 
RACINE, 
BAILEY, CIIARTERED 
PD. Box 1391; 201 
Pocatello, Idaho 
Telephone: 
Facsimile: 208-232-6109 
rcb@racinelaw.net 
Brad I I. Bearnson 
Beamson & Peck, L.C. 
399 North Main, Ste 300 
Logan, Utah l 
Attorneys for Defendant 
& 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE 
STEVEN an individual ) 
residing in Montana, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
~- ) 
) 
J?DGER L STEPHENS, an individual ) 
residing in Providence, Utah, JOHN DOES ) 
I-X. ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF ) 
Case No. CV-09-183 
Ali'FIDA VIT OF BRAD H. A-A~• AA'' 
IN SUPPORT OF 
BRAD IL BEARNSON, being first duly sworn under oath deposes and states as follows: 
AFFllJA Vff OF BRAD H. BEARNSON IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNl~Y'S FF.ES AND COSTS Page I 
I 
1 United 
a 
to 
testify to the following, all of which are within own persom1l knowledge 
judgment. 
to 
or based 
3. in the practice of law May 5, 1 holding 
Utah State 03633 and a Martindale-Hubble AV@) PreeminenffM rating, and is a 
partner with the law firm of Bearnson & Peck, L.C. in Logan, Utah. A substantial portion of 
affiant's has involved commercial litigation. Affiant is familiar with the prevailing rate 
for attorneys in northern Utah area engaged in the similar practices. A usual and customary 
hourly rate in northern Utah for legal services this kind is in the range $135.00 to $245.00 
per hour, varying on experience. Affiant's current rate is hour for all 
performed. In this matter IJearnson & Peck billed Defendant at an hourly rate of $250.00 per 
hour for all work performed partners, $175.00 hour for all work associates, 
and hour all performed paralegals. 
4. During the period commencing March 15, 10 through 11, there 
has been a total of 86.30 hours of billed work expended on behalf of the De fondant, all of which 
was and reasonably incurred in pursuing the action against the above named 
Defendant, for total attorney fees of $16,636.25. The itemization of the work performed, time 
expended, and incurred through $356.53, is reflected in a copy of the Bearnson Peck 
Detail Transaction File List forth on a daily basis), a true and correct of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. and costs are 
summarized in the Memorandum of Costs filed herewith. 
5. Affiant has personal knowledge of the commencement and progress of the above-
captioned action, and, therefore, is familiar with the costs and incurred in this action by 
the Defendant. Further, affiant has reviewed the time and costs records of Bearnson & Peck 
maintained in the above~captioned matter, on bebalf of Defendant. Those time records represent 
items of costs and fees that were reasonably and in the defense of 
this action Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BRAD H. BEARNSON IN SUPPORT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS · Page 2 
6. 
1, 
lS to recover 
Idaho 
7. All costs attorney's 
costs to lerms 
m representation of Defendant in the action. To my 
knowledge and belief, these items of costs and fees are correct and hereby submitted in 
compliance with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FURTHER SAITH AFFIANT NAUGHT 
of January, 201 L 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this dfaci~ day of January, 2011. 
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J 
rnson 
Client Number NOR16 
Matter Number: NOR16-00J 
Matter 
Northern Title 
Dates Jncludell on Ol-Oi-1900 Tlm1 Ol-26 201 l 
Ticket# Date' T'keeper Description 
T'EES 
03/15/2010 mm Services Rendered 
3 03/15/2010 SPB Office conference with Brad 
research regarding scrivener's error in 
ldaho. 
2 03/16/2010 BIIB Services Rendered 
4 03/16/2010 SPB Conduct 
conference with client. 
5 03/23/2010 SPB Review handle 
of service. 
7 03/30/20] () BHB Services Rendered 
g 03/J 1/201 () MLA Services Rendered 
6 04/05/2010 mm Services Rendered 
9 04/05/2010 SPB Determine deadline on Answer. 
JO 04/06/2010 SPB Heview status: motion to dismiss 
being filed; no need to prepare 
Answer. 
11 04/30/2010 MLA Services Rendered 
12 05/12/2010 SPB Follow np order 
13 05/24/2010 SP!3 Review joint statement 
iJdlto l /2ti/20 l l 
1.5/l'M 
I of 5 
Em Ilardiman 
Time Spent Amount 
1.50 $375 00 
1.80 $315.00 
0.75 $187.50 
l () $367.50 
0.20 $] 5 ()() 
1.00 $250 00 
3.25 $211.25 
l 00 $250.00 
0.10 $17.50 
() 10 $17.50 
1.00 $65.00 
0 l 0 $17.50 
0 J () $17.50 
EXHIBIT 
~ \\1A 1( jj 
a 
rnson 
Client Number NOR16 
Matter Number: NOR! 6-00 I 
Matter 
Northern Tille 
v. 
Dates Included on 01-0 l -1900 Thrn 01-26 20 l I 
Ticket# Date' T' keeper Description 
14 05/28/20 I 0 SPB 
15 05/31/2010 MLA Services Rendered 
16 06/02/2010 SPB Schedule in Pocatello. 
17 06/03/2010 SPB Schedule 
18 06/28/201 () SPB Emails with co-connsel 
prepare for 
19 06/29/2010 SPB direct 
22 07 /26/20 I 0 SPB Review responses. 
23 07/29/2010 mm Legal Services Rendered 
25 07/30/2010 MLA Services Rendered 
26 08/06/20 IO SPB Review email surnrrniry 
motion. 
27 08/11/2010 SPB Review email from co-counsel 
review summary 
filed counsel. 
Time Spent 
0.10 
0.50 
0.10 
0.20 
0 50 
0.10 
0 20 
1.00 
0.10 
0.20 
I /)6/20 ! I 
lS/l'iVl 
2 of 5 
f Iardiman 
Amount 
$17.50 
$32.50 
$17.50 
$35.00 
$87 50 
$17.50 
$55.00 
$81.25 
$17.50 
$35.00 
Daile l/26/201 l 
iS/l'M 
PHe,e: 3 of 
Hardiman 
Bearnson 
Client Number NOR16 Northern Title 
Matter Number: NOR!6-00l V. 
Matter· 
Dates Included on Ol-Ol-J900 Thrn 01-26-201 l 
Ticket# Date' Time Amount 
39 08/l 8/20 IO l 00 $250.00 
31 08/26/2010 mm Services r<endered 1.50 $375 00 
41 08/31/20 l 0 MLA Services Rendered HlO $260.00 
38 09/08/2010 mm Services Rendered 2.50 $625.00 
37 09/14/20 I 0 mm Services Rendered 0.75 $187.50 
36 09/15/20 I 0 BIIB I.egal Rendered LOO $250.00 
35 09/16/2010 B!IB Services Reudered 6.00 $1,500 00 
34 09/20/20 l 0 BUB Services Rendered 2.00 $500 00 
33 09/22/20 I 0 BIIB Services Rendered $312.50 
32 09/27/2010 mm Services Rendered 8.00 $2,000.00 
40 09/30/2010 MLA Services Rendered 12.75 $828.75 
28 I 0/06/2010 BHB Services I<endered 3.50 $875.00 
29 l 0/06/20 l 0 mm Legal Services Rendered 3 50 $875.00 
30 10/08/2010 BIIB Services Rendered 6.00 $1,500.00 
tl2 l 0/08/20 I 0 BIIB Services Rendered 6.00 $1,500.00 
43 J0/12/2010 BIIB Services Rendered 1.50 $375 00 
44 l 0/2~)/20 l 0 MLA Services Rendered 6.25 $406 25 
45 11/30/2010 MLA Services Rendered 0 75 $tl8.75 
rnson 
Client Number NOR 16 
Matier Numtnr: NORl6-00I 
Matter 
Dates Included 011 OJ-OJ 1900 Thrn 01-26201 l 
Ticket# Date' 
46 
47 
48 
01/1 l/2011 
01/21/2011 
0 l /26/20 l l 
03/16/2010 
09/29/20 ]() 
l 0/12/2010 
10/18/20 l 0 
11/16/2010 
T'keeper Description 
BHB 
BHB 
MLA 
mm 
SPB 
MIA 
Services Rendered 
Services Rendered 
Services Rendered 
SUMMARY 
SUMMARY 
Billable 
Billable 
Bmable 
Time Ticket 
Hours & Fees. 
IIours & Fees. 
Hours & Fees. 
Misc. Fee Debits & Credi1s .. 
SOFT COSTS 
Research 
Professional Service 
Billable: 
Trial: 
Flat 
Non-Billable: 
No 
Misc No 
Total: 
Total: 
SubTotal: 
lzeport Dale: 
Time Spent 
2.75 
0.50 
2.50 
IJ2.30 
() 00 
0.00 
() 00 
() ()() 
0 ()() 
92.30 
53.75 
630 
32.25 
92.30 
l /26/2011 
l.Y7PM 
$1 
$1 
4 of 
Hardiman 
Amount 
$687.50 
$125 00 
$162.50 
$0.00 
$000 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$0.00 
$1 
$1,102.50 
$1,500.00 
$15,136.25 
$30.00 
$1.73 
$4 90 
$ti 90 
$315.00 
$356.53 
rnson 
Client Number NORl6 
Matter Number; NOR16·00l 
Matier 
Northern Title 
v. 
Dales Included on 0101 l900Thru01·26~20ll 
Ticket # Date' nescripJ ion 
FEES: 
HARD COSTS: 
SOFT COSTS: 
TAXES 
LATE CHARGES 
TOTALS 
Date of Last 
Date of Last Dill: 
Total Costs: 
Billed Amount 
$15, 116.25 
$0.00 
$1 
$0.00 
$337.01 
01/24/2011 
01/26/201 
Time Spent 
Amount 
$1 
$0.00 
$0 00 
$0.00 
-------------~-
$l0,408.75 
J /26/2011 
l.57PlV1 
5 of 
Hardiman 
Amount 
$3 56 53 
Amount Due 
$5,084 03 
$0.00 
$0 00 
$0 00 
$337 Ol 
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DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BEAR LAKE COUNTY IDAHO 
STEVEN CUMMINGS, an individual 
residing in Montana 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROGER L STEPHENS, an individual 
residing in Providence, Utah, JOIIN DOES 
I-X 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-09-183 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF ITS MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
Plaintiff, Steven Cummings, (Cummings), by and through counsel of record, 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA respectfully submits the following Memorandum in Support of 
the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
11 (a)(2)(B). The Memorandum is supported by the pleadings and affidavits previously 
"'v 
submitted to the Court, including the full deposition of Steven Cummings, and the affidavit 
of Nathan Olsen, which contains the deposition of Dorothy Julian and other evidence that 
was not previously before the Court. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court held in its January 4, 2011, Decision on Motion for Summary Judgment 
that the August 3, 2007, Warranty Deed, executed and recorded by the Defendant Roger 
in its Motion to 1 
'' 
was unambiguous it did not exclude property on 
east 4, 11, 
However, the Court held that there were no material disputed facts there was an 
alleged "unilateral mistake" hy Stephens which Cummings had knowledge of that 
warranted reformation of the deed. (Id. at .) 
Reformation of a contract based on unilateral mistake is extremely rare, and only 
justified when the other party has knowledge of the mistake and tries to take advantage of 
it. Thus, whether the deed should be reformed depends entirely on what "knowledge of the 
mistake" Cummings may have had which hinges only on the writings that Cummings 
reviewed prior to the sale and his brief interactions with Exit Realty agents Dorothy Julian 
(Julian) and Evan Skinner (Skinner) prior to the sale. The Court chose to set aside the 
vvritings reviewed by Cummings and rely solely on oral representations of Evan'"""'"~' 
and Dorothy Julian (even though was instrncted in writing not to rely on such 
representations.) Under the record that was before the Court, Cummings' testimony is 
inapposite and in direct contradiction to the sworn statements of Skinner and Julian m 
itself at the very least creating material 
judgment for Stephens. 
of fact that do not warrant summary 
Further, when the Court made its decision, it did not have the full testimony of 
Dorothy Julian and that doubt on the credibility both Ms. 
Julian and Mr. Skinner. Moreover, there is strong evidence suggesting that after 
Cummings brought this matter to the attention of Stephens, that certain documents were 
tampered with to misrepresent what actually occurred. These additional facts should shed 
in its Motion to 2 
additional light very a reconsideration of s 
In Idaho, to reconsider are authorized Rule 11 
Rules of Civil Procedure. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 1 l(a)(2)(B) (2010). 
the Idaho 
Rule provides that "a 
motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any 
time the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen ( 14) days after the entry 
of the final judgment." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Rule 
1 l(a)(2)(B) provides a district court with authority to reconsider and vacate interlocutory 
orders so long as a final judgment has not been entered. Telford v. Neibaur, 130 Idaho 932, 
950 P.2d 1271 (1998). The case law applying Rule ll(a)(2)(B) permits a party to present 
new evidence when a motion is brought under that rule, but does not require that the 
motion be accompanied by new evidence. Johnson v. Lambros, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Idaho 
2006). It is own interlocutory 
for facial errors or errors law. Id. 
burden is on the moving party to "draw to the court's attention any new 
evidence that the movant relying upon." Id. "Indeed, the chief of a 
reconsideration is to obtain a full and complete presentation of all available facts, so that 
the truth may be ascertained, and justice done, as nearly as may be." d'Alene 
Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of N Idaho, 118 Idaho 81 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 
(1990). 
In Idaho, a unilateral mistake is not ordinarily grounds for relief for the mistaken 
party. ~Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. v. Wood By-Products, 107 Idaho 1 1 
in its Motion to 
Ct. 
3 
on rare has a 
1 Idaho 
is warranted only when the unilateral mistake is "coupled with actual or equitable fraud" by 
the other party. 0 'Connor v. Harger Construction, Inc. 145 Idaho 904, 910 (2008)(q'ting 
the Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.) When unilateral mistake is alleged, extrinsic 
evidence may be admissible to show the intent of the parties. Belk v. Martin, 136 ldaho at 
598 A party's intent can be settled as a mater of law using the plain language of the 
document. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399 (2008) 
As with mutual mistake, the burden of proving unilateral mistake as a justification 
for reformation is on the person alleging the mistake by clear and satisfa.ctory evidence. 
Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wood By-Products, 107 Idaho at 1027. The court should 
not grant the equitable remedy of reformation upon a probability or upon a mere 
preponderance of proof, but only upon certainty of error. Kincaid v. Baker, 66 Wn.2d 
1 (Wash. 1965) The evidence to sustain reformation must be 
convincing. Id. Absent a mutual mistake or a unilateral mistake coupled with fraud, shown 
by clear and convincing evidence, reformation is not warranted. ANNIE BEATRICE 
VICKERS, Personal Representative of the Estate of DELANSO JOHNSON v. ST JOHN 
HOSP. & JOHN E. BOCCACCIO, 1998 Mich. 
1998). 
1 
It is recognized that when the motion for summary judgment, the court 
must draw all facts and inferences in favor of non-moving party. G & M Farms v. Funk 
Irrigation 119 Idaho at 517; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 1 Idaho 872, 87 4 
in of its Motion to 4 
Haessley v. Title Co. of Idaho, 1 1 Idaho 463 (Idaho 1 
the of establishing 
Idaho (Idaho 1 must 
establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the elements challenged by the moving 
party's motion. Olsen v. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720 (Idaho 1990) (citing 
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)); see also Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho J 01, 102 
(Idaho 1988). 
Thus, in order to justify the reformation the deed on unilateral mistake in a 
summary judgment motion, the court must find in viewing all facts and inferences in favor 
of the non-moving party Cummings that there is no material fact that Stephens has proven 
with and convincing evidence that Cummings knew and took advantage a 
unilateral 
In his argument, a number of alleged facts emanating from 
individuals and communications that did not involve Cmnmings, or did not occur 
contemporaneously with 
Court appeared to 
fonnation of the contract. generally the pleadings.) 
these have no relevance as to whether the deed was 
ambiguous, or whether there was mutual mistake, but may have some relevance as to 
the on this turns on 
Cummings' supposed "knowledge" of intentions of the agreement, which would depend on 
1) the writings that Cummings reviewed prior to the sale and his interactions with 
Stephens' agents from Realty. 
in of its l\1otion to 5 
) 
mistake not warrant reformation of the deed unless 
'"""'''"A·" that Cummings had knowledge of and took 
advantage of a mistake in the contract that did not reflect the intent of the parties. (Mutual 
o.f'Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Wood By-Products, 107 Idaho at 1026 and other authorities cited 
infra.) Indicative of the high standard of proof necessary to reform a contract based on 
unilateral mistake are the of the Belk case relied upon by the Court in its decision. 
Belk v. A:fartin, 136 Idaho 652 (2001) In Belk, the party taking advantage of the mistake 
(Martin) "testified that he realized that the rental provision in the lease was different that 
the parties had agreed upon." Id. at 658. This was essentially an outright admission that 
there was a mistake that Martin remained silent about, and thus took advantage of a 1,000°/.1 
reduction in rent. Id. In this case, Stephens has failed to even come close to providing clear 
and convincing of an admission by Cummings that was aware any mistake. 
Instead, the facts suggest opposite. 
I. The facts alleged by Stephens through his agent Skinner and Cummings are 
clearly in dispute. 
The Court held that the writings in this case unambiguously include parcels from 
both sides of HWY 30 (Jan. 4, at but shifts focus on the verbal 
representations of 
acknowledges that there are disputed facts between Cummings and Dorothy Julian's 
testimony. (Id. at 19, 22) It instead rests its decision to reform the deed on "inferences" that 
it has drawn from the deposition of Cummings affidavit of Exit Realty agent Evan Skinner 
(Skinner) to suggest that Cummings "knew" that there was an alleged mistake in the deed. 
(Id.) In reality, the stark differences between Cummings and Skinner's allegations are not 
merely "inferences" but are factual. 
in of its Motion to 6 
Cummings unequivocally in his deposition that was shown the 
on some 
that had previously deeded to the seller's son. (Cummings Dep. At 63 and 
64.) Cummings further testified that Skinner indicated to him that the purchase included 
acreage on both sides of HWY 30 (excluding the acreage deeded to the son), and further 
that the east side property contained CRP income that immediately attracted Cummings. 
(Cummings Dep. at p. 65, Ins 1 p. 66, lns. l ) Cummings also testified that he was 
told that total acreage he was purchasing was between 360 to 369 acres. (Cummings 
Dep. p. 89, lns. 5-8) Cummings further testified that he was not given or shm:vn any map 
by Skinner of the property he was purchasing by Skinner prior to closing. (Cummings at p. 
96, lns. 9-17, 97 lns. 1-17) Cummings again emphatically reiterates at the end of his 
deposition that Stephens Ranch on both sides HWY 30 was "what I knew I was 
purchasing" and that "there was absolutely no exclusions brought to my attention other 
than a piece of property that had been deeded to the son." (Cummings Dep. p. 140. Ins. 3-
7.) Finally, any question about Cummings' testimony with regard to what was represented 
by Skinner about the east side of the highway should be put to rest by the following 
exchange in his deposition: 
Q. Just sum up all of the reasons that you in your mind thought you were buying 
property on the east side of the highway? 
A. Right out the 
Stephens ranch 
that's what it was represented to be. I though I was buying the 
Q. By Mr. Skinner? 
A. Absolutely. I never thought different. 
(Cummings Dep. p. 91, Ins 13) 
in its Motion to 7 
I 
Skinner's mere Yi material to 
on 
occasions that the property that was for sale included only the west side of the property, 
heavily disputed by Cummings. (Skinner Aff. 8, 13) Skinner also indicates that the acreage 
consisted of approximately 270 acres, as opposed to 360-369 acres as alleged by 
Cummings. (Id. at 13) 
denies. (Id.) 
also claims that he showed Cummings a map, which Cummings 
In its decision, the Court makes an observation to try and reconcile the testimony of 
Cummings and Skinner: "At no time does Cummings deny that Skinner said the sale was 
limited to property west of the highway." (Jan. 4, 2011, Decision at 23) While Cummings 
may have never directly "denied" what "Skinner said," it is not because Cummings' silence 
is an admission that Skinner made such statements - it is because at no point in Cummings' 
deposition was he corifronted with or questioned about Skinner's alleged statements. 
Stephens' attorney simply did not bring Skinners' testimony up in the deposition. 
Cummings' affidavit was submitted to the Court prior to Skinners' affidavit, so naturally, 
Cummings would not directly refuted Skinners' statements in that affidavit as 
Cummings cannot "deny" what he has not been asked to deny or what he has not even 
seen. Thus, the Court should not rest its decision based on a "lack of denial," but rather 
the facts themselves which are clearly in conflict. 
At the very least, the record before the Court was incomplete and lacked sufficient 
information to be able to make a determination - especially considering that it has heard no 
direct testimony from Cummings and no oral testimony from Skinner. On this basis alone, 
especially considering high evidentiary burden, the Court should allow for a full 
its Motion to 8 
and consideration the facts making decision on 
as to to 
What tends to be overlooked in this case is that Cummings was purchasing the 
interest of "Three Bar Ranches." Interestingly, both Julian's and Skinner's testimony are 
silent as to what was directly represented to Three Bar Ranches. The principal for Three 
Bar Ranches is Curtis Baum. Mr. Baum has signed a sworn affidavit that again contrndicts 
the allegations of Julian and Skinner, but instead supports Cummings. (See Baum Aff., 
attached as 1 to Olsen Aff.) This affidavit was not previously submitted to the Court 
because Cummings believed that the merger doctrine made such statements irrelevant. 
(Although the Baum affidavit which was signed in July of2008 was sent to Stephens' 
attorney about that time.) However, now that the Court has considered unilateral mistake as 
a basis for reformation, the and intent of the original buyer oec~o111es relevant 
Mr. Baum directly contradicts Skinner, in testifying that prior to entering into the 
agreement that 
parcels on both sides of Highway 30." (Baum Aff. at 5) Baum further indicates that he 
"confirmed and location of the property with the Department of Agriculture's Soil 
and Water Conservation district office located in Montpelier, Idaho." (Id.) Baurn's 
testimony the Court with disputed material facts, warranting a 
reconsideration of its ruling. 
III. The written terms are in direct dispute of the oral representations of the 
agents. 
Although Stephens claims that the written documents contained errors, the Court 
should not automatically dismiss the writings in determining the intent of the 
Motion to 9 
particularly Cummings' intent. As noted in Belk when unilateral mistake is alleged as a 
to 
the parties." (emphasis added.) Belk at 598. A party's intent can be determined according 
to the plain terms or words of the writing. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399 (2008). 
Thus, in assessing intent, in particular Cummings' intent, the Court should consider 
the plain terms of the writings that Cummings reviewed prior to closing the sale. At 
several points during his deposition, Cummings emphasized that his approach to 
purchasing real estate has always been to look to the writings to determine intent of the 
agreement, and in particular the boundaries of the property. (Cummings Dep. pp. 94, 
101, 1 139, 140) Further, because Cummings was purchasing the interests of Three Bar 
the writings became especially important - which is why insisted that Exit 
Realty fax him the Bar Ranches purchase and sale 
commitment (all of which were prepared by Stephens and his~"''""'"""' 
(PSA) and title 
These documents 
U\.A;UHlv the primary factor in determining just exactly what Cummings was willing to pay 
$850,000 to purchase. 
acknowledged by the Court, the PSA and the title commitment that was 
delivered to Cummings contained no exclusionary language. This was a confirmation to 
Cummings that he was purchasing Stephens Ranch on both sides of HWY 30, which fit 
well into his plan and which would eventually provide him some CRP fund to 
cover taxes. The \Vritten agreements described exactly what Cummings intended. 
In addition, the Court should note that Skinner indicates in his affidavit that he 
advised Cummings to "verify the square footage or acreage through any independent 
sources or means deemed appropriate by Buyer" and further that he "was not to on 
its Motion to R 
the Company or an of the Company regarding the square footage or acreage 
9 
at 1 Thus, even Stephens' Cummings not to rely on his or his agents' 
representations, but rather writing 
This dependence on the writing as opposed to any oral representations about 
property description is universal and hard line practice in real estate transaction. Typically, 
these disclaimers are used to protect the real estate agents from future accusations from 
buyers who want to alter the terms of the writing based on oral representations of agents. 
There is no doubt that if Cummings were attempting to change the written terms of the 
agreement based on oral representations of the agents, that Stephens would holding up 
the disclaimer as a justification not to alter the written terms. But such disclaimer should 
also protect buyers as well, who simply want to uphold the written agreement. Stephens 
should not be utilizing the disclaimer as both a shield and a sword. If it protects Stephens 
from attempts from buyers that try to alter the terms of an agreement, it should protect 
Cummings from sellers attempting to do the same. 
IV. Stephens' agents lack credibility. 
In its decision, the Court determined that there was a "clear factual dispute" as to 
whether there was "mutual mistake," finding that the testimony of the individuals differed 
and that "the dispute will tum on the credibility of the witnesses." (Jan. 2010, Decision 
at 20) There should be no reason why the same approach would apply in the analysis 
whether there was "unilateral mistake" and, in fact, should be more relevant because of the 
fraudulent attributes that are associated with reformation under unilateral mistake (i.e. the 
allegation that Cummings knew there was a mistake, but purposefully took advantage of it.) 
in Motion to 11 
Both in briefing and in oral argwnent, there is at least an insinuation that 
lS is simply to of a 
an accusation that Cummings and his family finds to be upsetting and repulsive. There is 
simply no evidence to suggest that Cummings has not been truthful or even inconsistent in 
his testimony. 
On the other hand, at trial Cummings would offer substantial evidence that the more 
viable explanation for the stark difference in testimony is that Stephens' ~"'~.,,.., were at best 
negligent in how they handled this transaction on behalf of Stephens, and also pressed 
Cummings into completing the transaction in an extremely short period of time whkh 
included not making critical disclosures that might have dissuaded Cummings from 
proceeding with the sale. There is also further troubling evidence that Stephens' agents 
have colluded to cover up their failures, thrusting their mistake back on Cummings. 
The Court did not have the full record to review when it made its decision. After 
the briefs were due for the respective summary judgment motions, the deposition of 
Dorothy Julian was taken. In addition, Cummings subpoenad the records of Northern Title 
Company and Exit Realty. (Neither side brought this additional evidence to attention of 
Court, fully expecting that at the very least there would be material disputes of fact that 
would cause this matter to go to triaL In fact, there were discussions about additional 
depositions, 
judgment) 
Even Skinner, Roger Stephens, pending the Court's decision on summary 
Additional evidence is now provided to the Court in support of tfos motion for 
reconsideration, as it relates to the credibility of Stephens' agents. This includes the 
deposition transcript of Dorothy Julian, key letters and documents that appeared in 
Motion to 12 
Northern Realty's records. (Olsen and The Court should find 
to 
Stephens' agents, including but not limited to the following: 
1. There are major discrepencies between the testimony of Dorothy Julian and 
Evan Skinner. For instance, Julian claims that she is the one who showed 
Cummings the residence on the property, not Skinner. (Julian Dep. p. 64, 
Ins. 16-21.) However, Skinner indicates that he was the one who showed 
Cummings the residence. (Skinner Dep. at 7, see also, June 8, 2008, 
Skinner Letter, Julian Dep. Ex. 29) 
3. 
Dorothy Julian further claims that at one point Skinner drove Cummings 
and her around the property in Skinner's truck. (Julian Dep. p. 22 lns. 1-18) 
Again this is inconsistent with Skinner's testimony, who said that "he" 
showed Cummings the property and the map, etc. (Skinner Aff. at 7, 13. 
also June 8, 2008, Skinner Letter) 
The Northern Title file contained a letter was \Vritten in June of 2008 
from Dorothy Julian (which she confirmed in deposition) describing her 
involvement with the transaction. This letter contains a major contradiction 
with her ovvn Affidavit and testimony, in that it states that she directed 
Cummings to meet with Evan Skinner who would show him the 
rather than her. Inconsistent with her deposition and affidavit more than a 
year later than her June, 2008, letter, there is no suggestion in her own letter 
whatsoever that she showed Cummings the property (Julian Aff 
58-60.) 
of its Motion to 
28, pp. 
13 
5. 
6. 
Title a letter from Evan Skinner June 
that is one 
property, rather than Julian, and further states that "Dorothy Julian has 
discussed this matter with me and she agrees how things happened." (June 
8, 2008, Skinner Letter, Julian Dep. Ex. 29) The Skinner letter also indicates 
that he was aware that Roger Stephens had showed Cummings around the 
property (which occurred months after the transaction was completed) 
suggesting that there was after-the-fact collusion occurring with Stephens. 
(Id.) 
Julian testified that she had little or no involvement with Three Bar 
Ranches transaction, in that it was handled almost entirely by Evan Skinner. 
(Julian Dep. pp. 50-52.) In fact, Skinner is the one who prepared and 
negotiated the Three Bar Ranches contract which was ultimately 
purchased by Cummings. (Id. also p. lns 16-25, p. 28 Ins. 1 
Thus, Julian would have little or no knowledge about what was 
to Three Bar Ranches. 
It is readily apparent in considering all facts and testimony that Ms. 
Julian truly had little or no involvementwith the Stephens Ranch 
transaction, other than as the listing agent. Skinner was the primary agent 
who dealt with potential buyers of the ranch. Why Stephens is attempting 
to prop Julian up as the primary agent in the transaction with Cummings 
rather than Skinner is in itself worth further examination by the Court. 
its Motion to 14 
7. $3,000 earnest money check that the original buyer Three Bar Ranches 
was for insufficient (Julian 
Realty agents failed to inform Cummings of this critical 
development, which could have saved Cummings $50,000 in the purchase 
of Three Bar Ranches interest. Jn fact, Cummings had been told that the 
buyers were "heirs of the Flying J fortune." (Cummings Dep. p. 52 Ins. 1 
1 7) It is also an indication of the urgency at which Exit Realty wanted to 
move this transaction, at the expense of full disclosure .. 
8. Cummings was given the "ultimatum" that if the transaction was not closed 
9. 
in three that the "deal would not go through." (Cummings Dep. p. 
Ins. 11-15.) Skinner created a sense of urgency that simply did not but 
prevented Cummings from performing additional diligence and/or from 
pursuing other opportunities. 
Julian represents in deposition and in affidavit that at her very first 
meeting with Stephens that the property listed was only going to include the 
west side. However, the listing agreement - which she confirmed in her 
deposition is for the Stephens Ranch on both sides of H\VY 30. 
(Julian Dep. pp. .) (The Court will note that "Parcel A" which 
contains the east property is not excluded in the listing agreement, and 
that further, the listing agreement states that it is for the "Stephens Ranch" 
with no exclusions limiting the property to the west side HWY 30.) 
10. In her deposition, Julian indicated that any records or documents involving a 
transaction with Exit Realty were kept in the files at Exit Realty. (Julian 
Motion to 15 
Ins. 1 p. 1-15 .) In her affidavit, Julian to a 
sale and was given to Cummings. (Julian Dep. p. 16, 1 Julian 
Aff 14, Ex. 3) mentioned previously, Cummings denies ever receiving 
such a map. Cummings' position is confim1ed by Exit Realty's file, which 
contained no such map (a fact that was stipulated in Julian's deposition) 
Julian Dep. p. Ins. 15.) 
11. Julian claims that the title commitment contained a map with arrows 
designating what parcels of the property were for sale. However, by her 
own admission, the faxed title commitment that she directed to be sent to 
Cummings does not contain any such map. (Julian Dep. pp. 26-27. The 
Court should note that Exhibits 19 and were the sent to Cummings 
containing the title commitment with no map with arrows.) In addition, 
this map did not appear in the closing packet that Cummings received in 
August of 2007. (See Cummings Dep. Ex.17 which contains the closing 
packet sent to Cummings.) Cummings did not first become aware of this 
map with the arrows until it was sent to him as part of the title policy 
April of 2008 (after Northern Title unilaterally recorded a deed excluding all 
of the east property). 
12. As confirmed by the fax headers, the title commitment that was faxed to 
Cummings on July 27, 2007, containing no exclusionary language and no 
map, originated from Northern Title. Cummings Aff 19 and 20) 
However, both the affidavits of Lori Thornock and Dorothy Julian claim 
in of its Motion to 
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that there are two additional title commitments (with the same Order 
were ever to 
Cummings. In addition, neither affidavit makes any reference to the 
with no exclusionary agreement (It is as if it never existed). Further, the 
warranty deed and title commitment that was prepared still included the east 
side property that was still a part of Stephens ranch. Cummings will present 
expert testimony at trial of how Julian's and Thornock's alleged conduct is 
completely outside the duties and normal activities of escrow agents and 
real tors. 
13. An internal e-mail by Northern Title official Jay Davis found in the 
Northern Title's file admits that there is nothing "in writing from Mr. 
Cummings to change the legal from the way it was attached to the PSA" 
stating further that this was "the most important" fact (See June 18, 2008, 
E-mail, Olsen Aff Ex. 3) Given their duties to disclose everything relevant 
to the transaction, it is inexplicable why neither Julian or Thornock 
disclosed to Cummings the major deviation from the PSA and the title 
commitment to add exclusionary language that effectively eliminates all the 
property on the east side of the highway. (It would make more sense, 
however, if exclusionary language was added to eliminate property not 
owned by the seller. By Stephens' counsel ovvn admission, the exclusionary 
language as it appeared below "Parcel A" in the title description that was 
recorded on August 2007, did just that. It simply eliminated property not 
owned by Stephens, and conveyed to Cummings the east side parcel that 
its Motion to 17 
was with what was the 
purchase agreement In case, should 
have been disclosed to Cummings.) 
14. There are several strong indications that some parties involved in the 
transaction colluded to cover their mistakes by trying to fabricate facts that 
somehow shift their error to Cummings. It is apparent there were several 
communications and meetings between the parties in June of 2008, after 
Cummings sent his demand letters and in fact, the title company, seller 
and realtor have since collaborated in their defense. (In fact, Stephens 
attorney has admitted that Northern Title is paying for Stephens defense and 
has also involved Northern Title's attorney, Brad Bearnson as a part of the 
defense. The subpoena that was directly issued to Northern Title was 
answered by Stephens' attorney this notwithstanding the fact that 
Cwnmings purchased an owner's policy from Northern Title and Northern 
Title acted as the closing agent for the transaction with duties to 
Cummings.) Below are several problematic facts suggesting a cover-up: 
a. In response to a demand letter to Stephens, in June of 2008, Stephens' 
attorney, Randy Budge, sent an alleged copy of the PSA with a legal 
description that is different than what was faxed to Cummings prior to 
the sale and what appeared in Exit Realty's files. (See Cummings Dep. 
Ex. 3, 19-20, Olsen Aff. 4. A complete copy of Olsen and 
Budge's June and July 2008 correspondence is included as a part 
Cummings Dep. 17.) alleged addendum to the PSA containing 
in of its Motion to 18 
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legal description sent by Budge in July, 2008, contains exception 
language to Parcel whereas PSA addendum with the 
description sent to Cummings in July Of 2007 before the sale closed - as 
confirmed by the fax headers - does not (If the Court carefully reviews 
the documents, before and after the fact, it will find that the documents 
were manipulated to suggest that Cummings had received writings with 
exclusionary language. This is a blatant recreation of the facts that is 
proven by the fax headers which show exactly when and where 
Cummings received the documents.) 
b. The title policy was not sent to Cummings until more than eight months 
after the transaction closed. (Cummings Dep. Ex. 1 The policy 
contained exclusionary language on the legal description not included in 
the purchase and sale agreement or the title commitment. At no point 
was Cummings ever informed by Northern Title about changes to the 
deed. However, it is readily apparent that there was discussion 
occurring between Stephens, Northern Title, the realtors, county 
officials, etc ... that Cummings was never infoi:rned of. 
c. More than month after the transaction closed, Cummings received an 
extraordinary visit from Stephens, who was attempting after the fact to 
re-define the boundaries of the property. Shortly after that visit, the 
deed was unilaterally altered to exclude all of the acreage east of HWY 
30. 
to 
d. nor to the lS a 
addition, neither Stephens nor Thornock disclosed to the Court whether 
the county assessor, Mr. Thornock, who allegedly "alerted" Stephens of 
an error, is also related to Lori Thornock. 
It is difficult to fully describe all of the facts and issues that question the credibility 
and motives of Stephens and his agents in a brief. However, the above should at least 
demonstrate to the Court that there are at least disputed facts as to whether Cummings 
"took advantage" of Stephens, or rather this was simply a failure of Stephens' agents that 
they are now trying to whitewash. 
It is also a testament to why the law emphasizes that the terms agreements be 
merged into the writing. After a transaction is completed, both buyer and seller should have 
the peace of mind to rely on the written agreement and not to worry about such agreements 
being altered after the fact because of oral representations or other parol evidence. It is 
why realtors have a statutory and ethical duty to fully disclose anything and everything that 
may be relevant to the transaction, which simply did not happen in this case. To that end, 
Cummings urges the Court to not only reconsider its ruling in favor of summary judgment 
for Stephens, but simply enforce the unambiguous August 3, 2007, Warranty Deed. There 
is simply nothing in the record that could constitute an admission by Cummings that he 
intended to purchase only the west side property, or anything different than what was in 
purchase and sale agreement and the title commitment Cummings is entitled to what 
bargained for. 
its Motion to 
Thus there is no mutual mistake or unilateral mistake with knowledge that would 
the not 
the true c1aims this case not be between Cummings and Stephens, but rather with 
Stephens and his own agents. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the foregoing, there are at least clearly issues of material fact with 
regard to whether unilateral mistake justifies reformation of the deed. Moreover, there is 
nothing in the record that directly suggests Cummings had "knowledge" of an alleged 
mistake with the deed. The Court should reconsider its decision whether the unambiguous 
deed should be set aside. At the very least, this matter should proceed to trial. 
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